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The Work of the Louisiana Supreme
Court for the 1938-1939 Term*
This year's symposium covers the work of the Supreme Court
of Louisiana during the judicial term which has just been completed-from October 1938 to September 1939. As in last year's
survey 1 the object is to examine the activities of our highest
appellate court and to give a panoramic topical consideration of
the cases decided.

I. STATISTICAL SURVEY
During the 1938-1939 term, 464 cases2 were filed in the Supreme Court docket. Two hundred and thirty-two, or 50% of the
cases, were applications for supervisory writs and writs of certiorari or review to the Courts of Appeal, of which 171 were either
granted or refused (see Tables VII, VIII).3 On the other hand,
242 cases were decided in written opinions. 4 This makes a total
of 413 cases actually disposed of by the Supreme Court (excluding applications for rehearings) or 89% of the total number of
cases docketed from October 3, 1938 to September 29, 1939.5 In
addition, a total of 150 applications for rehearing were filed,6

although rehearings were granted in only 11 instances (see Table
VII).
The number of cases appealed to the Supreme Court from
* This symposium has been contributed by the members of the faculty
of Louisiana State University Law School as follows: Statistical SurveyPaul M. Hebert and Carlos E. Lazarus; Procedure, Security Contracts, Insurance-Henry G. McMahon; Family Law, Mandate, Partnership, Succes-

sions, Mineral Rights-Harriet S. Daggett; Conventional Obligations, SaleJ. Denson Smith; Prescription--Joseph Dainow; Torts and Workmen's Compensation, Public Law-Thomas A. Cowan; Criminal Law and ProcedureWex S. Malone; Banking and Negotiable Instruments, Bankruptcy, Corporations-Dale

E. Bennett; Miscellaneous-Joseph

Dainow and Carlos E.

Lazarus.
1. The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1937-1938 Term
(1939) 1 LOUISIANA LAw RnVxEw 314-412.
2. This figure was obtained from The Official Daily Court Record showing the cases docketed in the Supreme Court from Oct. 3, 1938, to Sept. 29,
1939.
3. This information was gathered from The Official Daily Court Record.
4. This figure includes all cases for the 1938-1939 term officially reported

In Volumes 189, 190, 191, 192, and 193 of the Louisiana Reports.
5. For the corresponding figures during the 1937-1938 term see The Work
1 LOUISIANA
LAW RviEsw 314, 315.

of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1937-1938 Term (1939)

6. This figure was obtained from The Official Daily Court Record.
[31]
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District Courts was 206 as compared with 209 for the previous
term.' Of this number, 53.5% of the judgments were affirmed,
14% were reversed and 32.5% were modified or otherwise disposed of (see Table II). The corresponding figures for the 19371938 term show that although a smaller percentage of the cases
was affirmed during the 1938-1939 term, yet only 14% of the
cases were reversed as compared with 20% for the preceding
term.8
Only 18 cases reached the Supreme Court on writs of review
to the Courts of Appeal. Of these, 67% were affirmed, 11% were
reversed, and 22% were modified or otherwise disposed of. The
corresponding figures for the preceding term show that only
26.5% of the cases brought on writs of review were affirmed,
while 58.8% were reversed and 14.7% modified or otherwise disposed of .,
Table V shows that the bulk of litigation reaching the Supreme Court was again on appeal from the District Courts, such
litigation accounting for 85% of the cases reported (as compared
with 78% for the preceding term), while only 7.4% came upon
writs of review to the Courts of Appeal (as compared with 12.7%
for the 1937-1938 term), and 5.8% on supervisory writs to the
lower courts.
Table VI shows that the Parish of Orleans gave rise to 24.3%
of the cases appealed, an increase of 3% over the corresponding
number for the preceding term. ° The Parish of Caddo sent
11.1%; Evangeline Parish provided 4.9%; Webster-4.3%; Tangipahoa-3.8%; and East Baton Rouge-3.4%.
The topical analysis of decisions shown in Table IV has been
made arbitrarily for convenience of treatment of the main subject matter to which the decisions relate. The tabulation shows
that the greatest number of cases came up on procedural points,
such cases accounting for 27.3% of the cases decided in written
opinions. The next largest groups were: Criminal Law and Procedure-11.6%; Divorce-7.9%; Succession Matters-6.6%; Mineral Rights-5%; Torts and Workmen's Compensation-4.5%;
Conventional Obligations-3.7%.
7. Cf. The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1937-1938 Term,
supra note 4, at 316.
8. Cf. id. at 316.
9. Cf. id. at 316.
10. During the 1937-1938 term, the Parish of Orleans gave rise to 21.3% of
the cases appealed. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
1937-1938 Term, supra note 4, at 316.

TABLE I
VOLUME OF JUDICIAL BUSINESS
242
Cases disposed of with written opinions ................................
232*
Applications for writs filed during 1938-39 term ........................
171
Applications for writs considered .......................................
61
Applications for writs pending ..........................................
150
Applications for rehearings disposed of ................................
Cases docketed during 1938-39 term (excluding writ applications) ...... 232
464
Total matters docketed during 1938-39 term ............................
Total cases handled by the Court (excluding rehearing applications)... 413
Grand total of matters handled by the Court (including rehearing
563
applications) ..................................................
This figure includes applications for supervisory writs to the lower
courts as well as applications for writs of certiorari to the Courts of Appeal.
See Table VIII.
TABLE II
DISPOSITION OF LITIGATION

Affirmed .............
Amended and affirmed.
Affirmed in part and
reversed in part .....
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and.
remanded ...........
Amended in part, reversed in part and
affirmed .............
Reversed and rendered
Reversed and remanded
Reversed and judgment
of lower court reinstated .............
Reversed and judgment
of lower court
amended ............
Remanded on motion..
Motion to remand refused ................
Motions to dismiss
appeal refused ......
Motions to dismiss
appeal granted ......
Motion to dismiss appeal granted in part,
refused in part .....
Transferred to Courts of
Appeal for lack of
jurisdiction ..........
Appeal dismissed
ex proplo motu .......
Writs made peremptory
Writs recalled .........
Certified questions
answered ............
TOTALS

............

On
Appeal
from
District
Courts
110
14

On
CertiOn
On
On
orari
Super- SuperCertivisory
or
fied
visory
On
Writs
Appeal Review
Writs Questions
to
to
from
from
from
City Appelate District Juvenile Court of
C,ourts Courts
Appeal TOTAL
Courts Courts
123
..
..
..
12
1
15
..
..
..
1

6

6

....

1

1

2
2
31
26

4

..

2

..

..

1

..

1

.

.. ..
..

..

..

.

.

..

1

.

4

9

881...
.

1

.

.

.

2

5

1

..

6

22

51
206

1

18

14

1
2

1

242

TABLE III
DISPOSITION OF CASES REVIEWED ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
FROM COURTS OF APPEAL

Affirmed
Amended
Reversed
Reversed
Court of

Parish of
Orleans

First
Circuit

6

3
1

..............................
and affirmed ...............
and rendered ..............
and remanded .............
Appeal reversed and judg-

Second
Circuit

TOTAL

1

12
1
2
1

1

1

3

2

ment of lower court amended ....

Court of Appeal reversed and judgment of lower court reinstated ...

1

1

8

TOTALS .............................

7

3

18

TABLE IV
TOPICAL ANALYSIS OF DECISIONS
Banking and Negotiable Instruments ....................................
Colleges and Universities ................................................
Constitutional Law ......................................................
Conventional Obligations .................................................
Corporations .............................................................
Criminal Law and Procedure ............................................
D ivorce ..................................................................
E lections .................................................................
H ighw ays ................................................................
H usband and W ife .......................................................
Insurance ................................................................
L ease ....................................................................
M andate ..................................................................
M ineral R ights ...........................................................
Minors, Tutorship and Emancipation ....................................
M ortgages ................................................................
M unicipal Corporations ..................................................
P artition .................................................................
P artnership ..............................................................
P ledge ...................................................................
Practice and Procedure ..................................................
P rescription ..............................................................
Public Lands .............................................................
Sale ......................................................................
Schools and School Districts ............................................
Successions ...............................................................
Suretyship ................................................................
T axation .................................................................
Torts and Workmen's Compensation ....................................

8
1
7
9
2
28
19
1
1
2
4
2
1
12
5
5
8
1
1
1
66
7
1
8
4
16
3
8
11

TABLE V
JURISDICTIONAL ORIGIN OF CASES
* Appeals from District Courts ..........................................
Appeals from City Courts ............................................
On Writs of Review from Courts of Appeal ..........................
Questions certified by Courts of Appeal ................................
On Supervisory Writs to District Courts ..............................
On Supervisory Writs to Juvenile Courts ..............................

206
1
18
1
14
2

TOTAL ............................................................. 242

TABLE VI
GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF APPEALS FROM
DISTRICT COURTS
A-BY P
No. of
Parish
Cases
Acadia .........................
6
Allen ...........................
2
Bienville ........................
2
Bossier .........................
1
Caddo .......................... 23
Calcasieu ....................... 4
Claiborne .......................
2
Catahoula ......................
3
D eSoto .........................
2
East Baton Rouge ..............
7
East Carroll ....................
1
East Feliciana ..................
3
Evangeline .....................
10
Iberia ..........................
5
Jefferson .......................
5
Jefferson Davis ................
2
Lafayette .......................
2
Lafourche ......................
1
Lincoln .........................
6
Morehouse .....................
2
Natchitoches ...................
2
Ouachita .......................
6
Orleans Civil ...................
50

No. of
Parish
Cases
Orleans Criminal ...............
4
Plaquemines ....................
2
R apides ........................
5
R ichland .......................
2
Sabine .........................
2
St. Charles ..................... 1
St. Jam es ......................
1
St. John the Baptist ...........
2
St. Landry .....................
2
St. Martin ......................
1
St. M ary ........................
1
St. Tammany ..................
1
Tangipahoa .....................
8
Terrebone ......................
3
Verm ilion ......................
3
Vernon ......................... 2
W ashington ....................
5
W ebster ........................
9
West Baton Rouge .............
1
W inn ...........................
1
TOTAL .......................

B-BY JUDicIAL DISTRICT

206
No. of

Cases
First District (Caddo) ...................................................
23
Second District (Claiborne, Bienville) ....................................
4
Third District (Lincoln, Jackson, Union) ...............................
6
Fourth District (Ouachita, Morehouse) ..................................
8
Fifth District (West Carrol, Richland, Franklin) ........................
2
Sixth District (East Carrol, Madison, Tensas) ..........................
1
Seventh District (Catahoula, Concordia) ................................
3
Eighth District (Caldwell, Winn, LaSalle) ..............................
1
Ninth District (Rapides, Grant) ........................................
5
Tenth District (Natchitoches, Red River) ..............................
2
Eleventh District (DeSoto, Vernon, Sabine) .............................
6
Twelfth District (Avoyelles) .............................................
0
Thirteenth District (St. Landry, Evangeline) ............................
12
Fourteenth District (Calcasieu, Jefferson Davis, Beauregard, Cameron).. 11
Fifteenth District (Acadia, Lafayette, Vermilion) ........................
11
Sixteenth District (St. Mary, Iberia, St. Martin) ........................
7
Seventeenth District (Terrebonne, Lafourche) ............................
4
Eighteenth District (Iberville, West Baton Rouge, Point Coupee) .......
1
Nineteenth District (East Baton Rouge) ...............................
7
Twentieth District (East Feliciana, West Feliciana) ....................
3
Twenty-first District (Tangipahoa, Livingston, St. Helena) ..............
8
Twenty-second District (Washington, St. Tammany) .....................
6
Twenty-third District (Assumption, Ascension, St. James) ..............
1
Twenty-fourth District (Jefferson, St. John the Baptist, St. Charles)... 8
Twenty-fifth District (St. Bernard, Plaquemines) .......................
2
Twenty-sixth District (Bossier, Webster) ...............................
10
TO TAL

..............................................................

Orleans Civil District ....................................................
Orleans Crim inal District ................................................
TOTAL

..............................................................

152
49
5
206

TABLE VII
DISPOSITION OF APPLICATIONS FOR WRITS AND REHEARINGS
Granted Refused

Applications for Rehearings .....................
Applications for Writs ............................

11
15

139
156

TOTAL

150
171*

TOTALS ...................................
26
295
321
* This figure includes applications for supervisory writs to the lower
courts as well as applications for writs of certiorari or review to the courts
of appeal. See Table VIII.

TABLE VIII
DISPOSITION OF APPLICATIONS FOR WRITS
Granted
Supervisory Writs to lower courts .....
5
Writs of Certiorari to Courts of Appeal. 10
TOTALS ............................

15

Refused
28
128
156

Pending
41
20
61

TOTAL

74
158
232

TABLE IX
DISSENTS*

O 'N iell, C. J. ..................................
Fournet, J . ....................................
H iggins, J . .....................................
L and, J . .......................................
Odom , J . ......................................
Ponder, J . .....................................
R ogers, J . .....................................
TOTALS

...................................

With
Opinion
4
1
2
1
8

Without
Opinion
10
4
1
1
2
1
2
21

TOTAL

14
4
2
1
4
2
2
29

* In cases wherein rehearings have been granted, the dissents here
tabulated are those from the opinion on rehearing. Dissents from the original
opinions therein have not been included, since in such cases the final opinion
of the court is that rendered on the rehearing. Total number of cases in
which dissents were expressed-22.
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II. CIVIL CODE AND RELATED SUBJECTS
A. FAMILY LAW
Alimony
The case of Parker v. Parker1 consists largely of a resum6
of evidence regarding the ability of a defendant husband to pay
alimony, from which a discharge in bankruptcy does not relieve
him

2

Alimony was set at $100 per month for the wife and two

children (reduced from $125). The wife was making $70 per
month. The judge took into consideration evidence of the husband's living habits, and so forth. It was very difficult to
ascertain what the husband was making. Defendant did not furnish federal income tax returns nor his quarterly reports to the
State. His good faith was naturally questioned by the judge.
Martin v. Martin8 was a suit for divorce under Act No. 269
of 1916 as amended by Act. No. 31 of 1932. The defendant, wife,
in her answer, admitted the period had elapsed but, in reconvention, asked for alimony, alleging that she was not "at fault." She
was awarded $30 per month under Article 160 having "proved by
a preponderance of the evidence that she was not at fault in causing the separation, within the meaning of the provisions of Article
160, Revised Civil Code, as amended." The wife was also granted
$50 for attorney fees and all costs.
In Grisamore v. Grisamore,4 a husband sued for a separation
on the ground of abandonment. The wife, denying that she had
abandoned the husband, asserted that he abandoned her and
asked for separation on the same ground and for alimony pendente
lite. The lower court refused the demand for alimony on the
ground that "she could obtain the financial support of her husband
by returning to the matrimonial domicile." She appealed, and the
husband moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that, "inasmuch as each of the parties to the suit has been summoned to
return to the matrimonial domicile, this appeal presents nothing
for the court to decide." This motion was overruled. Article 148
allows alimony pendente lite if the wife needs it without reference to the merits of the suit, as an enforcement of the obligation
of the husband to support his wife during the existence of marriage.
1.
2.
3.
4.

191 La.
52 Stat.
191 La.
191 La.

559, 186 So. 27 (1939).
851, 11 U.S.C.A. § 35 (1938).
761, 186 So. 94 (1939).
770, 186 So. 98 (1939).
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Davieson v. Davieson5 came to the court by rule to reduce
alimony. The wife had been allowed $80 to support herself and
minor child. This amount was reduced to $50 as the child had
become a major. Wife's condition of health and need were unchanged. The allegation that she had a boarder was not proved.
Bienvenue v. Bienvenue6 was a suit for alimony under Article
160, giving relief to a wife who "has not been at fault." In a previous trial, the husband testified that the separation for which he
had obtained the divorce under the four year act "was by mutual
agreement." Now, the husband adduced evidence that he left the
wife because of her quarrelsome nature-particularly because she
threw an alarm clock at him! The court rested its final decision
largely upon the husband's judicial admission in the earlier proceeding and awarded alimony.
When the appeal in Grisamore v. Brennon7 reached the Supreme Court, it was held that the merits had been discussed and
the issue disposed of upon the previous hearing of the motion to
dismiss the appeal, and the plaintiff was condemned to pay $9.00
per week alimony pendente lite.
Marriage Annulment
Sunseri v. Cassagne8 presents a marriage annulment case on
the ground that the wife had colored blood of traceable amount,
1/16. The great-great grandmother of the wife, Fanny Ducre, was
a slave, and with her three children, was emancipated by her
owner, Leander Ducre, who, according to oral testimony, married
her afterwards. There was much evidence which, "while persuasive, is not conclusive and does not warrant us in holding that defendant is a member of the colored race, particularly in view of
the overwhelming testimony that she and her immediate associates
have always been regarded as members of the white race and
have been associated with persons of that race." Three certificates from the Recorder of Births and Marriages for Parish of
Orleans recited, however, that defendant was colored and that
her aunts were colored. They "are presumably correct and, if permitted to stand, will be decisive of the issues involved in this
case." Defendant asked for a remand that she might have a
chance to prove the incorrectness of these certificates and
stated that she had discovered certain evidence since the appeal
5.
6.
7.
8.

192
192
192
191

La.
La.
La.
La.

44, 187 So. 49 (1939).
395, 188 So. 41 (1939).
1046, 190 So. 125 (1939).
209, 185 So. 1 (1938).
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was taken which would prove the incorrectness. She was granted
the remand. The court said:
"We think that Defendant should be given an opportunity
to do this, since her marriage should not be annulled on the
ground that she is a member of the negro race unless all the
evidence adduced leaves no room for doubt that such is the
case.""
The wisdom of this statement is obvious. This problem is one
of particular difficulty as are all of those touching matters of
prejudice, tradition and social policy. The marriage restriction
law does not contain a definition of "persons of color," as do the
statutes of some of the states where the fraction is set forth. Our
court has defined a colored person in another connection as being
one with "an appreciable amount" of negro blood.10 In the case
under discussion a traceable amount of negro blood seems to be
the criterion. Since these cases have thus far reached the court
but rarely, no cause for alarm need be felt, but if their frequency
should ever come to suggest a "blood purge" situation, the court
or the Legislature may be forced to arbitrarily set the limit of a
definite fraction.
Custody of Children
In State v. McMillan11 the father and mother of the child
lived apart though neither had applied for separation or divorce.
The father put a four year old daughter in care of his sister in
Mississippi. At the request of the child's mother, an affidavit was
sworn out and filed in the Juvenile Court of New Orleans attesting that the child was a neglected child. The court found that
the child was not neglected, hence the Juvenile Court was without jurisdiction (under Act 126 of 1921 (E.S.) § 7) to determine
the question of custody. The Juvenile Court was prohibited from
proceeding further with the case, and all orders issued in the
Juvenile Court were set aside.
12
State ex rel. Martinez v. Hattier held that Article 14618
9. 191 La. at 223, 185 So. at 5.
10. Lee v. New Orleans Great Northern R. Co., 125 La. 236, 51 So. 182
(1910).
11. 191 La. 317, 185 So. 269 (1938).
12. 192 La. 209, 187 So. 551 (1939).
13. Art. 146, La. Civil Code of 1870: "If there are children of the marriage, whose provisional keeping is claimed by both husband and wife, the
suit being yet pending and undecided, it shall be granted to the wife, whether
plaintiff or defendant; unless there should be strong reasons to deprive her
of it, either in whole or In part, the decision whereof Is left to the discretion
of the judge."
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prevails over Article 21614 when a suit for separation or divorce
has been filed. The child, a girl of three, was left with her mother.
In Vice v. Vice,15 an appropriately entitled case, the father
sued for the custody of a child placed in the mother's keeping
after she had procured a separation from bed and board from
him on the ground of cruelty consisting of having accused her
of having had improper relations with his brother. The father
also asked to be relieved of the payment of alimony to the wife
for herself and the three year old son. The trial judge dismissed
the rule, and the Supreme Court set aside the judgment and
rendered one in plaintiff's favor, after having reviewed the record.
The latter was filled with sordid and salacious details related by
the husband, his brother and father, and certain cab drivers
employed by the husband to accompany him to the alleged rendezvous of his wife and brother for the purpose of witnessing
an adulterous act. Chief Justice O'Niell dissented on the same
ground which he took in Mouille v. Schutten6 that a man should
not be heard on grounds of public policy to testify to his own
immoral acts against his alleged accomplice and further on the
ground that the trial judge had seen and heard the witnesses
17
and must have had good reason for his judgment.
In a state, where for practical purposes, adultery is the only
ground for an immediate absolute divorce, testimony of this
variety is particularly dangerous. It is common knowledge that
this ground for divorce has long been used by unscrupulous lawyers and litigants to obtain what are in reality consent divorces
and, under previous popular subscription to a chivalric code, the
husband thus let the wife get the divorce decree whether she or
he or both wanted it. Now it is possible that husbands are availing themselves of the device to secure divorces, obtain custody
of children and defeat alimony decrees. At least three cases of
this variety have reached the Supreme Court within a year,
which, everything being considered, is a goodly number. There
are many ways provided by the Legislature by which individuals
may obtain divorces in one to two years, at least two of which
obviate the necessity for the washing of dirty linen-not an undue
14. Art. 216, La. Civil Code of 1870: "A child remains under the authority
of his father and mother until his majority or emancipation.
"In case of difference between the parents, the authority of the father
prevails."
15. 192 La. 1002, 190 So. 111 (1939).
16. 190 La. 841, 183 So. 191 (1938).
17. Carter v. Melchior, 150 La. 289, 90 So. 652 (1922).
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amount of time for deliberation regarding a second marriage if
the first has been a failure. Alimony is awarded with great care
by Louisiana courts, and the Legislature has set a maximum.
The defect in the law is that the statutes do not apply to both
husband and wife. If allegations of adultery, supported by this
type of evidence, are too often given credence, both husbands and
wives may be placed at the mercy of spouses without decency
or self respect. While it may be true that the so-called double
standard of morals is passing, it is not yet obsolete, and the wife
will suffer more in both social and business life than the husband
if these attacks become common. Most important of all, children
will be placed in unfit hands. In the majority opinion is found
the statement that:
"It is contended that the evidence given by the two taxicab drivers was unsatisfactory and unacceptable because no
reliable and decent person would voluntarily go upon a mission to be an eye witness to such an affair. If every person
took this view of these types of cases, the law would provide
that adultery is a ground for a divorce and a cause for depriving the mother of the custody of her minor children, but
it would be impossible to secure witnesses to prove the case.
The testimony of witnesses in matters of this nature should
be thoroughly considered and the court has no right to disregard such evidence without just reason. Of course, each
case, to a great extent, depends largely upon its own facts."'18
Many cases may be cited where circumstantial evidence was
considered sufficient and in the nature of things, an "eye witness"
not thought necessary, so that the cause of adultery need not be
nullified by refusal to accept the type of testimony under discussion.
Divorce
Gauthier v. Matthews 9 was a suit for divorce by the wife
on grounds of her husband's adultery. The case presents a question of fact only. The court applied the rule that:
"In actions for divorce, courts must take such evidence
as the nature of the case permits, circumstantial, direct, or
positive, and bring to bear upon it the experiences and obser18. Vice v. Vice, 192 La. 1002, 190 So. 111, 114 (1939).
19. 191 La. 326, 185 So. 272 (1938).
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vations of life, and thus weighing it with prudence and care
' 20
give effect to its just preponderance.
Having concluded that plaintiff had established her charges by
a preponderance of the evidence, the court awarded the decree
and alimony of $35 per month. The husband was making $198
per month as a fireman on the Missouri Pacific Railroad and had
certain expenses while away from home. The wife had asked for
$75 per month.
In Bernard v. Jefferson,21 a divorce was granted a husband
under the four year act. The lower court's decree was affirmed
after a review of the evidence. The court did not believe the testimony of the wife that the husband had spent two nights at her
home since the original separation, so the question of the effect
of cohabitation upon the living apart prescribed by the statute
was not presented.
In Brupbacher v. Brupbacher2 2 the court held that a divorce
must be granted when more than a year has elapsed since the
date of judgment of separation if no reconciliation has taken
place. The son was left with the father, and the daughter with
the mother as the best interests of the children were thus served.
$20 per month was allowed for the daughter's support. The wife
was working.
Separation From Bed and Board
Cruelty. In Peters v. Norris2s a wife was granted a separation
from bed and board from her husband, a dentist, on the ground
of habitual drunkenness and cruel treatment. The lower court had
awarded the boy to the wife and the girl to the husband because
of the alleged affection of the child for her father. This award
on custody was reversed, and the girl was placed with the wife,
as it did not appear to be to the greater advantage of the child to
be put in her father's custody as he was away all day. The child
was of "tender age," a girl, and the court thought she should be
in her mother's care. Alimony was raised from $60 to $80 to care
for the three. There was no conflict as to the amount of the husband's income.
The wife was awarded interest on her separate funds administered by her husband from the date of judgment. She had
20.
21.
22.
23.

191
191
192
191

La.
La.
La.
La.

at 330, 185 So. at 273.
881, 186 So. 599 (1939).
219, 187 So. 555 (1939).
436, 185 So. 461 (1938).
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no personal action to force an accounting from her husband as
to his administration of her separate estate. She failed to ask to
be recognized as owner of one-half of the community in her petition, and the "court cannot grant a relief not asked for in the
pleadings" so the lower court was reversed on that point also.
In Broderick v. Broderick14 a husband sued his wife for
separation from bed and board on the ground of habitual intemperance, cruel treatment and outrages. The wife denied the
accusation and set up a reconventional demand for separation
on the ground of cruel treatment. The demands of both parties
were rejected. The husband appealed, and his demand was rejected. The parties had been married but four months and eleven
days. The court found that even if Mrs. Broderick did become
intoxicated on several occasions, that was not habitual intemperance. Besides, said the court:
"... habitual intemperance, like ill-treatment of one of
the spouses toward the other-is not a just cause for a separation from bed and board unless 'such habitual intemperance,
or such ill treatment, is of such a nature as to render their
living together insupportable.' And the question whether the
habitual intemperance, or ill-treatment, in any given case, is
of such a nature as to render the living together of the parties
to the marriage unbearable,-or 'insupportable,' as the Civil
Code has it,-is a question for the court, and not for either
of the parties to decide. Mack v. Handy, 39 La. Ann. 491, 2 So.
181. In deciding that question, in any given case, the court
must consider the habits of the complaining party, and his
or her conduct towards the other party to the marriage. For
a period exceeding five months before Mr. Broderick married
the present defendant he was going out with her regularly
at nights, sometimes to night clubs and sometimes to picture
shows, and he knew the extent of her drinking, because, in
fact he drank with her; and he continued to condone her drinking until the morning of the very day he sued her for a decree
of separation because of her drinking. We do not mean by
this that Mr. Broderick approved of his wife's drinking to
excess. But the fact is that, by accompanying her on drinking
parties and by drinking with her, he encouraged her to drink,
knowing, as he contends, that she was liable to become intoxicated. A man who drinks with his wife on every drinking
24. 191 La. 492, 186 So. 5 (1939).
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party that she attends should not sue her for a separation
from bed and board on the ground that such drinking constitutes habitual intemperance of such nature as to render
their living together unbearable, without first discontinuing
drinking with his wife, and without giving her a sufficient
warning to reform her conduct in that respect."25
In Temperance v. Herrmann,26 a separation was prayed for
on grounds of slander and defamation and of cruel treatment.
On rehearing, a divided court refused to grant the separation
under the equal wrongs doctrine citing the following extract
from previous jurisprudence:
"'Under our law, disappointment in the marriage relation
and mere incompatibility of temper are not causes for a judicial separation between the spouses; excesses, outrages, and
cruel treatment are, but always with the qualification that
the complainant must be comparatively free from wrong.
"'Where the faults of husband and wife are nearly balanced and are of a similar nature, neither party can be heard
to complain in a court of justice.' "27
The wife was not found to be "comparatively free from wrong."
The court quoted the following:
"'Counsel for the parties have argued that the matrimonial relation is so strained as to render their living together
impossible, and, with much earnestness, have urged upon us
the advisability of putting an end to the unfortunate situation
by entering up a decree in favor of their respective clients.
We are unable to do this. The question with this court is not
whether it is best for the parties, or for society, that they
should be judicially separated, but whether they have brought
their case within those provisions of the law which regulate
the most important relation of social life.' "28
While this doctrine may seem unfortunate as a social policy, the
court is eminently correct in refusing to legislate regarding it,
particularly in view of the fact that the law-making body has
provided a simple solution for spouses in this situation, in the
two year divorce act, which should furnish ample relief to those
who are not unduly anxious to contract a new marriage after
having made a failure of the first.
25.
26.
27.
28.

191
191
191
191

La.
La.
La.
La.

at 496-497, 186
696, 186 So. 73
at 711, 186 So.
at 711, 186 So.

So. at 6.
(1938).
at 77.
at 78.
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In Moore v. Moore29 the husband, a doctor, sued his wife for
separation on grounds of cruel treatment and excesses. The wife
gambled-was extravagant and nagged and fussed! The court
stated that:
"Cruel treatment, under the jurisprudence of this state, is
not confined to physical mistreatment, abuse, or injury, but
can, likewise, result 5rom mental harassment alone arising
from conduct that is the 'very refinement of cruelty,' without
either force or blows."30
The case was remanded. It presents an excellent review of cases
on this subject with most interesting excerpts particularly from
the Krauss cases. 1
In Talbert v. Talbert 2 a wife sued her husband for separation
from bed and board on the ground of cruelty. She also asked for
alimony of $50 per month, $300 attorney fees, and a permanent
injunction against disposing of community property. A preponderance of the wife's evidence showed that the alleged acts of
cruelty-threats against the life, slander, and so forth were true.
In Cormier v. Cormier,3 the court affirmed a judgment
.granting a wife a separation from bed and board on the ground
of cruel treatment and awarded her permanent custody of her
two daughters and alimony. The cruel treatment consisted of
forcing the wife to live, not in the same house but in close
proximity to a hostile mother-in-law, who was also permitted by
the husband to keep one of the children all the time. The fact
that the wife permitted this condition to exist for a long time
was held to be forbearance rather than condonation. Since there
was no complaint, the alimony award was left at $20 per month,
which, the court commented, was certainly inadequate for the
three persons.
Tutors
In the case of In re Wyly's Tutorship,3 4 the mother, natural
tutrix, had been duly appointed, and an uncle was made undertutor. The tutrix was paid the full amount owed by the United
States Government in a life insurance policy. Four years after
29. 192 La. 289, 187 So. 670 (1939).
30. 192 La. at 292-293, 187 So. at 671.
31. Trautman v. Krauss, 159 La. 371, 105 So. 376 (1925); Krauss v. Krauss,
163 La. 218, 111 So. 683 (1927).
32. 192 La. 837, 189 So. 448 (1939).
33. 193 La. 158, 190 So. 365 (1939).
34. 191 La. 644, 186 So. 55 (1938).
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payment, the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs filed a petition
against the tutrix to show cause why she should not furnish bond
or submit an accounting under Section 21 of the World War
Veterans' Act. 5 The court held that while the Administrator has
the right in certain cases to intervene and make known his complaint, the disposition of the complaint is left to the state courts.
Louisiana requires no bond of a natural tutor. The amount had
been paid already in this case, so the Administrator did not have
the right to intervene under Louisiana Act 71 of 1932. The affairs
were found to be in good order in any case-with "not the remotest cause for suspicion." The rule was dismissed.
6
In Wallace v. Cassiere"
the court held that a tutrix is
estopped to plead irregularities in a family meeting in order to
defeat a mortgagee when she and the minors had received the
benefits involved.

Support of Wife
In State v. Dickinson 7 William Dickinson was found guilty
of contempt of court for failure to pay money for support of his
wife under Act 77 of 1932. He pleaded a divorce decree from
Mississippi, which was found to be a nullity because the court
granting it had no jurisdiction since he had not been a bona fide
resident of Mississippi for one year, which was required under
the Mississippi statute. The Juvenile Court was held to have had
jurisdiction, and their judgment was good. Writs of prohibition
and mandamus were refused.
Emancipation
In Succession of Hecker,88 the court held that a minor is fully
emancipated by marriage at, eighteen under Article 382 of the
Civil Code, even when married without the consent of the tutor.
Hence a recorder of mortgages was right in his position that the
court was without authority to authorize the substitution of a
bond by the tutor in lieu of a special mortgage, which could only
be cancelled ten days after an accounting should have been
rendered by the tutor.
35. 43 Stat. 613 (1924) as amended by 49 Stat. 607 (1935),
450 (Supp. 1938).
36. 192 La. 581, 188 So. 707 (1939).
37. 191 La. 266, 185 So. 20 (1938).

38. 191 La. 302, 185 So. 32 (1938), noted in (1939) 1

38 U.S.C.A. §
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CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS

This division deals with applications of the general law of
contract, a basic function of the judiciary. Just so long as individual possession and power of disposition are legally sanctioned,
courts will be called upon to consider expressions of agreement
to determine their legal stamina, their operative effect, their
consequences, and their finality. Much of the difficulty which
finds its way into the lap of the courts appears to be occasioned
by the belief, seemingly often held, that the processes of the law
may be employed to undo what the contracting parties had
chosen to do, or to compel one of them to live up to an agreement
he had not made. Necessity prompts an unwelcome choice; roseate
plans and hopes dwindle and disperse; dreams give way to fact
and fact to legal theory; and then the courts. Individuals will
continue to chafe against the operation of rules in their particular
cases and to search for methods of escape, hoping sometimes
against hope that law can be made to fit the individual pattern,
that all judges are Chancellors wearing shoes of varying sizes.
But they are mostly mistaken.
Baker, owning certain interests in a tract of land, needed
some money which Patton refused to lend with the interests as
security. But Baker had to have the money so he made a cash
sale of the interests to Patton and Patton gave him a counterletter fixing a time limit during which Baker would have the
power to repurchase. This period expired while Baker dozed in
juridical slumber. The land increased in value antd now Baker
wants it back. So he sues. All he wants the court to do is to
declare the transaction a pignorative contract or mortgage or
hypothecation so that he can recover his title by redemption. But
the court balks-it prefers to give effect to the intention of the
1
parties and the spirit of the Code. Baker v. Patton.
Then there was a Realty Company, thrilled over the prospect
of a fat return from a new subdivision. Under the spell of this
elation it entered into a written agreement with the Public Service Company for having gas mains extended to the subdivision,
paid some ten thousand dollars for the favor subject to a stipulation for a refund of a fixed sum for each additional customer
served from the extension up to the total amount of the payment,
the refunds to be made during a period of ten years from the
date of the contract, the remainder, if any, at the expiration of
1. 191 La. 784, 186 So. 336 (1939).
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such period, to be retained by the Public Service. Within this
time limit, refunds were made totalling approximately one-third
of the amount paid by the realty company. But the venture
proved unsuccessful and the liquidator of the realty company
sued to recover the amount of the deposit less the amount refunded.2 He apparently had conjured up three theories: (1) that
the contract was ultra vires as to both parties; (2) that the contract lacked mutuality inasmuch as the Public Service was not
obligated to do anything; and (3) that it contained a reprobated
penal or forfeiture clause. The court was adamant. It properly
disposed of the first two contentions by pointing out that the
contract had been fully performed and the Realty Company had
had the full benefit thereof. As to the third contention, it found
no analogy between permitting the Public Service to retain the
amount of the deposit over and above the refunds remaining at
the end of the ten year period and decisions in prior cases disallowing the enforcement of forfeitures of amounts paid by defaulting purchasers of realty where the forfeitures appeared
unreasonable and arbitrary.
Clearly enough, in the case at hand, the "deposit" was to
compensate the Public Service for the expense incurred in extending the mains to serve the subdivision, and the provision for
the refunds was charitably designed to enable the Realty Company to participate in or receive the advantage of any benefit
that might accrue to the Public Service through additional connections made possible by the extension contracted for. The court
devoted some time, however, to discussing the difference between
penal or secondary obligations and primary obligations, finding
that the refunding clause fell not within the former group but
the latter. Perhaps, the tendency to believe that a "penal clause"
is unenforceable should not be thus encouraged, because the penal
clause is specifically sanctioned by the law. It is only when such
a clause goes beyond reasonable compensation for damages incurred and is arbitrary and capricious that it should be denied
effect. But to a common sense agreement the court accorded a
common sense interpretation.
In like manner, an attempt to make a contract operate as not
intended resulted in the case of Rossignol v. Morgan & Jacobs.3
There an agreement to purchase a house and lot was conditioned
2. Reimann v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 191 La. 1079, 187 So. 30
(1939).
3. 191 La. 462, 185 So. 883 (1939).
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on the purchaser's being able to obtain a permit for the operation
of a cleaning and pressing business on the premises. This condition failed so the court annulled the contract and ordered the
broker to return the purchaser's deposit. It took the reasonable
view that the issuance of a temporary permit would not satisfy
the condition. The court likewise refused to uphold a claim by
the real estate broker for payment by the plaintiff of his commission, finding no warrant for such a claim in the contract. To
make the rejection complete, the opinion suggested that the rule
against forfeiture by the purchaser, established in an earlier
case, 4 was applicable.
The fact that courts look with disfavor on forfeiture results
both in a judicial reluctance to find an intention of this sort and an
insistence on strict compliance with contract provisions which
have such effect. Therefore, in Schultz v. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co., 5
recovery for conversion was permitted against a lessor who assumed dominion of certain property placed on the leased premises
by the lessee. The lease was for an indefinite term and provided
that upon its termination and the lessee's failure to remove property placed on the premises "the same shall become forfeited to,
and the title thereof shall become vested in the Lessor, should the
Lessor so desire." Subsequently, the lessor, after notifying the
lessee to vacate, and after obtaining a judgment of ejectment, converted the property (scrap iron) to its own use without notifying
the lessee of its intention to declare a forfeiture. The court repeated that forfeitures are not favored, are to be construed strictly
and will not be maintained unless the applicable requirements of
the contract are strictly followed, and decided that since the forfeiture here depended upon the will or desire of the lessor he
should have notified the lessee of his election to avail himself of
the privilege. If ever a forfeiture was justified, the facts indicate
that here was such.a case because of the unjustifiable stubbornness of the lessee in the face of repeated efforts to bring about his
surrender of the premises. But the lessor tried to give automatic
operation to an option. The application of the rule against forfeitures does demonstrate how carefully the court will guard
against encouraging such procedure.
Dispute over the meaning of an agreement led to the case of
Crowell & Spencer Lumber Co. v. Burns,6 where the court applied
4. Boisseau v. Vallon & Jordano, Inc., 174 La. 492, 141 So. 38 (1932).
5. 191 La. 624, 186 So. 49 (1939).
6. 191 La. 733, 186 So. 85 (1939).
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the established rule that when, in a sale of standing timber, the
time limit on removal by the buyer is fixed, such delay may not
be extended by the court and that title to timber not removed
before its expiration reverts to the seller. The applicable principles were not challenged, only the interpretation of the contract
was disputed.
Judicial reluctance to interfere with a positive and permissible manifestation of intention was demonstrated in Peterson v.
Moresi.7 A deceased grantee, on the day he acquired a parcel of
land by cash purchase, executed an instrument acknowledging an
undivided ownership in several others for certain fractions thereof, and agreeing to transfer these interests on demand. A number
of years later, after the grantee's death, the instrument was recorded and amicable demand was made by plaintiffs against the
widow and heirs for recognition as fractional owners of the land.
This suit, seeking a judgment "decreeing petitioners to be the
owners of the undivided interests specified" and ordering the defendants to execute a conveyance to them of the respective interests, followed refusal of the demand. The chief defense was the
prescription of ten years applicable to personal actions. The court
found that the facts did not disclose an offer to sell, or a sale, or a
mere promise to transfer, but was an acknowledgment of ownership in others, and that the plaintiffs' action to have this ownership recognized was a real and not a personal action, and so not
subject to the prescriptive period of ten years. On French authority, the grantee was dubbed the prdte-nom of the true owners.
The question of the admissibility of parol evidence to disprove an acknowledgment in an act of sale of the payment of a
certain cash consideration-a problem that has occasioned some
dispute in the Supreme Court-was before the court again in
Johnson v. Johnson This problem involves the proper application and interpretation of Civil Code Articles 1893, 1900, 2236,
2237, and 2276 particularly, and goes back to the case of Robinson
v. Britton," decided in 1915. In the present suit, the plaintiff had
acknowledged receipt of $500 cash "and other valuable considerations" in support of a transfer of real estate to her father-in-law.
She brought suit to annul for fraud (which she failed to prove) or
to have the transfer set aside for lesion beyond moiety. Her acknowledgment of $500 cash was held conclusive, although she
7. 191 La. 932, 186 So. 737 (1939).
8. 191 La. 408, 185 So. 299 (1938).
9. 137 La. 863, 69 So. 282 (1915).
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claimed that no such amount was ever paid. For the rest, the
court found the sale lesionary and ordered the appropriate relief.
Time was when the Chief Justice doubtless would have dissented on the parol evidence ruling. The supposition is that he
now feels his position too clearly established by previous dissenting opinions, 10 and the rule too well settled by numerous prior
decisions to warrant further complaint. But one may still wonder
whether the present rule was ever required by the provisions of
the Code, or whether it was justified, the common law rule appearing to be to the contrary."
A case outside the operation of the rule just considered was
presented to the court in Cleveland v. Westmoreland.1 2 A transfer
made in consideration of services rendered was attacked as a gift
or gratuity. The court, speaking through the Chief Justice, took
the view that under Article 1900-if the cause or consideration
stated in a contract is not the true cause or consideration for
which the contract was made-the contract is yet valid "if the
party (against whom a want of consideration is pleaded) can
show the existence of a true and sufficient consideration," and
that such true consideration might be shown by parol evidence.
As long as there is property there will be attempts to acquire
it by fraud, and courts will be called upon to defend the victim.
In Emerson v. Shirley,8 the court set aside a deed covering mineral
It found that the principal defendant and the plaintiff
werelands.
joint enterprisers which gave rise to a fiduciary
relationship
between them. The opinion does not make clear whether the decision was based on (1) fraud, resulting from the fact that the
principal defendant did not give the plaintiff the benefit of information he possessed; or (2) the fact that the defendants took advantage of the plaintiff while he was in an intoxicated condition;
or (3) contractual incapacity of the plaintiff resulting from drunkenness. A prior opinion in the case' 4 gives support to the view
that the real basis of the decision was temporary contractual incapacity caused by intoxication. However, the attention given in
the present opinion to the relationship between the parties,
coupled with the conflicting character of the testimony on the
plaintiff's condition, leads to the belief that the decision was pri10. Robinson v. Britton, 137 La. 863, 69 So. 282 (1915); Pfeiffer v. Nienaber,
143 La. 601, 78 So. 977 (1918); Hemler v. Adcock, 166 La. 704, 117 So. 781 (1928).
11. See Restatement, Contracts (1932) § 82.
12. 191 La. 863, 186 So. 593 (1939).
13. 191 La. 741, 186 So. 88 (1939).
14. 188 La. 196, 175 So. 909 (1937).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. II

marily based on fraud and overreaching on the part of the defendants. In the full light of the circumstances, the court refused to
find a ratification by the plaintiff in the deposit to his account of
the check received in payment and in the fact that certain checks
were later issued against the account, in keeping with the rule
announced in InternationalAccountants Society v. Santana.5
In Walter v. Caffall,16 a corporation was held liable on two
grounds for an indebtedness due plaintiff: (1) on the theory that
it had voluntarily assumed payment of the indebtedness at the
time it took over the assets of another corporation, and (2) on the
ground that it became the assumer in law of the obligations of the
other corporation because the transfer of assets to it was simulated and fraudulent. Under the first theory the plaintiff would
be a third party beneficiary. The second stems from the case of
Alliance Trust Co. v. Streater,7 where the present Chief Justice
dissented against holding a fraudulent actual corporate transferee
as an assumer. It is not entirely clear in the present case whether
the court considered the second corporation as being only a reincarnation of the first instead of a distinct corporate entity. There
is language to the former effect, however, and the facts perhaps
were sufficient to justify such a conclusion.
The rule that a release of one co-tortfeasor operates to discharge the others because of their solidary liability, in the absence
of a reservation of right against the latter, is well established. But
creditors continue to complain against it, despite repeated rebuffs.
This rule was applied, in the case of Reid v. Lowden, 8 where the
court also held that when a written agreement of compromise and
release containing no reservation is given to one co-tortfeasor,
parol evidence is not admissible to show an intention to reserve.
This view was apparently made to rest on two theories: (1) that
the written compromise agreement was not ambiguous, and (2)
that Article 3071, requiring written evidence of an agreement of
compromise, had been relied on by the plaintiff and consequently
parol evidence could not be received to "alter or change" the written agreement. The strictness of this application of the parol evidence rule, as expressed in the decision of the Court of Appeal,
has been criticized,") and a general consideration of Articles 2100,
2101, and 2203, will appear in a later issue of this Review.20
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

166 La. 671, 117 So. 768 (1928).
192 La. 447, 188 So. 137 (1939).
182 La. 102, 161 So. 168 (1935).
192 La. 811, 189 So. 286, (1939).
Note (1939) 13 Tulane L. Rev. 642.
See the forthcoming January issue for a Comment on these articles.
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Unfortunately, all too frequently is the court called upon to
weigh security of ownership against the importance of protecting
the purchaser of real property who relies on the public records.
In Bell v. Canal Bank & Trust Co., 21 the court applied the rule

which protects one dealing with immovable property in reliance
on the public records against the contention that the third party,
a mortgagee and subsequent purchaser, could readily have discovered the real owner's claim inasmuch as such owner was then
living on the property. The court felt that accepting a contrary
argument urged by the plaintiff "would destroy the law of registry which is based upon sound public policy of stable and clear
titles to realty."
If the principle upon which the rule rests be accepted, it is
difficult to understand how the court could have justified reaching
any other conclusion. That a mortgagee is protected to the same
extent as a purchaser, is well established; and the fact that the
mortgagor, the owner of record, was not in possession of the property at the time the mortgage was granted, was rightly held to be
immaterial. The remedy of an owner who does not receive the
required notice of a tax sale of his property-the unhappy plight
of the plaintiff-is a direct action to have the sale set aside. Where
the record is clear, third parties should be protected. The case
well demonstrates how dangerous it is for a curator ad hoc to treat
his appointment in too perfunctory a manner. Certainly the
curator appointed in the suit to quiet the tax title could have
discovered that those whom he was supposed to represent were
then living on the premises. If so, the loss of their property would
hardly have resulted. But hard cases cannot be allowed to make
bad law.
Another opinion involving the protection of persons dealing
with immovable property on the faith of the recorded titles was
rendered in Chachere v. Superior Oil Co.2 2 Here the plaintiffs who

claimed as descendants and heirs brought a petitory action against
a third party and his lessee alleging that their ancestor had made
a pretended sale of the property, in fact a donation in disguise
without any consideration, to the defendant's author in title. In
approving the judgment of dismissal the court seemed to rest its
decision on the theory that since the defendant owner was a third
person who had purchased the property on the faith of the public
records, he and his lessee should be protected. It did not consider
21. 193 La. 142, 190 So. 359 (1939).
22. 192 La. 193, 187 So. 321 (1939).
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the pleas of ten and thirty years prescription acquirendi causa. In
a concurring opinion the Chief Justice questioned the applicability of the doctrine of McDuffle v. Walker,28 and felt that since the
plea of prescription of ten years was a sufficient defense there
was no occasion to rely on the doctrine. The doubt in the mind of
the Chief Justice was based on Article 2239 of the Civil Code,
allowing to forced heirs the right to annul the simulated contracts
of their ancestors.
Inasmuch as the prevailing opinion did not decide the case on
the plea of prescription, as it might easily have done, but employed instead the rule concerning recorded titles, the inference is
that the court considered carefully the application of the rule to a
case where the claimants were heirs and intended to settle the
point. At the same time it is not necessary to conclude that the
Chief Justice held a contrary view. He may have preferred to
save final consideration of the question until a decision thereupon
was necesary. Whether the McDufie v. Walker doctrine should
be modified to protect the forced heirs of an ancestor who has
made a simulated transfer of his property will be considered in
detail in a later issue of the Review.
The fact that novation destroys the obligation novated stood
in the way of certain legatees claiming under a will after having
surrendered their rights to claim the legacies in return for a
promise of substitute performance in Carbajal v. Bickmann.2'
And the rule that novation is never presumed was properly
25
applied in Brock v. First State Bank & Trust Co.
Sufficiency of proof is always a problem for the advocate and
frequently for the court as well. Questions of this nature continue
to arise. Thus, in the opposition to an executor's allowance of
certain claims against the estate of a decedent, the opponent objected that the claims had not been established by competent and
legally sufficient proof, both generally, and under section 2 of Act
11 of 1926. In holding against these contentions, the court found
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case and to satisfy
the requirements of the statute in the testimony of the deceased's
bookkeeper corroborated by the deceased's own records and the
testimony of the executor. Succession of Sterkx v. Sterkx.26
23. 125
immovable
24. 192
25. 192
26. 193

La. 152, 51 So. 100 (1909) (protection of third parties dealing with
property on the faith of the public records).
La. 56, 187 So. 53 (1939).
La. 77, 187 So. 60 (1939).
La. 322, 190 So. 568 (1939).
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A problem of the same general nature was presented in Burk
v. Livingston Parish School Board,2 7 which reached the Supreme
Court again 2s during the preceding term when the court granted a
writ of review on petition of the plaintiff. The writ of review was
granted, according to the court, because of the refusal of the
Court of Appeal to allow the plaintiff, an architect, an item of
$852.20 charged to traveling expenses. The Court of Appeal had
refused to allow this claim on the ground that the amounts involved had not been proved with the required legal certainty, notwithstanding that the plaintiff testified that the charges were true
and correct. The Supreme Court found that the School Board did
not dispute that it was under a contractual duty to pay traveling
expenses, and it felt, contrary to the Court of Appeal, that the
evidence was sufficient to justify allowance of the claim. It agreed
with the lower court that the contract was sufficiently explicit
concerning the commission to be paid and therefore had to prevail
over an alleged custom of the profession concerning its proper
interpretation. The court also properly allowed interest from the
time plaintiff's final account was rendered and demand for payment made.
Perhaps the most interesting case presenting a problem dealing with the general law of contract from the standpoint of theory
was Fite v. Miller'2 9 where the court divided on the allowance of
damages for non-performance of a contract to drill an oil well.
Not only did the plaintiff not have the well drilled by someone
else, but at the time of the breach there was very good reason to
believe that drilling would result in only a dry hole.
The dissenting opinion took the position that no damages
were recoverable because the plaintiff had not proved any loss.
It suggested that if the plaintiff had paid someone else to drill the
well, an actual loss could have been shown. But since this course
had not been pursued, and since plaintiff could not show that
drilling would have produced oil, or how much, his claim for
damages was incapable of proof.30
The majority view was that plaintiff's position under the contract was analogous to that of one who purchases an uncertain
27. 191 La. 364, 185 So. 284 (1938).
28. See earlier opinion dealing with other matters in 190 La. 504, 182 So.
656 (1938).

29. 192 La. 229, 187 So. 650 (1939), noted in (1939) 2
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30. Cf. American Surety Co. v. Woods, 105 Fed. 741 (C.C.A. 5th, 1901),
applying a similar theory to a contract to construct a sewerage system where
plaintiff did not have the work completed by another.
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hope-a thing of value and capable of valuation. By the breach,
this value had been destroyed. It was something for which he
had given what the parties considered an equivalent, and which
was legally sufficient consideration-specifically an interest in a
lease. And then, in undertaking to value the hope the court used
as a criterion what it would cost to drill the well to the specified
depth.
It can be agreed that the damages recoverable in this kind of
case are to be measured by the value of the performance promised by the defendant as of the time performance is due. This
value divides itself into two elements: (1) the loss sustained, and
(2) the profit of which the aggrieved party has been deprived."
Whether performance would have been beneficial addresses itself
wholly to the question of the gains prevented by the breach. If a
plaintiff is unable to show that the breach has deprived him of a
profit only this element of the value of the performance falls. The
other element-the loss he has sustained-is another thing. In
undertaking to determine such loss it is necesary only to determine the value of the performance itself-the value of the actwithout regard to the benefit to be derived therefrom. No better
measure of such value can be found than what it would cost to
have the act done. Giving the plaintiff the monetary equivalent
of the physical act is not evaluating a hope of which he had been
deprived; it is merely compensating him for the loss of the value
he contracted for, and for which he had given or promised an
equivalent. Come what might from the drilling, he bargained for
it, paid for it, and was entitled to it, or, in lieu of specific performance, its equivalent in money.
An example may help. Let us assume that for a present adequate consideration paid to him, A contracts to dig a ditch on B's
land. The ditch is wholly unnecessary, will actually destroy the
value of B's land, although B does not know this, and that B wants
it done purely and simply to annoy his neighbor who will have to
look at it whenever enjoying the comfort of his porch. A defaults.
Let us further assume that at the time the default occurs B has
become friendly with his neighbor and is really glad at heart that
31. It will be admitted, of course, that if the value promised by a plaintiff
when weighed against the value promised by a defendant, as of the time of
the breach, shows a balance in favor of plaintiff this is in a sense a profit
on the transaction. However, giving such an amount by way of damages is
merely giving to the plaintiff the equivalent he bargained for, with its value
fixed as of the time performance is due. Otherwise, this value would be a
loss incurred.
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A has broken his contract. Under the theory of the dissent B
could not recover damages for the breach because he could prove
no loss. Likewise, under the theory of the majority opinion no recovery would be possible because the plaintiff has not been deprived by the breach of the value of an uncertain hope. Damages
are to be measured as of the time performance is due and surely
at that time, under the assumed facts, no such value could exist.
It would not do to answer that plaintiff could sue to resolve for
non-performance by the defendant. He could, but he would not
have to. The rule permits him to sue for damages. Their measure
would be the monetary equivalent of the act he bargained for and
which the other party failed to perform. He can recover no damages for profits of which he has been deprived because he has been
deprived of none.
This line of approach might have reconciled the majority and
minority. The dissenting opinion objected that damages for the
profits of which the plaintiff had been deprived were incapable of
proof and that plaintiff could not show a loss without showing
that oil would have been found. Apparently, the majority opinion
was considered as awarding damages for loss of profits although
such loss could not be proved. And, under the theory invoked by
the majority-that the plaintiff was entitled to the value of an
uncertain hope-the plaintiff does seem to have been allowed to
recover the value of uncertain future profits. The opinion is therefore open to criticism on this score. Fortunately, however, in
undertaking to evaluate this uncertain hope the court used the
cost of drilling as a measure. No harm resulted.
Clearly enough, if the plaintiff could have gotten someone
else to do the drilling and elected not to do so, he would not have
been entitled to damages for gains prevented because he could
not have shown that defendant's failure to perform had deprived
him of any profits. So, if the court in evaluating the uncertain
hope, was awarding damages for possible gains prevented, its
theory seems unsound. The breach by the defendant-assuming
the plaintiff could have had someone else drill-did not result in
deprivation of profits. If any such deprivation occurred, it was the
3 2
result of the plaintiff's own failure to have someone else drill.
This must have been the thought from which the minority could
32. A case might be supposed, of course, where a party would be deprived
of profits as a consequence of delay occurring between the time of breach and
the time when performance by another could be secured. No such case was
the present one.
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not escape. But they seem to have overlooked the loss sustained
by the plaintiff in losing the value of the act itself, that is, its
market value. This loss he sustained because he bargained for
that act and paid for it and then did not get it. And if a court
can not give him the act, it should give him the monetary equivalent thereof, without regard to what he may do with the money
when he gets it. If he does not want to drill a well with it, that
is his own affair. He has not received something for nothing; nor
is he in a better position than he would have been in if the con3
tract had been performed.1
This brings us back to the case at hand and to the suggestion
by the court that allowance should be made for the fact that if
the well had been drilled the defendant would have had a half
interest in it, and, further, that the defendant would have been
entitled to retain one-half of the plaintiff's half of the oil and gas
up to a certain amount to recompense him for the value of the
equipment employed, if a producer had been brought in. Such
allowances seem sound. In figuring the monetary equivalent of
the performance to be rendered the cost of an exactly similar
performance would have to be used as a guide. Therefore the
value the plaintiff lost in not getting the act itself was the value
of that performance by someone having similar interests in the
venture.
C.

PARTICULAR CONTRACTS

Sale
In Lee v. Perkins"the court followed an earlier decision 2 in
33. See Chamberlain v. Parker, 45 N.Y. 569, 572 (1871), wherein it is said,
"Where compensation is to be made to the plaintiff by delivery of an article
of value, the value of the article is the loss sustained by the plaintiff, if the
contract Is broken.
"So where a defendant for a compensation paid should agree to build a
house for the plaintiff, the value of the house would measure the damages,
if the defendant omitted to perform the contract....
"But there may be loss, in a legal sense, sustained by the plaintiff from
the breach of a contract by the other party, although it could be seen that
performance would have not benefited, but might have injured him. If the
owner of land employs and pays another to perform a certain act upon it, or

to erect a certain structure, it would be no defense to an action by the employer for a breach of the contract to show that the act to be done or the
erection to be made, would Injure the land or impair its value.
"The owner would be entitled to recover the value of the work and labor
which the defendant was to perform, although the thing to be produced had

no marketable value."
Cf. Ardizonne v. Archer, 72 Okla. 70, 178 Pac. 263 (1919); Restatement,

Contracts (1932) § 335, particularly Example 6; 5 Williston, Contracts (Williston & Thompson, 1937) 3798-3800, § 1354.
1. 192 La. 1049, 190 So. 126 (1939).

2. Langston v. Shaw, 147 La. 644, 85 So. 624 (1920).

1939]

WORK OF LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT

59

holding that a plaintiff may avail himself of litigious redemption
where the defendant transfers or sells an immovable or rights
arising therefrom during the pendency of an action in revendication. In this case a mineral lease, which the plaintiff was seeking
to have cancelled, was transferred by the defendant to a third
party. The court remanded the case to permit the plaintiff to
amend his pleadings and deposit the necessary amount in court
for the purpose of redemption.
Two studies of the problem of transfers of litigious rights
have recently been made. The French authorities are divided
on the question of permitting a plaintiff to avail himself of this
kind of relief against the transferee of the defendant. The present
case as well as Langston v. Shaw4 seem definitely to place Louisiana on the side of those favoring its allowance. This view stems
from the fact that Civil Code Articles 2652 and 2653 make no distinction between the plaintiff and the defendant in speaking of
litigious redemption. The instant case makes no mention of a
filing of a notice of lis pendens. This indicates, of course, that
the filing of such a notice is not a prerequisite to redemption by
a plaintiff. However, the case can hardly be considered as authority for such a proposition.
To similar effect was the decision in Sterkx v. Sterkx, 5 where
the court also held that the exception to litigious redemption
established by the first paragraph of Article 2654, "when the transfer has been made either to a coheir or to the coproprietor of
the right,"' applies only when the transferor is a coheir or coowner of the right with the transferee.
The case of Smith v. Cook,6 was again7 before the court during the last term when a judgment rejecting plaintiff's demands
was affirmed. Plaintiffs were trying to establish ownership to
certain land but they were unable to prove that the defendant
was guilty of any wrong toward their ancestor in purchasing the
property at a tax sale through an agent, there being no fiduciary
relationship which was violated.
Mandate
Power of Attorney. The case of Cleveland v. Westmoreland8
3.
(1939)
Right
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Comment, The Transfer of Litigious Rights in Louisiana Civil Law
1 LOUiSIANA LAW REVIEW 593, 818; Comment, The Sale of a Litigious
(1939)'13 Tulane L. Rev. 448.
147 La. 644, 85 So. 624 (1920).
193 La. 409, 190 So. 628 (1939).
191 La. 575, 186 So. 32 (1939).
189 La. 632, 180 So. 469 (1938).
191 La. 863, 186 So. 593 (1939).
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is concerned with the interpretation of a power of attorney given
by a daughter to her mother, in order that the latter might sell
or lease certain mineral rights. The mother was able to negotiate
a very profitable lease for her daughter through the assistance
of her brother and the services of an attorney. She paid these
assistants by transferring them a fractional mineral interest in
the land of her daughter. The daughter now sues to annul those
transfers, but without success. The court found that the power of
attorney was broad enough to enable its holder to make such a
transfer, given in consideration for the services rendered in
connection with leasing of the land. Furthermore, the court
found that the services were worth this consideration; and that
there was no fraud. It also held that plaintiff had ratified the contract by virtue of her knowledge and tacit consent by silence and
acceptance of benefits of the lease for two years and five months
after the transfers were made (or indeed until oil was produced
by the lessee).
The case of In Re Buller's Estates9 also involves an interpretation of a power of attorney.
"The pertinent part of the power of attorney reads:
'to sell all and any of the produce of my lands or any movables
and to pay and settle any and all such expenses and costs as
he may incur, and I contract to pay him one-half (1/2) of the
proceeds of the produce of my lands for his services in that
respect.'
"A mere reading of the power of attorney shows that it is
not coupled with an interest. The agent was not given an interest in the property but was only to receive a percentage of
the proceeds. The power not being coupled with an interest,
it terminated at the death of the principal."' 10
Tutors. The case of Parker v. Ohio Oil Co." decided that defendant oil company had paid rent royalties to the wrong party
in continuing to remit to the father of the plaintiffs after the latter
had become majors. 12 The opinion contains certain cited excerpts
which clearly set forth the duty of a third person in dealing with
an agent, particularly if that agent is the legal mandatory designated as a tutor.
9. 192 La. 644, 188 So. 728 (1939). See discussion of this case under Successions title, infra p. 72.
10. In re Buller's Estates, 192 La. 644, 649, 188 So. 728, 729 (1939).
11. 191 La. 896, 186 So. 604 (1939).
12. See Section on Mineral Rights, infra p. 76.
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"... one dealing with a known agent 'is not authorized under

any circumstances blindly to trust the agent's statement as
to the extent of his powers; such person must not act negligently, but must use reasonable diligence and prudence to
ascertain whether the agent acts within the scope of his
powers.'
"The principle applies with equal, if not greater, force to
one who deals with another as 'tutor', especially when the
documents, the letters of tutorship, with which he is familiar
show that the tutor was confirmed years before the dealings
took place.
"What the Supreme Court of Arizona said in Brutinel v.
Nygren, 17 Ariz. 491, 154 P. 1042, L.R.A. 1918F, 713, as to the
duty of one dealing with an agent is applicable to those dealing
with tutors. We quote [page 1045]:
"'The mere fact that one is dealing with an agent, whether
the agency be general or special, should be a danger signal,
and like a railroad crossing suggests the duty to "stop, look,
and listen," and if he would bind the principal is bound to
ascertain, not only the fact of agency, but the nature and extent of the authority, and in case either is controverted, the
burden of proof is upon him to establish it. In fine, he must
exercise due care and caution in the premises.'"13
The defendant further invoked the French theory of "tacit
mandate," which she contended was applicable because the children upon their majority suffered their father to continue the administration of their property. The court disposed of this contention in the following words:
"But defendant is in no position to invoke the doctrine of
tacit mandate because it had the means of knowing the truth,
of knowing the limitation or lack of the agent's authority. It
had sufficient information to put it on guard, as we have
already explained. The letters of tutorship dated in 1922 were
themselves 'danger signals,' sufficient to cause any prudent
person to 'stop, look, and listen.' Brutinel v. Nygren, supra.
14
Defendant's agents were negligent.'

Brokers' Commission. The facts of the case of Guy L. Deano,
Inc. v. Michel"5 were that a husband listed a piece of property
13. Parker v. Ohio Oil Co., 191 La. 896, 913-914, 186 So. 604, 610 (1939).
14. 191 La. at 914-915, 186 So. at 610 (1939).
15. 191 La. 233, 185 So. 9 (1938).
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for sale with a real estate agent, plaintiff in this suit. The agent
found a purchaser, thus entitling the broker to a commission
under his theory. After the husband had accepted the offer of
purchase and after the title had been examined and the act of
sale prepared, the wife of the woud-be vendor recorded a declaration of family home in accordance with the provisions of Act
35 of 1921, Extra Session. This prevented the husband from being
able to execute the deed and entitled the purchaser to a return
of deposit and costs. The court held that the real estate agent
could not collect the commission agreed upon from the husband,"6
because in the situation under discussion "the failure of Michel
to complete the sale was not due to any defect in the title but
was due to a condition arising subsequently which made it impossible for him to comply with his agreement. Michel had a
marketable title at the time he listed the property with Deano,
Inc., and it was through no fault of his that the sale to Miss
Bauman was not consummated." 1'
Partnership
The case of Dunlap v. Ramsey & Dunlap8 reiterated the
doctrine that the issue of whether or not a partnership "should
be dissolved is separate and distinct from the question of partitioning of the property or the liquidation of the affairs of the
dissolved partnership" and that "the latter only comes into legal
existence after the partnership has been dissolved."'' 9 Furthermore, the court said:
"Counsel has not cited any statute or decision which holds
that an action for the dissolution of the partnership is a summary and not an ordinary one. In the absence of any rule of
law making such a case a summary proceeding, the defendant
ordinary way
was entitled to be proceeded against in the
20
through service of a petition and citation.
The case of Brandin Slate Co., Inc. v. Bennett 2' is concerned
with a thorough review of evidence, including a document purporting to dissolve the partnership. From this evidence the court
found that a partnership had been formed between the defendants. Whatever the money-furnishing member had in contempla16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Mathews Bros. v. Bernius, 169 La. 1069, 126 So. 556 (1930).
Guy L. Deano, Inc. v. Michel, 191 La. 233, 237-238, 185 So. 9, 9-10 (1938).
191 La. 158, 184 So. 710 (1938).
191 La. at 161, 184 So. at 711.
191 La. at 163, 184 So. at 711.
193 La. 89, 190 So. 342 (1939).
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tion, he was liable to third persons as "an ordinary or common
partner" as he failed to record the articles of co-partnership in
the mortgage office as required by the provisions of Article 2845
of the Revised Civil Code. The partnership was engaged in the
contract business of erecting and repairing roofs. Since this could
not be regarded as a merchandise business, members were liable
to the plaintiff jointly and not in solido. It was found further
that one member had signed a continuing guaranty for the plaintiff's account and hence he was also liable individually for that
sum.
Security Contracts
(a) Pledge. The only two decisions22 involving this subject
which were handed down by the Supreme Court during the past
term applied the trite rule that the continued possession by a
creditor of property pledged operates a suspension of prescription
on the principal obligation.
(b) Continuing Guaranties. In Brandin Slate Co. v. Bennett22 plaintiff sought to hold defendant liable on the ground that
he had executed a continuing guaranty to secure the credit
purchases of a partnership. Defendant resisted the action on the
dual ground that the purported guaranty contract was a forgery
and that the indebtedness sued on was extinguished by payments
improperly credited to other obligations of the partnership. A
code article2 bars the assertion of any other defense by a defendant who has unsuccessfully pleaded the forgery of the instrument sued on. Since plaintiff was held to have proved the
authenticity of the contract, the court refused to consider the
additional defense of improper imputation of payments and
affirmed a judgment against the defendant.
(c) Suretyship. Under Article 3058 of the Civil Code, a surety
may enforce contribution from his co-sureties only when he has
paid the obligation in consequence of a lawsuit filed against him.
Four years ago, the Supreme Court broadened this right to enforce contribution by holding that where the co-sureties had
knowledge of payments made by the surety and consented thereto, they would be deemed equitably estopped from invoking the
22. Reconstruction Finance Corporation v. Holloway, 191 La. 583, 186 So.
35 (1938); Walter v. Calcasieu Nat. Bank of Lake Charles, 192 La. 402, 188
So. 43 (1939).
23. 193 La. 89, 190 So. 342 (1939).
24. Art. 326, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
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code provision. 25 Under this ruling, a judgment of the trial court
maintaining an exception of no cause of action filed by the cosureties to the surety's suit to enforce contribution was reversed
and the case remanded for trial. The cause came before the court
again this year, on appeal from a judgment rendered in favor of
the defendants after a trial on the merits. Under a finding that
no knowledge or consent of the co-sureties to the payments made
by the surety had been proven, the judgment appealed from was
affirmed.26
An elementary rule of suretyship views the discharge of the
principal debtor as working the release of the surety. 27 This principle was applied in Williams v. De Soto Bank & Trust Co.2s
There the plaintiffs sought to hold the defendants (other than
the bank named) as the sureties on all obligations of a defunct
bank which was indebted to plaintiffs. The named defendant was
sued because it had purchased all the assets and assumed all the
obligations of the defunct bank. In due course the plaintiffs compromised their claim against the named defendant bank, and
thereupon all the other defendants pleaded their release. Under a
holding that the pertinent banking statute 29 made the named defendant the principal debtor upon its purchase of the assets and
assumption of the obligations of the defunct bank, the court maintained the defense asserted and dismissed plaintiff's suit.
In Brock v. First State Bank & Trust Co.9 0 the defendant
bank in liquidation was sued on a promissory note, various individuals having been joined as guarantors of the obligation. A
number of the defenses unsuccessfully urged have no connection
with the present subject and will be discussed hereinafter.3 1 The
defendant guarantors sought to escape liability on the theory that
the guaranty was one personal to the original creditor which
could not be urged by the plaintiff merely because of his acquisition of the note. Since the latter and the guaranty contract were
parts of the same transaction, and since no language in either
obligation contained restrictive provisions limiting the benefit of
the guaranty contract to the payee of the note, the court overruled this defense.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
(1939)
30.
a1.

Leigh v. Wright, 183 La. 765, 164 So. 794 (1935).
Leigh v. Wright, 192 La. 224, 187 So. 649 (1939).
Art. 2205, La. Civil Code of 1870.
192 La. 848, 189 So. 451 (1939).
La. Act 300 of 1910, as amended by La. Act 198 of 1934 [Dart's Stats.
§§ 697-706).
192 La. 77, 187 So. 60 (1939).
Infra, p. 123.
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(d) Mortgages. Article 3269 of the Civil Code announces the
general rule32 that privileges on immovables prime mortgages,
and further provides that the loss which results from this priority
:'must be borne by the creditor whose mortgage is the least
ancient." In Blappert v. Succession of Welsch33 two mortgage
creditors had enforced their claims against separate pieces of
property, leaving no assets from which sufficient funds could be
realized to pay the privileged debts and charges of the succession.
Under the rule noticed above, the contest resolved itself into a
determination of "whose mortgage is the least ancient." The
holder of the most recent mortgage, to escape the effect of the
code provision, contended that his mortgage was merely the renewal of an older one executed prior to that of his competing
creditor. Since the inscription of this older mortgage had been
cancelled by agreement of the parties, and also because the new
mortgage effected the hypothecation of additional property, the
court rejected this contention.
In Wallace v. Cassiere,8 4 under proceedings of a family meeting regular on their face, the general mortgage of minors on the
property of their natural tutrix was subordinated to a special
mortgage to be executed by the tutrix thereafter. The latter
hypothecation was effected for the purpose of raising sufficient
funds to pay another mortgage on the property which primed
the minors' mortgage and thus avoiding an imminent foreclosure.
The proceedings of the family meeting were attacked on the
grounds that no such meeting had ever been held and that the
under-tutor had not been present. Since the minors had benefited
from the special mortgage, they were held equitably estopped
from urging the invalidity of the family meeting.
In People's Homestead & Savings Ass'n v. Worley"' plaintiff
had obtained judgment against two defendants in solido, which
when recorded became a judicial mortgage against the property
of both. Counsel for the judgment creditor, without authority and
through error, cancelled the judgment as to one of the solidary
debtors without reserving its rights as against the other. Plaintiff
32. One exception to this rule is that the mortgage primes the privilege
of materialmen for supplies furnished in the construction of improvements
commenced after the recordation of the mortgage. La. Act 298 of 1926, §§
1, 12, as amended by La. Act 323 of 1938, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 5106, 5117].
Others result from the failure of the creditors to have their privileges timely
recorded. Art. 3274, La. Civil Code of 1870, as amended by La. Act 45 of 1877.
33. 192 La. 173, 187 So. 281 (1939).
34. 192 La. 581, 188 So. 707 (1939).
35. 191 La. 453, 185 So. 880 (1939). •
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therefore sought to reinstate the judgment insofar as the latter
was concerned. The trial court's judgment maintaining an exception of no cause of action to the petition was reversed and the
case remanded for trial. The opinion, unfortunately, does not
state sufficient facts to permit the reader to appraise the court's
decision."
Jordan v. Crichton87 is of interest because of its holding that
a compromise between mortgagor and mortgagee, confirmed by
the moratorium commissioner, 8 has the effect of a judgment
between the parties. The judgment of the trial court decreeing
the specific performance of the compromise order was affirmed
on appeal.
Trite principles of the law relative to mortgages were applied
by the two remaining cases on the subject. In one, 19 the court
reiterated the settled rule that the mortgagee is not affected by
any defects of title not apparent on the face of the public records.
The other 40 applied the rule that only the effect of the registry
of a mortgage ceased after the lapse of ten years. Since the mortgage indebtedness had not prescribed, the mortgage remained
valid as to the mortgagor.
(e) Chattel Mortgages. A source of some annoyance to Louisiana attorneys generally, and to title examiners in particular,
lay in the fact that buildings were susceptible of hypothecation
both under a chattel mortgage and a mortgage on immovables.
An examination of the immovable mortgage records was not
sufficient to justify an opinion that the property and all of its
improvements were free from encumbrance. One of the most
important decisions handed down by the Supreme Court of
Louisiana during the past term was Buchler v. Fourroux,4 - which
36. The precise reason why the judgment was cancelled insofar as It
affected the first debtor does not appear from the opinion. If such cancellation resulted from a compromise which the attorney had no authority to
execute, then clearly the result of the decision Is correct. But if the can-

cellation was the result of an authorized compromise, and counsel merely
failed to make the proper reservation of rights against the named defendant,
then notwithstanding the apparent claim that "counsel was not authorized

to fail to make the proper reservations," it would seem that the decision Is
questionable. Cf. Art. 2203, La. Civil Code of 1870. There Is a vast difference
between the agent's performance of unauthorized acts, and his failure to
comply with instructions:
37. 191 La. 920, 186 So. 612 (1939).
38. Under the provisions of La. Act 2 of 1934 (2 E.S.).
39. Bell v. Canal Bank & Trust Co., 193 La. 142, 190 So. 359 (1939).
40. Schutzman v. Dobrowolskl, 191 La. 791, 186 So. 338 (1939), noted in
(1939) 13 Tulane L. Rev. 637.
41. 193 La. 445, 190 So. 640 (1939).
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apparently ended this annoyance. Section 1 of the Chattel Mortgage Act,42 permitting the execution of chattel mortgages upon
"buildings on leased ground," was held unconstitutional as being
broader than the title of the statute. Under the civil law of Louisiana buildings erected on real estate become immovable by
nature. The title's announced legislative intent to permit the
mortgaging of movable property was held not to afford sufficient
indication of a provision sanctioning the mortgaging of immovables by nature.
The Chattel Mortgage Act43 requires the reinscription of the
mortgage every five years for its continued validity as to third
persons. In E. C. Palmer & Co. v. Louisiana Printing Co." the

plaintiff had proceeded via executiva to enforce its chattel mortgage on certain machinery and equipment of the defendant. The
latter was then in the process of judicial liquidation and at the
request of the liquidators plaintiff agreed to refrain from judicial
sale of the movables to enable the defendant to continue its
business. These agreements were renewed from time to time,
until more than five years had elapsed since the execution of the
mortgage. The liquidators then urged the invalidity of the chattel
mortgage because of plaintiff's failure to reinscribe. Under these
facts, the court properly held the liquidators equitably estopped
from urging this defense.
D.

SUCCESSIONS

Wills

(a) Interpretation. In Succession of Vatter1 a bequest to
"all my other Nieces & Nephews 5,000-" 2 was found "plain
and unambiguous." The phrase was interpreted to indicate a
single gift of $5,000 to all rather than separate $5,000 gifts to each.
Since the services rendered by the attorneys were "purely
routine" and included "no serious litigation" the court reduced
the fee from $15,000 to $10,000. A claim by the brother of the
testatrix for services rendered was disallowed as it lacked necessary corroboration.
42. La. Act 198 of 1918, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 50221.
43. La. Act 198 of 1918, § 17, as amended by La. Acts 81 of 1922 and 232
of 1924 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 5028].
44. 192 La. 757T, 189 So. 126 (1939).
1. 192 La. 657, 188 So. 732 (1939).
2. 192 La. at 661, 188 So. at 733.
3. 192 La. at 667, 188 So. at 736.
4. 192 La. at 665, 188 So. at 735.
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(b) Revocation. Succession of Dambly.5 The essence of this
case is found in decision of the question whether a will is revoked
by a later will which is intact but unfit for probate due to its
having been found in three pieces. The court held that the first
will stood. The details and possibilities of this very interesting
case have been previously discussed in this journal and need not
be again presented at this time.
(c) Annulment for insanity. The case of Finck v. Delmore,
stripped of procedural and administrative questions, resolves into
a consideration of the factual question of the sanity of an uninterdicted testator. After most careful consideration, the court
upheld the will. It stated that even admitting the technical,
medical classification to have been one of insanity, it was shown
that the testator made her will at a "lucid interval." The court
reiterated the rule, announced in Succession of Ford,7 that
the opinions of experts, "however weighty and plausible, must
yield when opposed to facts." The old question of whether an
interdicted person can make a valid will during a "lucid interval"
is still open. Dictum in the case under discussion indicates that
such a will would be invalid.8
The will in question had provided for certain legacies, the
usufruct of the whole being given to the testator's mother, an
interdict. It was held that the special legacies might now be collected from the succession of the mother, who had enjoyed the
usufruct until her death.
In Succession of Tyler,9 decedent's will was annulled because
it was clearly proved that the testatrix was insane at the time
she executed the instrument. In the will itself was a clause providing for the "tombstone to be preserved and used in some
way."'10 The proof was not sufficient to support the idea of a "lucid
interval," which the court described as a "temporary cure," continuing long enough to give "certainty of the temporary restoration of reason."'
(d) Proof of handwriting.Succession of Beals12 is concerned
with proof regarding the authenticity of the handwriting of
5. 191 La. 500, 186 So. 7 (1939), noted in (1939) 1 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
464.
6. 192,La. 317, 188 So. 15 (1939).
7. 151 La. 571, 92 So. 61 (1922).
8. Finck v. Delmore, 192 La. 317, 324, 188 So. 15, 17 (1939).
9. 193 La. 480, 190 So. 651 (1939).
10. 190 So. at 652.
11. 190 So. at 656.
12. 192 La. 153, 187 So. 275 (1939).
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decedent who had made an olographic will. Since the statements
of "experts" were in direct conflict, the court relied upon the testimony of those who had "frequently seen the decedent write"
and "were familiar with the decedent's handwriting." The proof
satisfied the court that the will had been
".. . entirely written, dated and signed in the handwriting
of the testator. . . . Moreover, it would appear that it would

only be reasonable and the natural thing for the decedent to
will his estate to his wife who had lived with him for twentysix years instead of leaving it to his nieces and nephews who,
from their own evidence, admit that there was no closeness
between themselves and Joseph C. Beals's family for the last
fourteen years." 18
(e) Universal legatees. In Succession of Peters,14 the testator
had provided for particular legacies to his wife and unborn child
and left to his brothers and sisters "in equal proportions the remainder of my estate," describing this remainder. The child was
born alive, and the legacy left him was found to be less than onethird, his forced portion. The court declared that the brothers
and sisters were "residuary or universal legatees" under the
phraseology of the will and hence were obligated to make up
the necessary contribution for the l~gitime of the child. The wife,
as a particular legatee, suffered no diminution of her bequest.
Reduction
Prescription.Succession of Dancie.15 This case is concerned
with two definite and clear cut questions-one, factual, to determine where the deceased's domicile was in order to make certain
that proper jurisdiction had been exercised in previous probate proceedings'-and second, to determine whether prescription had run on the right to bring an action for reduction. The
court removed all doubt which hitherto may have existed regarding the rule that the five year prescription period in bar of
actions to reduce excessive donationsI T begins to run on the date
of judgment probating a will and not from the date of death or
the date of actual putting in possession. The cause of action was
said to have arisen at the time of probate. The parties at interest
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

192 La. at 156, 187 So. at 276.
192 La. 744, 189 So. 122 (1939).
191 La. 518, 186 So. 14 (1939).
Art. 935, La. Civil Code of 1870.
Art. 8542, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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are then informed that there was a will, who the testamentary
heirs were, and so forth. In the words of the court,
"The proceeding provides the forced heir with all the information necessary to enable him to prepare his suit to reduce
the disposition to the disposable quantum. He is left in no
doubt as to the person against whom his action must be
brought. His right to demand a reduction accrues when the
will is proved before a competent tribunal, recognized as valid,
'
and its execution is ordered. 1s
The contention was made that the rule was not uniform and was
thus confusing and that the position of the court was not consistent. It was pointed out that the jurisprudence was consistent
in finding that in a testate succession, the prescriptive period
begins to run from the date of probate, and in an intestate succession from the date of death, because in the latter case, reduction would have to deal with gifts inter vivos, and forced
heirs would, in the latter case, be in possession of the necessary
facts at the date of death. The case is valuable for its logic, its
resum6 of jurisprudence and for its definite and satisfactory conclusion on a hitherto not clearly defined point.
In the case of Succession of Grivaud,9 opposition was made
to the final account of a testamentary executor. The opponent
contended that the disposable portion had been exceeded. However, the court found that, even admitting the allegation, the right
to reduce had prescribed. It was urged that a tutor or curator
should have been appointed for a minor who was alleged to be
insane. This contention failed because it was not shown that the
minor's interest had been in any way neglected.
Representation
Mims v. Sample. 0 This case again records the principle that
an individual inheriting by representation is not bound for the
warranties of the represented if he has renounced the latter's
succession or accepted it with benefit of inventory. In this case,
a minor for whom acceptance, if at all, must be with benefit of
inventory, after coming of age renounced her father's succession.
She cannot now be held for a warranty binding upon her father,
who had illegally sold an undivided interest in land belonging
18. Succession of Dancie, 191 La. 518, 534, 186 So. 14, 19 (1939).
19. 192 La. 181, 187 So. 284 (1939).
20. 191 La. 677, 186 So. 66 (1939).
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to his father, in whose succession the grandchild now claims a
part by representation.
Irregular heirs
In Succession of Bonner'21 it was alleged by petitioner that
a will (naming him as executor) had been found and should be
probated. The defendants, who had been recognized as heirs in a
previous judgment, were the natural brothers and sisters of the
deceased, and they claimed that the will in question had been
confected after the death of the alleged testator and was spurious'
The court reviewed the testimony most thoroughly and found
that "the trial judge was not only justified in rejecting the plain''
tiff's evidence, but that he was eminently correct in doing So. 22
With proper judicial restraint, the court remarked that "they
[plaintiffs] tell a most extraordinary story."
The case is of particular interest in that the half-blood,
natural brothers and sisters of the deceased were recognized as
the legal heirs under Article 923 of the Civil Code, apparently
without controversy as to acknowledgment by their common
ancestor. Ordinarily, proof sufficient to establish this relationship
would constitute proof of informal acknowledgment. The decision
is eminently correct and particularly satisfactory to students who
have been disturbed by previous confusion in the jurisprudence.
While the proof used in the lower court to establish the relationship does not appear in the opinion, the very fact that the court
does not go into the question and apparently takes it as a matter
of course in following the language of Article 923 is most encouraging. Since the common parent of these children was dead,
the decision obviously would not be authoritative as to the rights
of the natural brothers and sisters in a situation where the parent
was alive. It might be persuasive, however, in giving similar unfortunates the right to the estate of a deceased brother or sister
even when the living parent could not take for lack of having
formally acknowledged. The reason for refusing the right to a
parent is excellent but should not be asserted to prevent a natural
brother or sister from benefiting. The result would be an additional penalty on the innocent illegitmate. This opinion avoids
mention of the theory that the rights come, to the brother or
sister through the parent and hence must be determined according to the right which the parent would have had. The case
21. 192 La. 299, 187 So. 801 (1939).
22. 192 La. at 316, 187 So. at 806.
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presents an equitable and proper application of Article 923 and
achieves an ideal of social justice.
Settlement
The case of Carbajal v. Bickmann2 is a prolongation of a
dispute regarding the settlement of the succession of one Mrs.
Seeger. The controversy has reached the Supreme Court in various phases for at least the fourth time. Mrs. Seeger, who died
on March 8th, 1925, "left a will in which she provided for special
legacies, consisting of two separate pieces of real estate in favor
of her two daughters, Mrs. Manzella and Mrs. Bickmann respectively, as extra portions, free from collation."' 24 The third
daughter, plaintiff in this suit, questioned the validity of these
bequests on several grounds and hence, in order to settle the
matter, the three daughters entered into a written agreement
stating the amounts each was to receive, the procedure to be
followed, and other pertinent matters. Mrs. Manzella and Mrs.
Bickmann breached the agreement by selling their undivided
interests in certain of the properties. After much litigation, they
are now claiming as defendants to Mrs. Carbajal's partition suit,
under the agreements to which they themselves had failed to
adhere. The partition was allowed, and their claims were rejected
because it appeared that they had profited considerably and were
now attempting to leave the third daughter, plaintiff, with practically nothing.
In Re Buller's Estates25 is concerned with various questions
arising in consolidated succession proceedings. The wife had one
child by a previous marriage and one by Mr. Buller. During her
second marriage, all of the property of Mr. Buller was transferred
to her as a dation en paiement. In the settlement this payment
was attacked by the child of the second marriage. The court
found it to have been simulated, there having been no "existing
debt" from Mr. Buller. It was found that Mrs. Buller died possessed of all separate funds she had ever had, allegedly used by
Mr. Buller as a basis for the dation. As a conservatory measure,
the movables had been sold by one of the heirs after agreement
with the opposing heir and after an acceptance with benefit of
inventory and institution of the attack on the giving in payment.
The court held, however, that this did not constitute an uncon23. 192 La. 56, 187 So. 53 (1939).
24. 192 La. at 62, 187 So. at 55.
25. 192 La. 644, 188 So. 728 (1939).
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ditional acceptance of Mr. Buller's estate estopping the plaintiff
heir from denying the judicial acknowledgment of the dation en
paiement by Mr. Buller in bankruptcy proceedings.
The Succession of Marinoni" sets forth another chapter in
this prolonged and interesting settlement. The heirs of the universal legatee, sister of the deceased, attempted in this suit to
take seizin of the decedent's estate from the testamentary executor. Since a suit was still pending to determine the claims of
one Mrs. Lewis seeking to be recognized as the legitimate daughter and forced heir of the deceased, the court refused to grant
the plaintiff seizin. The plaintiff also sought to have a child, referred to in the will as having been adopted, eliminated and to
have the appointment of the widow as tutrix of this minor set
aside. Exceptions of no cause of action and prematurity were
filed in this connection and maintained by the court.
In Burns v. Rivero, 7 plaintiff sought to have a sale of realty
to her set aside because only an undivided half interest was in
her vendor. The latter had purchased the property during the
community with funds earned in a business conducted by her.
The court found that the children of defendant, vendor, had
signed and recorded an instrument declaring the property to be
the separate property of their mother. Since they were the only
ones who could claim that their father's half of the property had
been wrongfully sold, the title was held to be good because these
children and their heirs were forever estopped from claiming an
interest. The general question of heirs' estoppel is an involved
one, by no means clear. The jurisprudence on the problem has
extended over a long period and is not altogether consistent. The
proper treatment of the problem requires more space than can
be allotted in this brief resume.
In Succession of Hogh,28 forced heirs attempted to bring into

the succession certain property standing in the name of their
father's stepdaughter. They invoked Article 2239 giving the right
to forced heirs to annul simulated contracts of those from whom
they inherit. It appeared from the plaintiffs' petition that money
and not real estate had been transferred by the father. Hence the
plaintiffs were held to have shown no cause to lay claim to the
property.
26. 192 La. 751, 189 So. 124 (1939).
27. 192 La. 767, 189 So. 129 (1939).
28..193 La. 260, 190 So. 399 (1939).
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Trusts
The case of H. C. Drew Manual T. School v.,Calcasieu Nat.
Bank" disclosed that certain bonds belonging to plaintiff corporation had been pledged to secure a $10,000 note made payable
to the defendants. The suit was for cancellation of the note and
return of the collateral and was successful. Arrangements had
been made to secure new capital for the failing bank. The note
was given for stock in the corporation which was to take over the
financially involved bank. The whole transaction was held void
because it contravened Act 124 of 1882. This statute prohibits
the pledging or encumbering of trust property by educational and
charitable trusts. The plaintiff corporation was established under
this act, as directed by the will of H. C. Drew.
Partition
In Wyche v. Taylor, 0 the court found that certain community
property now owned jointly by divorced husband and wife, was
not susceptible of division in kind and must be partitioned by
licitation. The parties were held not to be bound by an unsigned
agreement. The court emphasized the rule that judicial partition
cannot be effected otherwise than by drawing of lots, or by sale
and division of proceeds.
The case of Cox v. Cox 3' was concerned
with partition of
community property. The only question was one of ownership
of 156 shares of stock. The court reviewed the testimony and
found this item to be community property, since it was purchased
with borrowed money by the husband after his marriage to the
defendant. He purchased the property from his first wife in settlement of the first community.
Community Property
In Succession of Lewis,3 2 the court found that proceeds of a
life insurance policy taken out prior to the marriage of the deceased husband fell into his separate estate, the beneficiary
having died before the insured. The premiums paid after the
marriage were credited to the community. United States Adjusted
Service Bonds were held to belong .to the husband's separate
estate since his service in the World War was rendered prior to
his marriage though the certificate and bonds issued were re29.
30.
31.
32.

192
191
193
192

La.
La.
La.
La.

790,
891,
268,
734,

189 So.
186 So.
190 So.
189 So.

137
602
401
118

(1939).
(1939).
(1939).
(1939).
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ceived after the marriage. The husband died intestate leaving a
wife and brothers and sisters. The wife, of course, inherited the
husband's share of the community,"" and the brothers and sisters
inherited equally his separate estate.3 4 Costs were paid out of the
movables and were prorated between the widow and collaterals.
E.

MINERAL RIGHTS

Servitude
Prescription.The case of State ex rel Bourgaux v. Fontenot,1
instances a proceeding to cancel a mineral reservation from the
records for nonuse of the Servitude. William McFarland sold land
to Emile J. Bourgaux on August 24, 1907, and reserved the mineral rights. McFarland had acquired the land in full ownership
during the existence of the community between himself and his
wife. He died on October 29, 1915, leaving a widow who died in
1919 and many descendants, some of whom were minors and one
of whom was interdicted subsequent to McFarland's death. Under
the doctrine of Sample v. Whitaker,2 and Ford v. Williams,8
prescription would not have run because of the status of some
of the co-owners. Plaintiffs asked for cancellation on the theory
that the widow in community was vested of right in one-half of
the servitude and held the other half in usufruct; that the minors
held a naked title only and that it was the widow's duty to preserve the servitude by user. The minors' relief was said to be*
only against her for having failed to preserve the servitude under
Article 590 of the Civil Code. The court disposed of this plea by
the simple statement that the fact that Article 590 gives relief
against the usufructuary for the loss of a servitude does "not
change the law that 'Prescription does not run against minors
and persons under interdiction. . . . '" The same point was urged
in a supplemental brief in Ford v. Williams4 with negative results. The decision does not purport, of course, to indicate the
respective rights of naked owners and usufructuries of a mineral
servitude but it inclines at least toward the view that a very
different matter from ordinary usufruct is involved and must receive special treatment that the rights of both parties may be
33. Art. 915, La. Civil Code of 1870.
34. Art. 912, La. Civil Code of 1870.

1. 192 La. 95, 187 So. 66 (1939).
2. 172 La. 722, 135 So. 38 (1931).
3. 189 La. 229, 179 So. 298 (1938).

4. 189 La. 229, 179 So. 298 (1938)

..

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. II

protected." The usufruct of a mineral servitude, a real right,
presents a more involved problem than usufruct of the ordinary
predial servitude and, under the logical assumption that the
taking of oil and gas is really an alienation of the substance itself,
certainly usufructuary and naked owner should concur in any
disposition of the right.
The alternative demand of the relators pointed out a clause
in the contract of sale stipulating that the vendee of the land
might buy the mineral rights for $550. The contention was that
this clause was a resolutory condition. The court held that if it
were, it had prescribed in ten years.
The use by the court of the word interrupted in connection
with the minor's protection rather than suspended is disturbing.
The same thing, incidentally, is true of Act 64 of 1925. Of course,
the term may have been inserted inadvertently and probably
will have no effect when the distinction becomes important to
the issue but if the well known very different results are to be
expected, it is unfortunate that the word is not used in its ordinarily understood sense.
In Cox v. Acme Land & Investment Co., Inc.," plaintiff, Cox,
owned two tracts of land designated by the court as A, containing forty acres, and B, containing twenty acres. Cox created a
servitude on tract A on September 21, 1922 by selling to one
McFadin one-half of the mineral rights in the forty acres. This is
the servitude in question which plaintiff maintains should be
cancelled because of prescription of ten years nonuser. Defendant,
who had acquired one-sixth of the mineral rights in this tract,
maintained that the prescription had been interrupted by production and acknowledgment. The plea of interruption was
grounded on the following facts. On February 5, 1924, Cox created
a servitude on tract B, by selling one-fourth of the mineral rights
in the twenty acres to one Cook, who sold one-sixth to Roy. On
November 15, 1926, Cox, Roy, and six of the other ten mineral
owners leased to the Woodley Petroleum Company for a primary
term of five years the entire sixty acres comprising both tracts,
A and B. This lease was not signed by four owners of interests in
tract A. On April 4, 1937, a well was brought in on tract B by the
Woodley Petroleum Company and production continued to date.
Defendant contended that the lease to the Woodley Petroleum
5. See Daggett, Mineral Rights as They Affect the Community System
(1938) 1 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 17, 30 et seq.
6. 192 La. 688, 188 So. 742 (1939).

1939]

WORK OF LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT

77

Company was a joint lease which integrated the two servitudes
originally created so that production on any part of the sixty
acres would preserve the whole. The court applied the "intention
test," well defined by previous jurisprudence' and found the
lease not to be joint and hence not to constitute acknowledgment
of a continuance of the life of the servitude upon which no production occurred. The court said:
"The fact that the life of the Woodley lease was extended
by production on one of the servitudes covered by the lease
did not relieve the owners of the other servitude of their
obligation to exercise their rights thereunder."8
A second lease signed by Cox dealing with tract A was also
found not to be an acknowledgment of rights of the defendant,
was not intended as such and was made after prescription on the
servitude had run and hence had no effect.
Munn v. Wadley, 9 is the companion case to Childs v. PorterWadley Lumber Co.,10 and the relationship is similiar to that
between the Sample v. Whitaker cases. In the Childs case a landholder in good faith cleared his land of the original mineral
reservation under the doctrine of Sample v. Whitaker" and
Sample v. Whitaker12 and Acts 161 of 1920 and 64 of 1924. In
the present suit the defendants urged against a plaintiff landowner in bad faith that under the doctrine of Sample v. Whitaker 8 prescription had been suspended by virtue of the minority
of one of the stockholders who had originally reserved, because
when the corporation was dissolved the property vested in the
stockholders. The case turned on the question of whether or not
the mineral right, a real right, passed immediately to the stockholders, one of whom was a minor. Louisiana law governed since
a transfer of title of realty in Louisiana was in question. The
court held that title did not and could not pass without a written
deed or judicial decree and that title remained "in the corporation, in liquidation, long after" the date of dissolution and in fact
had never been transferred by deed. This doctrine was said to
7. See Daggett, Mineral Rights in Louisiana (1939) 53 et seq.
8. Cox v. Acme Land & Investment Co., Inc., 192 La. 688, 701, 188 So.
742, 747 (1939) (italics supplied).
9. 192 La. 874, 189 So. 561 (1939). This case is also discussed in the section
on Corporations, infra p. 127.
10. 190 La. 308, 182 So. 516 (1938).
11. 171 La. 949, 132 So. 511 (1930).
12. 174 La. 245, 140 So. 36 (1932).
13. 172 La. 722, 135 So. 38 (1931).
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apply whether a corporation owed debts or not. That being the
case, obviously the minority of a stockholder played no part.
Acceptance of payments was held to have been not a waiver but
a mere acknowledgment that the reservation was "yet in force"
when the payments were made. It was not "an admission that
the rights were not then subject to the prescription of ten years
liberandi causa." The plea that the reservation was a "mandate
coupled with an interest" was disposed of by citation from Childs
v. Porter-Wadley Lumber Co., 1" which appeared in the following
language:
"'We do not find any merit in the defense that the reservation of the minerals for thirty-five years, with the obligation
on the part of the vendor to pay the vendee or assigns onehalf of the net revenues derived from the sale of the minerals
constituted a mandate coupled with an interest and therefore

was imprescriptible.'

)15

Reiteration of the settled doctrine that a mineral grant or reservation, a servitude, would prescribe in ten years of nonuser without suspension or interruption followed, with a clear expression
that this legal result would ensue regardless of the term stipulated in the contract. In discussing the matter of the "mandate
coupled with an interest," the following interesting statement
appears:
"Aside from the question whether this plea is consistent
with the plea made in the answer to the suit, that the reservation constituted a mandate coupled with an interest, it
would be a matter of no importance if the reservation should
be termed a lease, or if it should be termed a mandate coupled
16
with an interest."'
The use of the word lease in this sentence, while of no real value
since the question was not in issue, is nevertheless worthy at
lease of observation in connection with the unanswered problem
of a maximum term for a mineral lease.
The case of Wadley v. Gleason 7 is an associate to that of
Munn v. Wadley 8 decided on the same day. The additional question is one of estoppel. The plaintiff in this suit was the tutor of
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

190 La. 308, 182 So. 516 (1938).
Munn v. Wadley, 192 La. 874, 883, 189 So. 561, 564 (1939).
192 La. at 882, 189 So. at 563.
192 La. 1052, 190 So. 127 (1939).
192 La. 874, 189 So. 561 (1939).
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the minor whose interest was adversely disposed of in the Munn
case and the defendant, Gleason, was her undertutor. Both were
stockholders in the corporation. Several petitions had been filed
by the tutor, in which the undertutor concurred, asking for power
to deal with the minor's mineral interests. These petitions were
alleged by the plaintiff to indicate an acquiescence on the part of
the defendant to the theory, held erroneous in the Munn case,
that title vested in the stockholders of the corporation at the date
of dissolution of the legal entity. The plea was that the defendant
was thereby estopped to contend now that prescription had run
against the mineral servitude of the corporation in favor of him,
the landowner. The court found that the plea of estoppel was
not well founded under the following test:
"One of the essential elements of a plea of estoppel is
that the party pleading it shall have been induced by the
false representation of the party against whom it is pleaded to
act in a way in which he would not have acted but for the
false representation. .

.

. Besides, the false representation

must be one of fact, not merely an error of law, in order to
constitute an estoppel."'10
Royalty
Vincent v. Bullock2 0 arose as a slander of title suit to remove
from the record a sale of a royalty interest by defendants, which
had been reserved by plaintiffs in a sale of the land more than
ten years previously. The suit was dismissed. The court held that
a royalty interest of this nature was not a rent charge and not a
servitude but a "real obligation which passed with the property
into the hands of the owner" subject to the happening of the
uncertain event, production, which must take place within ten
years or the condition be considered as broken. While the reservation was made in perpetuity, the court's reasoning indicated
that royalty was grounded upon and necessarily proceeded out of
the right to explore which, under the law of servitude and prescription of real rights, could be retained without exercise for
only ten years. 21 Many questions are opened by this decision.
What would constitute "exercise" of the real right? The right to
explore was sold with the land and hence obviously is not to be
considered. The law governing suspensive conditional obligations
19. Wadley v. Gleason, 192 La. 1052, 1057, 190 So. 127, 129 (1939).
20. 192 La. 1, 187 So. 35 (1939). See Comment (1939) 1 LOUISLANA LAW
REVIEW 416.
21. Art 3529, La. Civil Code of 1870.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. II

offers many possibilities. The question of suspension by minority
or otherwise is immediate together with many other problems,
the solutions of which are awaited with great interest. If the
judiciary develops this concept as carefully and surely as they
did the doctrine of servitude, another satisfactory chapter will
be added to the law of mineral rights in Louisiana. The decision
may serve to check the wide speculative royalty dealing which
is often without regard to landowners or producers of this
valuable natural resource and which might tend to becloud and
confuse the best interests of both.
Payment of Rent Royalty
In Parker v. Ohio Oil Co., 22 an oil company continued to pay
rent royalties to the father of plaintiffs as "tutor" after they had
reached majority. Without first getting an accounting of tutorship from the father and having him discharged as tutor, the
plaintiffs now sue for these royalties. This, they have a right to
do. A "tacit mandate" may have continued between the father
and children after their majority but defendants cannot rely upon
this as defendants had the means of finding out the legal limitations of defendants' authority. There was no estoppel by mere
silence or "standing by" of plaintiffs, as defendants were not
"misled into doing that which [they] would not have done but
for such silence. '2 They knew they were dealing with the father
as tutor and could have examined the tutorship proceedings to
discover the ages of the children had they wished to. The three
year prescription on oil rent collections was applied, the judge
being unable to regard the suit as one for an accounting.2 ' This
decision evidences again the strictness of the court in holding
oil companies liable when payment has been made, but to the
wrong party.
Lease
(a) Cancellation. The case of Tooke v. Simplex Oil Co.,
Inc.2 5 was a suit for cancellation of a lease on the ground that
production was not in a paying quantity. The court found that
the plaintiffs by letters had demanded, as an apparent satisfaction
of the lease contract, that the defendants begin drilling within
thirty days, which they did. They expended $30,000 in develop22.
23.
24.
25.

191
191
Cf.
191

La. 896, 186 So. 604 (1939).
La. at 910, 186 So. at 608.
Da Ponte v. Ogden, 161 La. 378, 108 So. 777 (1926).
La. 726, 186 So. 83 (1939).
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ment after the plaintiffs' demands were made. It was held that
plaintiffs are now estopped from demanding cancellation.
The case of Breard v. Pyramid Oil & Gas Co., Inc., 2 was an
unsuccessful attempt to cancel a lease. Plaintiff had originally
leased 520 acres under a contract which provided that, after discovery, defendant must drill at least one producing well to each
eighty acres. The facts that complaint had been made that this
provision was not being carried out and that the parties had
entered into a supplemental agreement changing the original
lease showed that there was no misunderstanding of the amendment to the original contract. The agreement as modified provided that the lease was to remain in effect "as long as oil or
gas was produced in paying quantities from any part of the
property." There was consideration for the second contract because two hundred and eighty acres of land covered in the original agreement was released and "certainty with reference to
controverted rights

'27

was secured."

After the original lease was signed the first lessee assigned
part to a second corporation, the Junior Company. The supplemental agreement upon which the decision rested was signed with
the two corporations. After that there was a reassignment by
the Junior Company to the original lessee. Since production had
ceased on the tract held by the Junior Company, plaintiff pleaded
that even under the second agreement, production on the tract
held by the original assignor would not hold the acreage on the
originally assigned tract. The plaintiff maintained that the reassignment was simulated but was unable to prove it. There was
no discussion of the distinction between sublease and assignment,
the latter word being used. Admitting that the reassignment was
not simulated, why the transfer should have reincorporated the
acreage into the original lease does not appear. The principle is
of interest under the doctrine of the line of cases holding that
an assignment constitutes a new lease which must stand by itself
under the production clause. The interpretation of the supplemental agreement with both companies might have produced
this result, but if so, why the discussion regarding simulation?
If the original assignment constituted a new lease under Smith
26. 191 La. 420, 185 So. 303 (1938).
27. 191 La. at 426, 185 So. at 305.
28. Citing Harris v. United Gas Public Service Co., 181 La. 983, 160 So.
785 (1935).
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v. Sun Oil Co., 20 why should a second disposition to the original

assignor produce different results than if made to a third person?
(b) Annulment. The case of Reiners v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.,30 was an action to annul a mineral lease made prior
to interdiction on the ground that the lessor was insane. In the
judgment of the lower court the proof failed to satisfy the test
for notorious insanity laid down by the Civil Code and after
a most careful and thorough analysis of the record the Supreme
Court was of the same opnion.
(c) Act No. 205 of 1938. The case of Allison v. Maroun3' is
based on Act 205 of 1938. It was admitted to be a matter of general knowledge that this act was passed to vitiate the effect of
the decision in Gulf Refining Co. v. Glassell,3 2 The question was
"whether an owner of a mineral lease may maintain an action
for slander of title without having possession of the leased
premises, but basing his right of action upon the possession held
by the lessor."'3 The court held that while lease owners have
under the statute the same rights in general to assert and defend
their titles as have landowners, they have no greater rights and
since a landowner not in possession could not bring this action,
neither could a lease owner not in possession, since a lessor's possession does not inure to the lessee, though the converse is true.
The court indicated that under the act, had the lessor been in
possession of his "incorporeal immovable property," (the lease),
he could have brought the action. Plaintiff was remitted for relief
to Act 38 of 1908 which provides for situations where parties are
not in actual possession of the real property.
(d) Joint venture. The case of DeJean v. Whisenhunt,.4 was
an action by two plaintiffs to recover their portions of the profits
made on a certain lease obtained by the defendant under an
alleged joint venture. The court held that, since the case was
governed by the law in effect prior to the adoption of Act 205
of 1938 classifying mineral leases as real property, the trial judge
was correct in overruling the exception that oral evidence was
not admissible. Furthermore, under the doctrine cited from
Emerson v. Shirley,"' proof of a joint venture might be made in
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

165 La. 907, 116 So. 379 (1928).
192 La. 415, 188 So. 47 (1939).
193 La. 286, 190 So. 408 (1939).
186 La. 190, 171 So. 846 (1936).
Allison v. Marous, 193 La. 286, 190 So. 408, 409 (1939).
191 La. 608, 186 So. 43 (1938).
188 La. 196, 175 So. 909 (1937).
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any case by parol evidence if it was only collateral to the question
of ownership and was not introduced for the purpose of establishing title. The factual question of the joint venture was established, and the plaintiffs were awarded their two-thirds of the profits.
Damages
The case of Fite v. Miller 6 was a suit for damages for breach
of contract by failing to drill at defendant's expense for joint
benefit, argued on an exception of no cause or right of action.
This case is of particular interest as it clearly and satisfactorily
lays down another important rule in the law of oil and gas. After
a thorough review of the authorities of other states and a comparison of our law with the common law, a divided court held
that a suit of this nature does disclose a cause of action. The
case in fine was grounded on Article 2451 of the Revised Civil
Code of 1870, and the measure of damages for breach was said
to be
".... the value of the uncertain hope which the plaintiff had, in
consequence of the assurance that a well would be drilled in
search of oil or gas on the leasehold .... We are not called
upon now to lay down a formula for ascertaining the value
of the uncertain hope which the plaintiff claims he was
deprived of. The best criterion will be the amount that it
'37
would cost to drill the well to the depth specified.
The court thus makes it clear that the value of the hope is the
measure of damages. After indicating that this hope may best be
measured in terms of the cost of drilling a well, the court suggests further that the terms of the particular contract to drill
may be considered in arriving at this cost.
During the development of the law of mineral rights, litigants
have had great difficulty in obtaining damages due to the peculiar
nature of the subject matter involved. If this clearly defined rule
is adhered to, it may do much to protect valuable interests from
persons who would take advantage of a situation which tended
to promote the activities of speculators who could gamble with
the potential assets of others with a minimum danger to themselves.
36. 192 La. 229, 187 So. 650 (1939), noted in (1939) 2 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
198, and (1939) 13 Tulane L. Rev. 639. This case is also discussed in the section
on Conventional Obligations, supra p. 55.

37. 192 La. at 250, 187 So. at 657.
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In the case of McCoy v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corporation,8
reaching the Supreme Court for the third time,3 the plaintiffs
were again disappointed. This suit was in tort and predicated
upon the expression of the court in the second case of the series
to the effect that damages might be estimated and awarded to an
adjacent landowner by virtue of the fault of his neighbor in
allowing gas to escape if it could be shown that the market value
of the land or mineral rights had been impaired. A great deal of
evidence was carefully reviewed, and the court found that there
had been no fault. It was established that, while in the light of
subsequent events better judgment might have been exercised,
there was no neligence or lack of earnest effort to control the wild
well.
The case of Ferguson v. Britt" was an action for damages
for breach of contract by executing another lease to a third party
before the first lease (to plaintiff) had been recorded. The defense was that there was no bad faith on defendant's part and
that no damages were actually suffered by plaintiff. Plaintiff paid
for the lease by draft which was never cashed. Plaintiff attempted
to prove that he had sustained substantial losses because he could
have obtained a high price for his lease but for defendant's act.
This he could not prove "with that reasonable degree of certainty the law requires. ' 41 Since plaintiff sustained no loss and
was not deprived of profit, the court awarded $300, the difference
between the amount that plaintiff had paid for the lease and the
amount the second lessee paid on the same day.
F. PRiESC nPTION
An indispensable unit in every well-developed legal system
is a scheme of prescription-by whatever names it may be called.
This is necessary because people frequently fail to exercise the
full measure of their rights and the law must carry out its
function of eliminating uncertainty between conflicting interests.
Thus through failure to exercise his rights a person may either
lose a right of action to demand something or may forfeit his
property to somebody else. Properly speaking, these two forms of
prescription constitute a mode of extinguishing obligations and a
38. 191 La. 332, 185 So. 274 (1938).

39. Previous appearances of this case before the Supreme Court are
reported in 175 La. 487, 143 So. 383 (1932) and 184 La. 101, 165 So. 632 (1936).
40. 191 La. 371, 185 So. 287 (1938).

41. 191 La. at 378, 185 So. at 289.
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mode of acquiring property. The common denominator which
brings the two together under the one heading of Prescription
is the concept of inaction of the losing party.
Liberandi causa
In order to fix the time limit of inactivity beyond which a
right of action is lost, a balance must be struck between the importance of the right and the societal interest in eliminating
uncertainty. Of course, the latter force is the controlling one, and
the result is expressed in the different time limits of the various
liberative prescriptions. All cases are provided for either specifically or by general category.
Where there are no complications as to interruption or suspension of the running of the time, the matter is simply a calendar computation of the period of inactivity-starting from the
moment when active exercise of the right became possible. However, another phase in which dispute may center is the preliminary identification or classification of the right in question. Thus,
in Hartman v. Greene' where the plaintiff was suing the defendant for inducing a breach of contract, Chief Justice O'Niell
properly classified the claim as one in tort and therefore barred
by the prescription of one year. The plaintiff's contention that the
cause of action was one in damages ex contractu was ruled out
because the defendant had no contractual relationship with the
plaintiff.
A similar issue about the identification of the cause of action
was the basis for litigation (and dissent) in Shepard Realty Co.
v. United Shoe Stores Co. 2 After making a twenty year lease, the

lessee refused to take possession and never did occupy the
premises alleging that the building was not delivered "in a tenantable condition" as stipulated in the contract. The defendant's
plea of a three-year prescription under Article 3538 of the Civil
Code 8 was sustained in the lower court, and on this point there
was affirmance by the Supreme Court. The majority opinion
accepted the claim as coming under "arrearages of rent charge 4
1. 193 La. 234, 190 So. 390 (1939).
2. 193 La. 211, 190 So. 383 (1939).
3. Art. 3538, La. Civil Code of 1870: "The following actions are prescribed
by three years: That for arrearages of rent charge, annuities and alimony,
or of the hire of movables and immovables ..
"
4. The present English text "arrearages of rent charge, annuities" is an
inadequate and misleading translation of the original French as found in
Art. 3503, La. Civil Code of 1825: "arrdrages de rentes perpdtuelles ou
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• . . or of the hire of movables and immovables." The dissenting

opinion of Justice Higgins considered the claim as one in damages
for breach of contract and not an action to recover rent.
Another conflict as to the nature of the cause of action was
settled in Peterson v. Moresi5 where it was held that a suit for
title to real estate was a real action and was not barred by the
ten-year prescription of personal actions.'
In Morris v. Foote,7 one of the grounds for contesting title to
an adjudicated property was that the processes in the foreclosure
proceeding had incorrectly been issued to and served on a tutrix
instead of the plaintiffs through their tutrix. 8 The court held that
this irregularity came within the terms of Article 3543 and that
the liberative prescription of five years was applicable.9
An instance of a special statutory liberative prescription came
up in the case of Causey v. Opelousas-St. Landry Securities Co.10
The defendant held the property under a deed which purported
to be "founded on a forfeiture for taxes" and he showed that the
original vendee and successors in title had paid the taxes for ten
years before and for three years after Act 185 of 1904. This met
the requirements of the statute and the thirteen year prescription
was upheld.
Acquirendi causa
Although the inactivity of a person is in itself a sufficient
basis for liberative prescription, the requirements for acquisitive
prescription are more extensive. As a mode of acquiring property
for the new owner, there must be not only the negative loosening of the prior owner's ties through inactivity (for a certain
length of time) but also some positive basis for the establishment
of the property relationship in the new owner. This positive factor
viagdres." The same French text in the Civil Code of 1808, p. 488, 3.20.78,
Is more correctly translated as "the arrears due on life annuities."
In the present case the court avoided falling into an erroneous application of this part of the article by classifying the claim more specifically
under the latter part of the same sentence of Article 3538, ". . . for arrear. of the hire of movables and immovables." However, as indicated in
ages.
Justice Higgins' dissent, the classification of the action as one to recover
rent can very well be disputed.
5. 191 La. 932, 186 So. 737 (1939).
6. Art. 3544, La. Civil Code of 1870.
7. 192 La. 996, 189 So. 601 (1939).
8. La. Act 179 of 1918, § 1 (2) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1933 (2)].
9. This article was amended and the period reduced to two years by La.
Act 231 of 1932. However, the facts of the present case occurred prior to the
amendment.
10. 192 La. 677, 188 So. 739 (1939).
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is called possession, and must be shown for the specified period
of time.11 Since the original owner's inactivity is only a negative
incident of acquisitive prescription, the problems necessarily
focus on the positive element of the present holder's possession.
Even when there is absolutely no color of right or title, it is
necessary in order to acquire "possession" of property that there
be not only a corporeal possesgion 12 of the thing but also the intention of possessing as owner.'3 Consequently, in Walter v. Cal4
it was pointed out that a
casieu Nat. Bank of Lake Charles1
pledgee cannot have the kind of possession that is necessary as
a basis for acquisitive prescription. As long as a person has corporeal possession of a thing by reason of a situation which itself
constitutes acknowledgment of somebody else's ownership, he
can not acquire that thing by prescription. 15
Acquisitive prescription, as a mode of acquiring property, is
sometimes easier to prove than to establish title on the merits.
Thus, in Bremer v. Young, 6 a jactitation suit was converted into
a petitory action when the defendant set up a record title to the
property, and the plaintiff established his ownership by means
of showing a thirty year prescription. Tacking on a prior possession17 by his mother was permitted on proof that she had
really purchased for her son and had transferred the title to him
a few years later.
Again, in Continental Land & Fur Co. v. Lacoste, 8 the
simplest solution of a question of title in a petitory action was by
use of the thirty year prescription. However, this was limited to
those parts of the property which were actually possessed and
clearly distinguishable from the surrounding marsh. Likewise,
in Smith v. King" the defendant's perfect record title was attacked by one who claimed an interest emanating from an alleged
community two generations back. Instead of trying to untangle
11. Arts. 3441 et seq., 3473, 3474, 3475, 3479, 3487, 3488, 3500 et seq., 3506
et seq., La. Civil Code of 1870.
12. Although physical possession of a part of a large tract may suffice
as a basis for civil possession of the rest, there can be no such civil possession of any part of the property which is in the physical possession of
somebody else. Morris v. Hankins, 192 La. 504, 524, 188 So. 155, 162 (1939).
13. Arts. 3436, 3487 et seq., 3500 et seq., La. Civil Code of 1870. See also
Arts. 3473-3475, 3479, 3487, La. Civil Code of 1870.
14. 192 La. 402, 188 So. 43 (1939).
15. Arts. 3489, 3490, 3520, La. Civil Code of 1870.
16. 192 La. 261, 187 So. 661 (1939).
17. Arts. 3493-3496, La. Civil Code of 1870.
18. 192 La. 561, 188 So. 700 (1939).
19. 192 La. 346, 188 So. 25 (1939).
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the knotted facts for a decision on the merits, the court confirmed
the defendant's title on the basis of a ten year prescription in
good faith.
As distinguished from the longer term prescription in favor
of one who adversely possesses as owner, there is the shorter
term prescription in favor of one who believes and has reasonable basis to believe that he is possessing as true owner. To get
the benefit of this, the possessor must produce a "just title" and
prove his "good faith. ' 20 In Garner v. Sims,2 ' through a complex
set of facts and mineral transfers emanating from two different
sources, the court found merit in the defendant's plea of a ten
year prescription in good faith and maintained the claims acquired through him.
One of the essential elements of the shorter term acquisitive
prescription is the possessor's "good faith" and even though the
law creates a presumption in its favor2 2 the issue is often the
turning point in the case. Thus in Coleman v. Pollock 23 the plaintiff presented considerable evidence to impugn the defendant's
good faith, but without success. The plaintiff contended that a
recital in the deed of the vendor's married status was enough to
destroy the vendee's good faith. The court dismissed this contention on the ground that it was fairly well established that "a
purchaser is not required to examine thoroughly the title tendered him by the vendor in order to be in good faith. '24 However,
the purchaser's good faith would seem to be open to question if
he had actual knowledge of the vendor's married status.
The strength of the presumption of good faith is further
demonstrated in the case of Keller v. Summers.2 5 The defendant
had acquired the property through the adjudicatee of a sheriff
sale, and although an examination of the record would have disclosed a defect sufficient for annulment, 2 it was held that the
failure to make this inquiry did not destroy the presumption of
good faith.
20. Arts 3478, 3479, 3480 et seq., 3483 et seq., La. Civil Code of 1870.
21. 191 La. 289, 185 So. 27 (1938).
22. Art. 3481, La. Civil Code of 1870.
23. 191 La. 813, 186 So. 346 (1939).
24. 191 La. at 822, 186 So. at 349. Cf. Arts. 503, 3451, 3480, 3481, 3484, La.
Civil Code of 1870; New Orleans Auction Exchange v. Vincent, 168 La. 802,
123 So. 331 (1929); Nugent v. Urania Lumber Co., 16 La. App. 73, 78, 133 So.
420, 423 (1931).
25. 192 La. 103, 187 So. 69 (1939).
26. The sheriff sale did not bring enough money to pay off all the
privileges and mortgages and could therefore have been annulled under Art.
684, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
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III. TORTS AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Only two cases involving important points of tort law came
before the Supreme Court during the last term: Loprestie v. Roy
2
Motors, Inc.,1 and Squyres v. Baldwin.
In the Loprestie case the court applied the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur to an automobile rear end collision case. Here the
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' automobile had crashed
into the rear of their car as it was proceeding on a straight roadway, in broad daylight, and with an unobstructed view ahead.
No specific act of negligence on the part of the defendants was
alleged by the plaintiffs. The trial judge sustained exceptions of
no cause of action on the grounds (1) that in order to invoke the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the plaintiff should have negatived
his own negligence, and (2) that he should also have alleged that
the driver of the following car was guilty of negligence "in
terms."8
The doctrine that the plaintiff must allege and prove absence
of contributory negligence as a condition to recovery has little
support. 4 Such a burden is a heavy one even in the ordinary
negligence case. Where, however, the plaintiff is relying upon
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur the burden would be too great
to carry. For in invoking the rule of res ipsa loquitur the plaintiff
admits that he cannot prove the acts which constitute the defendant's alleged negligence, and insists that the burden of negativing negligence rests on the defendant. It would certainly have
been anomalous, therefore, if the Supreme Court had sustained
the trial judge on this first point. The result would be that the
burden of negativing negligence would rest on the defendant
even though the plaintiff had offered no evidence of negligence;
while the burden of negativing contributory negligence would
rest on the plaintiff even though the defendant in turn had offered
no evidence of contributory negligence. In the Loprestie case the
court disposed of this point by very briefly ruling that in this
jurisdiction "it is not necessary to negative plaintiff's negligence
in an action for personal injuries."
In disposing of the second contention, namely that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not applicable to rear end collisions,
1. 191 La. 239, 185 So. 11 (1938).
2. 191 La. 249, 185 So. 14 (1938).
3. Loprestie v. Roy Motors, Inc., 191 La. 239, 244, 185 So. 11, 12 (1938).
4. Although at early common law the rule was different. See Harper,
Law of Torts (1933) 300, § 135.
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the court pointed out that in such cases the defendant is in a
better position than the plaintiff to explain the accident, and that
the situation itself bespeaks negligence. Hence, said the court,
"a presumption of negligence arises from the fact itself of the
accident."
The Court of Appeal for the First Circuit had decided in this
case 5 that the mere allegation of a rear end collision did not
suffice to satisfy the requirements of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur since such an allegation failed to disclose circumstances
from which the defendant's negligence could be reasonably inferred. In the opinion of that court, the allegation merely stated
that a collision had occurred and no more. It quoted the well
known rule that the occurrence of the accident does not raise the
presumption in the absence of attendant circumstances which
could justify the inference of negligence. However, the court
could have regarded the meeting of the two cars as the "accident"
and the fact that the collision was a rear end one on a straight
highway, in broad daylight, etc., as the attendant circumstances
from which the negligence of the rear driver could be inferred.6
In reversing this holding, the highest court definitely established the rule that a rear end collision may well raise a presumption that the collision happened as a result of the negligence
of the rear driver where no other circumstance (such as darkness,
fog, obstructed vision, or other factor) leaves room for an inference that the rear driver was not at fault.
The Court of Appeal stated that in its opinion res ipsa
loquitur was a rule more of evidence than of substantive law and
that considered from this standpoint "its application properly
lies in the trial of the case rather than in a consideration of the
pleadings. '7 It therefore affirmed the action of the trial court in
sustaining an exception of no right or cause of action. However,
if this rule were strictly applied, it is difficult to see how the
doctrine could ever withstand an exception of no cause or right
of action, since its only justification lies in those situations in
5. Morris v. Roy Motors, Inc., 181 So. 57 (La. App. 1938).
6. This was exactly the result arrived at on a similar state of facts by
Justice Odom, then Judge of the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, in Overstreet v. Ober, 14 La. App. 633, 636, 130 So. 648, 650 (1930), where he said:
"The driver of the [rear] car says he saw the truck ahead of him. The
mere fact that he ran into it is not sufficient proof of his negligence. But
the fact that he did, coupled with the facts that the road was open, had no
defect in it, and that he saw the truck ahead of him, called for an explanation
by him."
7. Morris v. Roy Motors, Inc., 181 So. 57, 59 (La. App. 1938).
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which the plaintiff pleader is unable to allege facts showing how
the injury occurred. In fact, it is precisely in freeing the plaintiff
from adverse judgment on the pleadings that the doctrine should
have its greatest usefulnes 8 Therefore, a broad application of the
rule is always advisable in case of exceptions to the pleadings.
The Supreme Court stated that res ipsa loquitur creates a
presumption of negligence. This raises the question of the effect
of the doctrine in the trial of a case in which it has been held
that res ipsa loquitur is properly applicable. The rule has two
requirements: (1) Knowledge of the facts giving rise to the injury are peculiarly in the possession of the defendant; and (2) the
injury is of a kind that ordinarily does not occur if due care has
been exercised. These two requirements are quite different in
nature and each must be kept in mind in determining the effect
which should be given to a finding that the doctrine res ipsa
loquitur is in order. Ordinarily it is said that the rule raises a
presumption of negligence on the defendant's part or that the
burden of proof shifts from the plaintiff to the defendant. What
is the precise effect of the rule considered from its evidentiary
aspect?
It is apparent that the rule can mean9 either (a) that the
full burden of proof has been shifted 0 and a prima facie case of
negligence on the part of the defendant is made out,:" so that if
neither party does more, the judgment must be for the plaintiff;
or (b) that the defendant must now come forward to impart his
8. In Lykiardopoulo v. New Orleans & Carrollton R. R. Co., 127 La. 309,
53 So. 575 (1910), an exception on the ground of vagueness because of failure
of plaintiff to allege acts constituting negligence in an explosion of defendant's boiler was successfully met by the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
9. In this connection see Harper, Law of Torts (1933) 181-186, § 77;
Harper and Heckel, Effects of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur (1928)
22 Ill. L. Rev. 724.
10. "Our conception of the law is that where the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is applicable it simply shifts the burden of proof ordinarily borne
by the plaintiff to the defendant." Porter, J., in Cavaretta v. Universal Film
Exchanges, Inc., 182 So. 135, 141 (La. App. 1938). "The doctrine of 'res ipsa
loquitur' does not create liability. Its sole effect is to create a presumption
or Inference of negligence, which shifts the burden of proof." Vargas v. Blue
Seal Bottling Works, Ltd., 126 So. 707, 708 (La. App. 1930).
11. "The accident itself makes out a prima facie case, and the burden
is on defendant to show absence of negligence." Lykiardopoulo v. New
Orleans & Carrollton R. R. Co., 127 La. 309. 312, 53 So. 575, 576 (1910). The
inference here is that when res ipsa loquitur applies, the burden on the defendant is not that of satisfactorily accounting for the accident but of showing freedom from fault. See East End Oil Co. v. Pennsylvania Torpedo Co.,
190 Pa. 350, 42 Atl. 707 (1899).
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peculiar knowledge 12 to the court, after which the case proceeds
as an ordinary negligence case; or (c) the defendant must impart
his knowledge and thereafter proceed, with the handicap that the
court has taken judicial notice of circumstantial evidence of negligence on his part; but the burden of proving such negligence as
entitles the plaintiff to recover remains with the plaintiff.1
If the question is one of making the defendant explain the
knowledge which is peculiarly his, we have merely a procedural
question of discovery before trial. This aspect of res ipsa loquitur
is really not the gist of the rule. In point of fact, the essence of
the doctrine is that the injury is one of a kind that ordinarily
does not occur unless negligence exists, and the fact of the defendant's peculiar knowledge is adventitious. If defendant's
peculiar knowledge were the important part of the rule, then
the force of the rule should be spent when and if the defendant
imparts what knowledge he possesses. This situation would satisfy
the requirements of (b) above, and the case would be shorn of
presumption of negligence.
I believe, however, that in res ipsa situations, the courts are
attempting to classify cases on the basis of likelihood of harm
rather than on the point of peculiar knowledge. I believe that
here is an endeavor on the part of the courts to formulate a
theory of risk, a doctrine which partakes of absolute liability
since the plaintiff ordinarily need not prove the defendant's
negligence. On the contrary, such negligence is presumed to
exist (though rebuttal is possible).
12. ". . . When . . . the facts causing the injury are peculiarly within the

knowledge of defendant and not equally accessible to plaintiff, the burden
Is on defendant to explain the cause of the accident, if he desires to escape

from the inference of negligence. .

.

. Since defendant has not seen fit to

offer any explanation as to the cause of the fire . . . the plaintiff is entitled

to a recovery ..

" (Italics supplied.) Rogers, J., in Jones v. Shell Petroleum

Corp., 185 La. 1067, 171 So. 447, 449 (1936). Suppose in the Jones case, the
defendant had imparted all the knowledge it possessed of the accident.
Would the case then have proceeded without any presumption against the
defendant? See also Gomer v. Anding, 146 So. 704, 707 (La. App. 1933):
The task then devolves upon the defendant to present an explanation
"...
"
to exculpate himself from the local presumption ...
13. "In our opinion, res ipsa loquitur means that the facts of the occur-

rence warrant the inference of negligence, not that they compel such an
inference; that they furnish circumstantial evidence of negligence where
direct evidence of it may be lacking, but it is evidence to be weighed, not
necessarily to be accepted as sufficient; that they call for explanation or
rebuttal, not necessarily that they require it; that they make a case to be
decided by the jury, not that they forestall the verdict. Res ipsa loquitur,
where it applies, does not convert the defendant's general issue into an
affirmative defense. When all the evidence is in, the question for the jury
is, whether the preponderance is with the plaintiff." Sweeney v. Erving, 228
U.S. 233, 240, 33 S. Ct. 416, 418, 57 L. Ed. 815 (1913).

1939]

WORK OF LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT

93

It would serve the interests of clarity if the Louisiana courts
were to indicate precisely what is the effect of a ruling that the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable. The cases are not clear
on the point. If the burden of proof of negligence shifts whenever
res ipsa loquitur is applicable, then there is no good reason why this
presumption should not exist in all cases where the circumstances
of injury are the same. Peculiar knowledge has nothing to do with
negligence. There seem to be, therefore, only two logical choices
for determining the effect of res ipsa loquitur: (1) when the defendant's peculiar knowledge is imparted the case should proceed
as an ordinary case of negligence; or (2) regardless of peculiar
knowledge, all fact situations creating an injury "which is of a
kind that does not occur ordinarily when due care has been
exercised" should create a presumption of negligence on the part
of the defendant.
Squyres v. Baldwin 14 was a case which modified the wellknown rule that the presence of unguarded railroad cars across
a highway does not of itself constitute negligence. The circumstances of this case were such as to induce the court to hold that
the exception rather than the rule should be applied. Here the
defendant's train of fifteen cars was being shunted across a highway upon which plaintiff was riding by automobile during a
heavy snowstorm at night. The cars were being shifted along
a little-used private spur line. Visibility was exceedingly poor
and the defendant's cars were cloaked in snow so as to present
a dull gray appearance which harmonized with the surrounding
countryside. The automobile in which the plaintiff rode as a guest
was progressing at a rate of speed not in excess of 15 miles per
hour. Although plaintiff's host was driving with his head protruding through the side window so as to aid his vision, he did
not perceive the freight cars until it was too late to avoid a
collision. The defendant contended; inter alia, that no negligence
on its part had been alleged and proved.
The court stated that the question here raised had never
before been presented to it. It is a well settled law that the
presence of railroad cars at a crossing is in itself sufficient warning to travelers. 15 It is not ordinarily necessary that the company post guards on the highway to ensure that travelers will
exercise ordinary care to avoid collision. Nevertheless, if circumstances are such that not even reasonable precautions on the part
14. 191 La. 249, 185 So. 14 (1938).
15. See cases cited in the opinion, 191 La. at 257, 185 So. at 17.
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of travelers will suffice to apprise them of danger, then the railroad company is under a duty to take affirmative steps to guard
against collision.
Santana v. Item Co.' 6 reaffirmed the rule that a newspaper
is liable for defamation even in the absence of intention or negligence; provided injury be proved. In this case a student at Louisiana State University claimed that the defendant newspaper
company had defamed him by reprinting a letter from the Reveille (the student newspaper) in which the plaintiff was supposed
to have attacked the unwarlike spirit of his fellow students. In
point of fact the plaintiff had not written the letter. The court
was unable to see how the plaintiff had been injured by the report complained of since condemnation of unwarlikeness does
not subject one to ridicule, contumely, or abuse in an American
community. It did indicate, however, that the newspaper would
have been liable if the matter in issue had been defamatory.
In Edwards v. Derrick 7 defendant was charged with the
defamation of a political rival. He had accused the plaintiff of
misappropriating public funds. As a matter of fact, the plaintiff
had been exonerated by the grand jury and by the state auditors of this very accusation. In settling the damages, the court
reckoned up the average damages in suits of a similiar nature
and arrived at the figure of $500-not a very substantial amount
unless we bear in mind the fact that political rivals are always
allowed considerable latitude in discussing one another's character before the public.
In Gray v. deBretton18 it was held that a sheriff is not liable
on his bond for injuries resulting from the negligent operation
of a vehicle by a deputy sheriff in conveying a prisoner to jail.
"The purpose of an official bond is to provide indemnity
against malfeasance, nonfeasance and misfeasance in public
office. Such a bond can not be construed so to the operate as
a policy of insurance in favor of the traveling public against
damage in an automobile collision. The liability in this case,
if any, is the liability of the deputy sheriff and of nobody
else."1 9
16.
17.
18.
19.

192 La. 819, 189 So. 442 (1939).
193 La. 331, 190 So. 571 (1939).
192 La. 628, 188 So. 722 (1939).
Per Rogers, J., 192 La. at 639, 188 So. at 726.
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Goodwin v. Terrell ° and Fogleman v. Interurban Transportation Co., Inc.21 raised only questions of fact, while Hartman v.
Greene,22 a suit for alleged inducement of breach of contract, was
disposed of by the doctrine of prescription.
Workmen's Compensation
Higginbotham v. Public Belt R. R. Commission28 raised the
question of whether a maintenance man who had been employed
by the defendant to work on the Huey P. Long Bridge at New
Orleans was engaged in interstate commerce at the time of his
injury and death. The workman had been taking soundings of
piers to determine whether defects in the bridge existed. His
work therefore related to maintenance and repair of the bridge.
The plaintiff's widow sued under the state compensation act and
the Railroad Commission defended on the ground that since the
deceased employee had been engaged in interstate commerce,
the action, if any, must be brought under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act. The contention of the defendant was sustained.
It seems clear that the court arrived at a correct conclusion
in holding that the employee had been engaged in interstate
commerce at the time of his decease. Citations in the opinion
abundantly establish this point.2 ' Moreover, with this point settled, the state compensation act is clearly inapplicable to the
case. 25
This case illustrates the difficulties which the wholly outmoded second Federal Employers' Liability Act"6 create in the
administration of workmen's compensation. Under that unfortunate act it is necessary for the workman to prove that at the
time of the injury he was engaged in interstate commerce, a jurisdictional issue which not even thousands of cases on the point
have served to settle. Moreover, this act requires the workman
to allege and prove negligence 27 on the part of the employer and
makes the contributory negligence of the employee effective to
20. 192 La. 267, 187 So. 663 (1939).
21. 192 La. 115, 187 So. 73 (1939).
22. 193 La. 234, 190 So. 390 (1939).
23. 192 La. 525, 188 So. 395 (1939).
24. 192 La. at 539-541, 188 So. at 399-340.
25. Boston & Maine R. Co. v. Armburg, 285 U.S. 234, 52 S. Ct. 336, 76 L.
Ed. 729 (1932); Montgomery v. Terminal R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 335 Mo. 348,
73 S.W. (2d) 236 (1934), cert. denied 293 U.S. 602, 55 S. Ct. 118, 79 L. Ed. 694
(1934).
26. 35 Stat. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 51-59 (1928).
27. New Orleans & N.E. R.R. Co. v. Harris, 247 U.S. 367, 38 S. Ct. 535, 62
L. Ed. 1167 (1918).
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diminish the damages recoverable. 28 The only aspect of a true
workmen's compensation statute which this measure provides is
that it deprives the employer of the defences of voluntary
assumption of risk 29 and of the fellow servant rule.' In spite of
the Knickerbocker Ice Co."1 case, it seems likely that the Supreme
Court of the United States now would welcome a federal statute
which would permit the injured workman to rely upon the benefits of the state workmen's compensation laws.
The alternative would be a complete revamping of the second
Federal Employers' Liability Act. This statute was enacted in
1908, prior to the development of workmen's compensation statutes. However, if this were done the question of interstate commerce would still remain to be determined in every fact issue
not already adjudicated by an appellate court. The advantage of
a new federal statute would be that having come late upon the
scene it could incorporate all the improvements which three
decades of the administration of the workmen's compensation
statutes have found to be feasible.
In Jefferson v. Lauri N. Truck Lines,3 2 after judgment had
been paid by the defendant employer, the plaintiff physician
sued for fees for expert medical testimony. The expert had been
called by the trial judge ex proprio motu. The court held that
the Employers' Liability Act interpreted in connection with the
Code of Practice forbade suit for costs after judgment had been
made final, and the physician was therefore left without redress.
Justice Higgins dissented from this interpretation of the pertinent
statutes. This situation illustrates once more 8 the inadvisability
of subjecting such a continuing problem of administration as
workmen's compensation to the exigencies of trial procedure.
The flexibility and informality of commission administration are
needful to a proper execution of such industrial problems.
In Fouchaux v. Board of Commissioners of Port of New Orleans"' it was held that an employee of a lessee of a wharf and
28. 35 Stat. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C.A. § 52 (1928).
29. 35 Stat. 66 (1908), 45 U.S.C.A. § 54 (1928).
30 Kanawha Ry. Co. v. Kerse, 239 U.S. 576, 36 S. Ct. 174, 60 L. Ed. 448
(1916).
31. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 40 S. Ct. 438, 64 L. Ed.
834, 11 A.L.R. 1145 (1920).
32. 192 La. 29, 187 So. 44 (1939).
33. In this connection generally, see Mayer, Workmen's Compensation
Law in Louisiana (1937) 135-142.
34. 193 La. 182, 190 So. 373 (1939).
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elevator leased from the Board could not maintain an action
under the Employers' Liability Act against the Board because of
lack of privity of contract between the workman and the Board.
IV. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Only two cases which may be fairly construed as involving
the substantive ingredients of crime were before the Supreme
Court last year. The most important of these is State v. Gendusa,1
which was considered on appeal from a second trial. The indictment was for burglary under Section 850 of the Revised Statutes,2
a capital offense. The court previously had held on the first appeal" that the indictment was fatally defective in that the prosecution had failed to charge the defendant with breaking. This
defect was remedied in the new indictment. To support this ingredient of the offense the State introduced evidence that
Gendusa opened an unlatched screen door which was kept closed
by an ordinary spring. The Supreme Court affirmed the holding
of the district court that this constituted sufficient breaking to
satisfy the terms of the statute. Without purporting to criticize
the correctness of this conclusion one is likely to be impressed
by the fact that the seriousness of Gendusa's conduct did not
arise from the opening of an unlatched screen door, but rather
from his entering a defenseless dwelling at night with intent to
steal, and particularly from his beating the sleeping occupants
4
into a state of insensibility.
Gendusa raised two interesting points regarding the effect of
the Supreme Court's action on the first appeal. The indictment
had been declared fatally defective as an insufficient statement
of the capital offense of burglary as defined by Section 850 of the
1. 193 La. 59, 190 So. 332 (1939).
2. La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, § 850, as amended by La. Act 21 of 1926, § 1
[Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) art. 818].
3. 190 La. 422, 182 So. 559 (1938). The first appeal of this case was discussed by Hall, The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1937-1938
Term, Criminal Law and Procedure (1939) 1 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 371, 376381.
4. Under the present statute the essentials of the crime are satisfied by
an allegation and evidence that defendant was armed with a dangerous
weapon, even though no assault was committed. La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, § 850,
as amended by La. Act 21 of 1926 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) art. 818].
La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, § 854, as amended by La. Act 20 of 1926, § 1
[Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) art. 821], defining burglary of a less serious
degree, requires a breaking only *Chen the offense is committed in the daytime. It appears that the substantial, distinguishing feature between Sections
850 and 854 lies in the more serious menace to personal safety denounced by

the former section.

t
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Revised Statutes,' and the case had been remanded. On the
present appeal the defendant contended that the court had tacitly
admitted in the earlier decision that the first indictment adequately charged all facts necessary to constitute a violation of
Section 854 of the Revised Statutes" (a less serious type of burglary, in which the entry, if at night, need not be attended by
breaking). From this the defendant concluded that the new trial
was prescribed under Article 8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
More than one year had elapsed between the commission of the
crime and the filing of the second indictment. He contended that
prescription had not been interrupted, since the indictment had
not been annulled or set aside except as it attempted to charge
a capital offense. He further argued that for the same reason the
second trial placed him in double jeopardy. In answer to these
contentions the court pointed out that when the defendant presented his motions to quash and in arrest of judgment on the
first appeal he had urged that the indictment "fails to state or set
out any offense known to the law." The court further stated that
the purpose of remanding the case on the first appeal was not to
enable a second prosecution on the invalid indictment.
The conclusion that the offense was not prescribed appears
fair enough. However, it is difficult to understand how the
sufficiency or insufficiency of the indictment could be affected
by the defendant's contention on the previous appeal or the
court's purpose in remanding the case. The fact remains that the
indictment was inadequate under Section 850, Revised Statutes,
but did sufficiently set forth the offense condemned by Section
854. A more direct solution might have been achieved through a
judicial interpretation of the terms, "quashed, annulled or set
aside," as they appear in the prescription article.
In State v. McCranie7 the requisites of intent and fraud in
the crime of forgery were considered by the court. The offense,
as defined by Section 833 of the Revised Statutes,8 is not complete
unless it was perpetrated with the intent to "injure or defraud
any person." In practice, however, the mental requisities of forgery are usually satisfied if there is evidence indicating that some
5. La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, § 850, as amended by La. Act 21 of 1926,
[Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) art. 818].
6. La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, § 854, as amended by La. Act 20 of 1926,
[Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) art. 821].
7. 192 La. 163, 187 So. 278 (1939).
8. La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, § 833, as amended by La. Acts 67 of 1896
204 of 1918, § 1 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) art. 936].
9. See the charge of the lower court approved in State v. Laborde,
La. 136, 45 So. 38 (1907).

§ 1
§ 1
and
120
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person may suffer by receiving the paper as genuine." The possibility of injury as indicated above is usually gathered solely
from the nature of the instrument and the circumstances attendant on the defendant's conduct. It follows that "fraud," and "intent to defraud" are terms more properly descriptive of external'
facts than of the defendant's state of mind. Neither the wishes
nor the motive of the accused are likely to be of any consequence
in determining the existence of the crime; nor is the fact that
loss did not follow the wrongful conduct a matter of any importance.
Article 284 of the Code of Criminal Procedure categorically
provides that all objections to the indictment must be taken
before arraignment. However, the consequences of non-observance of this requirement are not set forth, and the provision of
the article is somewhat inconsistent with other parts of the Code.
For example, Article 253 allows the court in its discretion to entertain a motion to quash after the commencement of the trial,
and Article 265 permits the defendant at any time, with the consent of the court, to withdraw his plea of not guilty and substitute
a demurrer oi" a motion to quash. The Supreme Court recently
held in the case of State v. Verdin ° that refusal to allow withdrawal and substitution after the trial has begun amounts to an
abuse of discretion if the defect in the indictment is one of
substance. A similar rule would probably prevail under Article
253 where the motion to quash is not attended by a withdrawal
of the plea. It is interesting to note that this latter article makes
elaborate provision for amendment and continuance of trial
where the defect is one of form; and even if amendment is made
to an error of substance, the trial may be allowed to proceed if
it clearly appears from the whole proceedings that the accused
has not been prejudiced or misled by the defect and his rights
will be fully protected. 1 However, if the defendant proceeds
10. 192 La. 275, 187 So. 666 (1939).
11. Art. 253, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928: "No indictment shall be
quashed, set aside or dismissed or motion to quash be sustained or any
motion for delay of sentence for the purpose of review be granted, nor shall
any conviction be set aside or reversed on account of any defect in form or
substance of the indictment, unless the objection to such indictment, specifically stating the defect claimed, be made prior to the commencement
of the trial or at such time thereafter as the court in its discretion permit.
The court may at any time before, during or after the trial amend the indictnent in respect to any defect, imperfection or omission in form or
substance or of any variance with the evidence. If any amendment be made
to the substance of the indictment or to cure a variance between the indictment and the proof, the accused shall on his motion be entitled to a
discharge of the jury, if a jury has been empaneled and to a reasonable
continuance of the cause unless it shall clearly appear from the whole pro-
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under Article 265, it is not clear that these elastic provisions of
Article 253 are available to the trial court. Certainly the latter
article does not expressly contemplate the event of issue between
State and defendant being withdrawn. It appears reasonable to
assume that where complaint is made of a defect so serious that
judgment could not properly be pronounced on a verdict responsive to the indictment, the motion to quash or the demurrer
must be granted. But it does not necessarily follow that the defendant must be permitted to withdraw the plea of not guilty
under Article 265. Amendment and continuance of the trial may
often be advantageous where the error, even though one of substance, is such that the provisions and safeguards of Article 253
are applicable. It is believed that the two articles can easily be
reconciled arid construed in harmony with each other. Perhaps
such a procedure might have been followed to advantage in the
Verdin case. The indictment in that case failed to allege the time
and place of the commission of the several breaches of the peace
with which the defendant was charged. Furthermore, it appears
that the motion was filed before any evidence had been introduced by the prosecution. It is not unlikely that an amendment
of the indictment and a continuance would have adequately protected the defendant, and thus avoided the necessity of a new
indictment and arraignment.
For obvious reasons a plea to the territorial jurisdiction of
the court may be interposed at any time, and if the court sustains
the plea, no further proceedings can be had before the same
tribunal. In State v. Nugent 2 the Supreme Court correctly pointed
out that Section 9, Article 1 (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution
of 1921 guarantees that the defendant shall neither be convicted
nor tried in any parish other than the one in which the crime
was committed.
The manner of drawing the grand jury is set forth in Article
184 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. However, failure to conceedings that he has not been misled or prejudiced by the defect or variance
in respect to which the amendment is made or that his rights will be fully
protected by the proceedings with the trial or by a postponement thereof
to a later day with the same or another jury. In case a jury shall be discharged from further consideration of a case under this section, the accused
shall not be deemed to have been in jeopardy. No action of the court in refusing a continuance or postponement under this article shall be reviewable
except after motion to and refusal by the trial court to grant a new' trial
therefor and no appeal based upon such action of the court shall be sustained, nor reversal had, unless from consideration of the whole proceedings,
the reviewing court shall find that the accused was prejudiced in his defense
or that a failure of justice resulted."
12.'191 La. 198, 184 So. 746 (1938).
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form to the provisions of this article was held in State v. Saba's
not to constitute a matter of jurisdiction. Hence an objection to
the method of selecting the grand jury cannot be asserted on a
motion in arrest of judgment. In the Saba case the slips on which
the names of the grand jurors were written were emptied from
their envelope into a cigar box from whence they were drawn
by the sheriff. This procedure had been previously condemned
by the Supreme Court and held sufficient ground to sustain a
motion to quash.1 4 In the earlier case the court had said:
"We conclude that the defendant was indicted by an illegally
impaneled grand jury and, consequently, in contemplation of
law, there was no grand jury-hence, no indictment upon
which a legal conviction could be predicated."'15
This statement, accepted at its face value, doubtless lends support to the defendant's contention in the present case that his
objection could be asserted at any time, even after verdict. However, the correctness of the court's conclusion in the Saba case is
not open to serious question from the standpoint of efficient trial
practice. The above quotation from the earlier decision must be
regarded as an overstatement of the court's posifion.
In two cases objections were made to the fairness of trial.
In State v. Migues1 6 the question was somewhat pretermitted by
the fact that the application for a new trial was not made until
after verdict. The court held that the proper procedure for voicing
objection is by motion for change of venue made before trial and
not by motion for a new trial. In this case the fact which was
alleged to have prevented a fair and impartial trial was the publication of the Lunacy Commission's report, the findings of which
were adverse to the defendant's claim of insanity. He charged
that this report created an adverse sentiment in the community.
The court held that nothing in Article 267 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, as amended by Act 136 of 1932, prevents such publication. In the case of State v. Price'7 the defendant moved for
a change of venue, alleging that he was a ranger whose duties
included supervision of the dipping of cattle. He claimed that
13. 191 La. 1009, 187 So. 7 (1939).
14. State v. Kifer, 186 La. 674, 173 So. 169 (1937). In State v. Obey,.193
La. 176, 190 So. 371 (1939), the court reaffirmed a position previously taken
that the signature of the foreman of the grand jury on the bill of indictment
must affirmatively appear in the record.
15. State v. Kifer, 186 La. 674, 685, 173 So. 169, 172 (1937).
16. 191 La. 55, 184 So. 540 (1938).
17. 192 La. 615, 188 So. 718 (1939).
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this practice was very unpopular in the community, and created
sentiment so adverse that a fair trial was impossible. Forty-two
witnesses were heard in determining the motion, half of whom
were called by defendant and half by the State. Eighteen witnesses were of opinion that the defendant could secure a fair and
impartial trial in Rapides Parish, while fourteen held the contrary view. Ten of the persons summoned declared that they had
not heard the case discussed. This testimony obviously presented
no situation which would warrant the Supreme Court in reversing the ruling of the trial court, which had refused a change
of venue.
Complaint regarding the fairness of trial was made under
18
rather novel circumstances in the case of State v. O'Day. The
defendant was tried and convicted of manslaughter. Thereafter
a bill of information was filed for the purpose of having him
sentenced as a triple offender under Act 15 of 1928.19 Evidence
of two prior convictions was set forth and the defendant was
sentenced for a term of from forty to sixty years. He had previously been indicted and convicted in the Province of Alberta,
Canada, for the offense of "theft of an automobile." This conviction was one of the items presented in the bill of information.
On appeal, however, the Supreme Court held that the offense of
"theft" as defined by Article 347 of the Dominion Criminal Code
does not necessarily constitute a felony under the laws of Louisiana. 20 For this reason the judgment of conviction as a third
offender was set aside. However, the judgment finding defendant
guilty as a second offender was affirmed, and the case was remanded for imposition of sentence. On motion for rehearing the
defendant urged that the admission of evidence of the Canadian
offense was highly prejudicial and that the entire finding of the
trial court was affected thereby. This, he asserted, deprived him
of a fair trial. The court correctly dismissed the contention. The
question of whether or not defendant had been previously convicted and sentenced for previous felonies was simply an inquiry
of fact and no question of guilt or innocense of the earlier crime
was involved.
18. 191 La. 380, 185 So. 290 (1938).
19. Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) arts. 709-711.
20. Only brief reference has been made above to this main point at issue
in the O'Day case. The question is one of considerable difficulty and merits
extended discussion. For this reason it has been considered in a Comment
which appears at page 177 in this number of the LOUISIANA LAW Rvisw.
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The Supreme Court has reaffirmed the position that the
allowance of a new trial or a continuance rests largely in the
sound discretion of the trial judge.2 1 His findings will not be
disturbed unless it is clearly shown that there has been an abuse
of discretion. Where the motion for a new trial is based on
allegedly. newly discovered evidence the court must be convinced
not only that the new testimony was unknown to the petitioner
during the first trial but likewise that it could not have been
discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence by the
defendant and his counsel. Thus, where witnesses in a trial for
manslaughter were residents of the defendant's neighborhood
and the defendant was unable to show that he could not have
secured their presence on the initial trial, a new trial to make
their testimony available was refused.22 In practice the degree
of diligence required of counsel will likely be influenced by the
apparent value of the newly discovered evidence, and it is noteworthy that in the case under consideration the new testimony
would probably have had no appreciable effect on the verdict.
Numerous irregularities in the selection, qualifications and
conduct of the petit jury were urged during the past year as
grounds for new trials. Without exception these efforts were unsuccessful, and in most instances the asserted defects were trivial.
A new trial is not likely to be granted for irregularities relative
to the conduct and sequestration of the jury unless it is apparent
that there are substantial grounds inducing the court to believe
that the fairness of the trial was thereby affected. Here again the
ruling of the trial court is highly persuasive on appeal and notice
is taken of all safeguards and correctives adopted to minimize
the effect of the asserted irregularities. In State v. Migues 23 complaint was made of the refusal of the trial court to permit the
defendant's counsel to examine each slip as it was drawn for the
tales jury box. It was held, however, that the procedure was conducted under circumstances which adequately protected the defendant's interest. In State v. Stephens 4 one of the petit jurors
had previously been convicted of unlawful possession of liquor in
violation of the federal laws. This offense was declared to be
merely a misdemeanor. It does not disqualify a juror under Article 172, Code of Criminal Procedure, which renders ineligible
21. State v. Longino, 191 La. 714, 186 So. 79 (1939); State v. Gray, 192 La.
1081, 190 So. 224 (1939).
22. State v. Gray, 192 La. 1081, 190 So. 224 (1939).
23. 191 La. 55, 184 So. 540 (1938).
24. 191 La. 111, 184 So. 559 (1938).
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for jury service anyone who has been convicted at any time of
any felony. The following circumstances were severally urged
as violations of sequestration rules: the presence of an attending
physician in a hotel room in which the jury was sequestered,2 5
the attendance of a deputy sheriff who had not taken the oath
of office,21 and the presence of unsworn jurymen among the jurors
27
before trial.
According to the traditional English practice the officer in
whose custody the jury was placed during the consideration of
its verdict was required to take an oath that he would keep the
jury "in some convenient and private place without meat, drink
or fire (candlelight excepted) .... 1-28The extent to which this
ancient requirement has been relaxed is well illustrated by the
recent case of State v. Price.29 Five pints of whiskey served free
of charge to the jury during four days of deliberation was held
not sufficient ground for a new trial where it appeared that the
distribution among the jury seemed to have been "fair enough"
and none of them drank to excess. However, the court condemned
the practice of drinking intoxicants in the jury room. The question was one of little practical importance since the case was
remanded on other grounds.
The high degree of latitude allowed the trial judge in the
conduct of trial is exemplified in State v. Williams." In this case
the judge allowed twenty-eight hours to elapse from the time
when the arguments were closed until the time when he delivered
his charge to the jury. During this period the jurymen were
allowed to separate, and one of them served on the jury in
another case. The Supreme Court pointed out that separation is
permissible under Article 394 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
It further decided that the period of twenty-eight hours, although
unusual, was not excessive in view of the fact that the trial judge
was of opinion that he required this time to prepare his instructions. The Supreme Court, apparently motivated by absence of
precedent, held that service by a juror on another case in the
interim was not sufficient ground to warrant setting aside the
verdict, unless the defendant could show that he suffered a disadvantage thereby. The wisdom of this conclusion is open to
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

State v. Migues, 191 La. 55, 184 So. 540 (1938).
State v. Odom, 192 La. 257, 187 So. 659 (1939).
State v. Longino, 191 La. 714, 186 So. 79 (1939).
2 Bishop, New Criminal Procedure (2 ed. 1913) 846, § 991.
192 La. 615, 188 So. 718 (1939).
192 La. 713, 189 So. 112 (1939).
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question. The defendant usually will be unable to show specifically that his interest was adversely affected by such procedure.
It appears that the possibility of injury is a general one and grows
out of the fact that concentration and disputation on a foreign
set of facts tends to dim the memory of the juryman and becloud
his impressions of the earlier trial. It is imperative that the jury
should not only be isolated from corrupt and subversive influences but likewise should be shielded from situations which
would tend to confuse the facts presented on trial. Both policies
appear to underlie the elaborate sequestration provisions which
are found in all jurisdictions.
Failure to meet the technical prerequisities to appeal pretermitted consideration of the merits of several cases. Shortcomings in the bills of exceptions resulted in the denial of appeal
in at least two instances1 In the case of State v. Kennedy"
failure to apply for a new trial in the district court as required
by Article 559, Code of Criminal Procedure, precluded the defendant from making such motion on appeal.
In State v. Verdin33 the defendant acquiesced in the judgment of the trial court and paid his fine while his appeal to the
Supreme Court was pending. These facts were urged by the State
on re-hearing in an effort to persuade the Supreme Court to set
aside its prior judgment which had reversed conviction. The defendant filed ex parte affidavits tending to show that he had
requested the district judge to suspend the operation of the sentence until the Supreme Court should have an opportunity to pass
on pending applications for certain writs. He alleged that this
request was refused and that the defendant paid his fine, not in
acquiescence in the judgment, but rather to avoid serving a jail
sentence which was not recallable. The Supreme Court refused
to pass on this issue, and remanded the case for the purpose of
having the record completed regularly and the issue determined.
In State v. Scruggs3 4 the defendant and his wife were indicted

for larceny of goods of the value of more than $100. However,
they were convicted of larceny of goods valued at less than $100.
Pending appeal the defendant broke jail and escaped, whereupon
31. State v. Odom, 192 La. 257, 187 So. 659 (1939). Bills of exception were
prepared but were not signed by the trial judge. State v. Carlson, 192 La.
501, 188 So. 155 (1939). Testimony complained of was copied in the record
and exceptions were taken on trial, but no formal bill was prepared. Cf. State
v. Taylor, 192 La. 653, 188 So. 731 (1939).
32. 192 La. 846, 189 So. 450 (1939).
33. 192 La. 275, 187 So. 666 (1939), noted in (1939) 39 Col. L. Rev. 1244.
34. 192 La. 297, 187 So. 673 (1939).
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the Attorney General filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. The
motion was granted. The court resorted to the well-known rule
that if a person convicted of a criminal offense breaks jail and
escapes, his appeal will be dismissed. However, Chief Justice
O'Niell, in a dissenting opinion, asserted that the sentence was an
absolute nullity, and that if the defendants were apprehended
they could not be compelled to serve imprisonment on an invalid
conviction and sentence.
The district court has no criminal jurisdiction over juveniles
under seventeen years of age except for capital crimes and assault
with intent to rape2 This limitation raises difficult problems
where the defendant, a juvenile, is charged with murder.
Complications arise from the fact that the jury may properly
return either of three verdicts: guilty as charged, guilty of murder without capital punishment, or guilty of manslaughter. If the
latter verdict is pronounced, the defendant cannot be sentenced,
but must be turned over to the juvenile court. How should the
jurymen be instructed, so that their verdict will be in proper
form and yet will not be affected by knowledge that a return of
manslaughter will deprive the district court of jurisdiction to
proceed to sentence? Formerly the procedure was to instruct the
jury that if it should find the defendant guilty of manslaughter
and further find that the defendant was under the age of seventeen years at the time the crime was committed, it, the jury,
should report these findings and return no verdict.3 6 There are
two major vices in this instruction. First, it imposes on the jury
the determination of a jurisdictional fact, which is properly a
function of the court. Second, it suggests that a verdict of manslaughter returned against the juvenile will be a nullity. Under
this instruction the jury may likely find the defendant guilty of
murder in order to prevent an escape from punishment. For these
reasons the Supreme Court in the recent case of State v. Bedford37 has revised the procedure. No distinction between adult
and juvenile defendants is now permissible in the general instructions, and the jury must be apprised of the three verdicts
available in a murder trial. If a verdict of manslaughter is returned, the trial judge shall then determine through a special
proceeding whether the defendant was under the age of seventeen years at the time of the killing. This marks a definite im35. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 52; La. Act 83 of 1921 (E.S.), § 5 [Dart's
Stats. (1939) § 1683).
36. State v. West, 173 La. 974, 139 So. 304 (1932).
37. 193 La. 104, 190 So. 347 (1939).
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provement over the old procedure and eliminates the difficulties
referred to above.
In the case of State ex rel. Clayton v. Joness the court was
confronted with the problem of determining whether or not the
finding of the trial judge that the accused was over the age of
seventeen years is a conclusive finding and precludes further inquiry into the question through resort to a writ of habeas corpus
after the defendant has been convicted and imprisoned. The
Supreme Court declared that a quesion of jurisdiction can be
raised on motion in arrest of judgment, on appeal, or by petition
for writ of habeas corpus.
The result achieved by the decision is proper under the facts
as presented and accords with the solicitous regard which the
court manifests toward delinquent juveniles. Unfortunately,
however, the broad rule announced is likely to encourage
attempts to use the writ of habeas corpus for the purpose of reopening criminal litigation after it has properly been put at rest
by final court determination. The court made no attempt to distinguish an absence of jurisdiction from those situations where
the existence of jurisdiction depends on a controverted issue of
fact which must be determined and is determined by the court
before rendering judgment. In the latter instance the court is
vested with power to find the facts on which its jurisdiction
depends, and in that sense it exercises jurisdiction in disposing
of the preliminary inquiry, although the result may be that it
determines that it cannot go further. An erroneous finding of
fact is subject to correction through the usual channels of appeal;
but should the question be subject to further inquiry in an independent proceeding instituted after avenues for appeal have been
abandoned or are closed? The conclusion of law reached in the
instant case is opposed to the rule which generally prevails in
other jurisdictions.-9
Several decisions relative to evidence in criminal proceedings were handed down during the past year. In two cases the
court considered the admissibility in a criminal trial of evidence
38. 192 La. 671, 188 So. 737 (1939).
39. Toy Toy v. Hopkins, 212 U.S. 542, 29 S. Ct. 416, 53 L. Ed. 644 (1909).
See also cases cited in 15 C. J. "Courts" § 173, n. 83.
Art. 137 (1), La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928, provides that the writ of
habeas corpus is available where the court ordering defendant confined "has
exceeded its jurisdiction." However, it is doubtful that this situation obtains
under the facts of the present case.
A more detailed consideration of this problem will be made in the
January issue of the LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
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of prior offenses. In the case of State v. McCranie,40 the defendant was indicted for forging the endorsement on a check payable
to his employer. The prosecution succeeded in introducing evidence of several prior forgeries of endorsements which were
alleged to have been made under circumstances similar to those
in the case at trial. The evidence was held admissible as tending
to prove intent to defraud, a system, and guilty knowledge. The
Supreme Court supported its conclusion by referring to Articles
445, 446 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The same problem
41
received detailed consideration in the case of State v. Rives.
The defendant was tried for larceny of cows belonging to W. He
objected to the introduction of testimony which tended to show
that several months before the commission of this offense he had
solicited certain persons to aid in the theft of cows belonging to
N. The per curiam of the trial judge assigned as reasons for the
admission of the evidence, that the earlier solicitations showed
method and intention and also that they indicated that defendant
had "a mind bent on doing mischief." The Supreme Court reversed this ruling and remanded the case.
Odom, J., prepared the opinion, in which he reviewed most
of the decisions of Louisiana pertinent to the problem. Evidence
of the earlier offenses was not admissible to show method, he
stated, because no attempt had been made by the State to reveal
any particular method employed by defendant in committing
the crime with which he was charged. He further ruled that the
evidence was not admissible to show intent. This element of the
crime of larceny is usually established by the facts and circumstances surrounding the particular case under investigation. Only
when the evidence might reasonably permit an inference that
the defendant acted in good faith or perhaps through a mistake
as to ownership is it permissible to show previous offenses of a
similar nature. Any effort to show that defendant had "a mind
bent on doing mischief" resolves itself into an attack on the defendant's general character. No such attack can be made by the
issue.
prosecution until the defendant has placed his character in 42
The following quotation from the opinion is noteworthy:
"A reading of the cases shows that in each instance where
testimony of the commission of extraneous offenses by the
accused was admitted, the separate offense had a direct bear40. 192 La. 163, 187 So. 278 (1939).
41. 193 La. 186, 190 So. 374 (1939).
42. 190 So. at 381.
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ing upon or some connection with, or threw some light upon,
the issue before the jury. There is no doubt that, for the purpose of showing intent, the State may, under some circumstances, introduce testimony tending to show that the prisoner
had committed other like crimes. But, for the testimony to be
relevant, it must be shown that the extraneous crimes bear
some relation to the main charge."
The court dismissed the contention that Articles 445 and 446
of the Code of Criminal Procedure were intended to facilitate the
introduction of evidence of prior offenses. These articles only
affirm the general principles applied by all courts.
The elaborate network of restrictions which make up the
hearsay rule and its exceptions operated to give the defendant
a new trial in State v. Price.48 The State succeeded in introducing
a dying declaration in a prosecution for manslaughter. The deceased had been shot and was taken to his home across the street.
Immediately he asked for his friend, C, and stated to him that
"he didn't believe he could make it, couldn't make it." He then
made his declaration in which he charged that the defendant had
shot him. Thirty or forty minutes later he repeated the statement
to another person, L, and requested that he be taken to a hospital several miles away where he died a few days later. The
Supreme Court held that the admission of the deceased's statement implicating defendant was reversible error. The fact that
the deceased asked to be taken to a distant hospital indicated that
he did not contemplate imminent death, said the court. In order
for the statement to be admissible the declarant must contemplate
the immediate prospect of death. It is not enough that he has
abandoned hope of recovery. The ruling in this case can hardly
be termed a liberal one, even in a department of law where a
highly cautious attitude prevails. It is difficult to understand how
the request of the deceased that he be taken to a hospital could
affect the solemnity of his declaration to C made at least forty
minutes earlier.
The case of State v. McKee 4 4 involved a conspiracy to rob
and murder. The trial court admitted the testimony of one conspirator to the effect that he and the defendant purchased an
automobile with their undivided portion of the spoils of the crime.
This ruling was affirmed on appeal. The court announced the
43. 192 La. 615, 188 So. 718 (1939).,

44. 193 La. 39, 190 So. 325 (1939).
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familiar rule that the conspiracy continues until the spoils have
been divided, if a division of the loot is contemplated by the
conspiracy. So long as the conspiracy continues the statements
of one conspirator are admissible against the others. Furthermore, the evidence of the purchase of the car was admissible in
corroboration of the testimony of the conspirator who implicated
defendant in the confederation. Chief Justice O'Niell rendered
a special concurring opinion in which he rested the admissibility
of the evidence solely on the ground of corroboration.
V. PUBLIC LAW
A. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The only case which raised an important issue of constitutional law before the Supreme Court during the last term was
Hibernia Mortgage Co. v. Greco., In this case the defendant,
Greco, had purchased certain real estate, giving in payment part
cash and a promissory note secured by a mortgage and vendor's
lien on the property. The note was then acquired by the plaintiff
mortgage company. Thereafter Greco sold the property to the
defendant Toga Realty Company, a corporation, which assumed
the payment of the promissory note. Four years later the legislature enacted a statute levying a franchise tax on corporations
doing business in Louisiana and providing that the lien of such
tax should be a first lien on all corporation property. Thus, the
tax lien was subsequent in time to the vendor's lien. The Hibernia Mortgage Company then obtained the property by sheriff's
sale. Thereupon the mortgage company obtained a rule on the
state to show cause why the mortgage and vendor's lien should not
be declared superior to the state's tax lien. The mortgage company contended that a holding that the subsequently obtained
tax lien was prior in law to its vendor's lien would be unconstitutional as an impairment of the obligations of a contract. It
was held that the statute was constitutional and that the state's
lien was superior.
The court admitted that a state statute is unconstitutional if
it destroys or directly impairs the remedy for the enforcement
of an obligation of a contract, but stated that the fundamental
purpose of the present act was the collection of the state's revenue and that its effect on private obligations was merely indirect
or collateral and therefore not open to constitutional objection.
1. 191 La. 658, 186 So. 60 (1939).
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Moreover, the court pointed out that the contract in question
was an obligation between private parties and that as such the
contract had been entered into with reference to the inherent
taxing power of the state. Therefore, the fact that the tax statute
was passed subsequently to the origin of the contract was immaterial.
The court was careful to distinguish this case from the long
line of decisions which holds that a state may not impair the
obligation of its own contracts by subsequent operation of its
taxing power. 2 These cases hold that the solemn undertaking of
a state in the exercise of its power to borrow money is in effect
a commitment of the state not to derogate from this obligation
by the exercise of some other sovereign power. It is interesting
to note that these decisions in effect hold that the exercise of one
sovereign power may bar or render ineffectual the exercise of
another power. The situation is strikingly similar to that before
the Supreme Court of the United States in one of the celebrated
gold clause cases. Perry v. United States' ruled that the federal
government could not invalidate its own obligation to redeem
certain certificates in gold.4 It will also be recalled that in another
one of these cases the abrogation of the gold clauses in private
obligations was sustained.'
The holding of the Hibernia Mortgage Company case seems
to be directly contrary to a dictum in the case of Domenech v.
Lee, 6 decided by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit. In that case it was held that a Puerto Rican
statute making certain work relief premiums prior liens on employers' property could not be construed as making such liens
superior to the lien of mortgages executed previously to the
effective date of the statute. The court felt that a contrary decision would be an unconstitutional impairment of the obligations
of a contract. In this connection the court said, "we are of the
opinion that this provision of the act [of 1928] is not to be construed as giving a prior and superior lien over the intervenor's
mortgage upon the real estate, for to give it that effect would be
2. Cited in the court's opinion and discussed at length. 191 La. at 666675, 186 So. at 62-66.
3. 294 U.S. 330, .55 S. Ct. 432, 79 L. Ed. 912, 95 A.L.R. 1335 (1935).
4. It will be remembered, however, that that case was disposed of in
favor of the government since the petitioner failed to prove damage.
5. Norman v. B. & 0. R. Co., 294 U.S. 240, 55 S. Ct. 407, 79 L. Ed. 885, 95
A.L.R. 1352 (1935).
6. 66 F. (2d) 31, 35 (C.C.A. 1st, 1933), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 708, 54 S. Ct.
207, 78 L. Ed. 608 (1933).
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to impair the obligations of the contract created by the mortgage
given to the [intervenor] in 1926."
Perhaps the plaintiff could have contended that the statute
deprived it of its property without due process of law. Certain
other priority of lien cases have held that the due process clause
is applicable.

7

In a per curiam decision on an application for re-hearing in
the HiberniaMortgage Company case the court made it clear that
its decision was restricted to the facts of the instant case in which
the proceeding was by way of an ordinary suit against the original mortgagor and the corporation which had bought the mortgaged property and had assumed the debt. It expressed no opinion
on the question whether "a holder of a mortgage, with a stipulation that the mortgagor shall not alienate or hypothecate the
mortgaged property to the prejudice of the mortgagee, may protect himself in a situation like this by availing himself of the
pact de non alienando; that is, by bringing an action quasi in rem,
as by an executory proceeding against only the original mortgagor and the mortgaged property."8
In Graham Mfg. Co. v. Rolland,9 a foreign corporation having
no branch office in the state and employing only traveling salesmen to solicit orders was held not subject to a license tax on
corporations doing business within the state. The statute which
sets forth the requirements for a foreign corporation to do business within the state0 makes a special exemption for corporations which engage only in interstate or foreign commerce. Moreover, the Constitution of the United States under the commerce
clause forbids the licensing of businesses of this character which
are deemed to be engaged in purely interstate commerce."
In State v. Board of Pharmacy of Louisiana,1 2 the relator
asked for a writ of mandamus and in the alternative for a mandatory injunction to the State Board of Pharmacy compelling
it to renew his license to practice the profession of pharmacy
7. Fisher v. Wineman, 125 Mich. 642, 84 N.W. 1111, 52 L.R. A. 192 (1901);
Pacific Spruce Corp. v. Oregon Portland Cement Co., 133 Ore. 223, 286 Pac.
520, 289 Pac. 489, 72 A.L.R. 1507 (1930).
8. 191 La. 658, 676-677, 186 So. 60, 66 (1939).
9. 191 La. 757, 186 So. 93 (1939).
10. La. Act 267 of 1914, § 24 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1247].
11. Robbins v. Shelby County, 120 U.S. 489, 7 S. Ct. 592, 30 L. Ed. 694
(1887).
12. 192 La. 551, 188 So. 697 (1939).
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upon the payment of one dollar. 12a He claimed that Act 305 of

1936 fixing the fee at five dollars was unconstitutional.
The position of the relator was somewhat obscure. By submitting the fee of one dollar the relator admitted that the collection of a fee in some amount was constitutional. The court
held that the amount of five dollars per annum did not appear
excessive. The relator's main contention seemed to be that the
challenged act of 1936 provided that four-fifths of the amount of
the fee should be placed in a special fund "to be used only for
the necessary expenses of inspection, enforcement and statistical
research by representatives of the State Board of Pharmacy or
its duly authorized agency."''
It is clear, as the court pointed out, that that provision of the
act is a police measure and is not intended to raise revenue;
therefore the claim of the relator that his property had been
taken without due process of law and that a burden which should
be borne by the general public had been saddled on him was not
well founded.
A case which incidentally raised a point of constitutional
law was Barret v. First Nat. Bank of Shreveport.14 Here the court
sustained a statute which provided that the prescriptive period
for a bank's liability for payment of a forged check should be one
year after notice to depositor that vouchers representing payments are ready for delivery, or if such notice is not given, then
one year after return of such voucher. The plaintiff had argued
that this was an unconstitutional discrimination between the
depositors to whom delivery of vouchers has been made and
those who have been merely notified that vouchers are ready for
delivery.
Three cases 15 raised the objection that the titles of certain
statutes in question failed to meet the requirements of Article
3, section 16 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921 which provides
that "every law enacted by the legislature shall embrace but one
object, and shall have a title indicative of such object." The court
indicated that it intended to follow a principle of liberal con12a. As provided for by the original "Pharmacy Act," La. Act 66 of 1888,

as amended.
13. 192 La. at 558, 188 So. at 699.
14. 191 La. 945, 186 So. 741 (1939), noted in (1939) 1 LOUISIANA LAW REvmw 835.
15. State v. Board of Pharmacy of Louisiana, 192 La. 551, 188 So. 697
(1939); State v. Martin, 192 La. 704, 189 So. 109 (1939); Jackson v. Hart, 192
La. 1068, 190 So. 220 (1939).
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struction in passing upon constitutional objections of this sort.
17
It moreover stated in State v. Martin0 and in Jackson v. Hart
that the means adopted to enforce a law is not an object of the
law and therefore need not be included in the title of the law.

B.

EMINENT DOMAIN

Parish of Jefferson v. Texas Co.' involved an expropriation
case which raised the issue of the nature of the title which the
Parish of Jefferson took in certain condemnation proceedings. In
1919 Congress authorized the construction of a canal known as
the Dupre Cut in Jefferson Parish on condition that no expenses
should be incurred by the United States for acquiring any lands
or easements necessary for the improvement thereof. The Parish
of Jefferson obtained a judgment expropriating an eighty-acre
strip of the marsh land of the heirs of one Samuel Davis. In
accordance with the judgment of expropriation the parish paid
the sum of $2.00 per acre for the land taken. Thereafter by
notarial act of, donation the parish transferred perpetual use of
the land to the United States. The defendants held leases claimed
by the heirs of the original owner of the land and the parish
brought suit to remove clouds on its title. The dispute centered
on the nature of the title which the parish took by the condemnation proceedings and the nature of the title which it donated
to the United States for use in connection with the canal. Interests
of the United States, of Jefferson Parish and of the heirs of the
original owner and their leases were therefore involved.
The issue can be stated in the form of a dilemma such as often
appeared in the old text books of logic. If we concede the right
of the Louisiana courts to pass on this suit notwithstanding the
absence of the United States as a necessary party, the Texas
Company's claims r-ight be put as follows:
By the expropriation proceedings Jefferson Parish attempted to take either (1) full ownership, or (2) a servitude.
If the parish attempted to take full ownership then the title
taken over and above a servitude was a taking of property
for a private use and was unconstitutional; and if the parish
be held to have taken full ownership then it donated full
ownership to the United States, in which case it could not
maintain a suit to remove clouds from its alleged title. If the
parish took merely a servitude, then by the act of donation
16. 192 La. 704, 189,So. 109 (1939).
17. 192 La. 1068, 190 So. 220 (1939).

1. 192 La. 934, 189 So. 580 (1939).
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it gave to the United States all that it took and the right to
the use of the lands in ways that do not interfere with the
operation of the canal remained in the heirs of the original
owner and in their lessees. In either event, therefore, the
parish can not maintain its suit.
The court, by a majority of four justices held that the judgment of expropriation gave to the parish full ownership; that
such judgment was res judicata as against the heirs of the original owner and their privities; and that the act of donation conferred on the United States merely a servitude. Three justices
dissented, with Justice Odom declaring that the parish had intended to take only what was necessary for the operation of the
canal, to wit, a servitude; that it had donated the servitude to
the United States; and that the remaining interests in the land
were in the defendants.
The case is now before the Supreme Court of the United
States on certiorari.
C.

TAXATION

An extremely important decision clarifying the Industrial
Exemption provision of Paragraph 10 of Section 4 of Article X
of the Constitution, as amended by Act 68 of 1936, was Mattingly
v. Vial.1 That law exempts from taxation new industries or any
addition to any existing industry upon such terms as the Governor shall deem to the best interests of the state. In this case
the State had entered into a contract exempting Mattingly from
ad valorem taxes and from special taxes on all property used in
connection with Mattingly's milk plant on condition that Mattingly should make certain additions to his existing plant. Thereafter the state levied taxes on the real estate upon which the
plant was situated and on certain articles of merchandise held
on the property for future use in the operation of the plant.
It was held that these taxes were valid. The court laid down
the important principle that the object of the Industrial Exemption law was to relieve manufacturers of new or additional tax
burdens incident to the erection of new plants or of new additions to old plants; and that these exemptions should be strictly
construed. The court pointed out that it was not the intention
of the Constitution to permit plant owners to escape taxation on
property not strictly to be viewed as new plant or new additions
1. 193 La. 1, 190 So. 313 (1939).
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to old plant. Merchandise temporarily on the premises likewise
could not be viewed as additions to plant.
In preparing the regular assessment roll in 1935 a parish
assessor failed to extend thereon a special school tax against the
taxable property of the taxpayer. In 1936, the omission was
discovered and a supplementary tax roll was prepared in accordance with Section 12 of Act 170 of 1898, as amended, which indicates the procedure for the back assessment of property omitted
or "erroneously assessed." The taxpayer contended that the term
"assessment" in the act referred only to the listing of property
by description sufficient to identify it and did not include the
levy of taxes, nor the extension of taxes already levied. The court
held that the term "assessment" was a generic one used
synonymously with the whole statutory method of imposing the
tax, and as thus interpreted, the term "erroneously assessed" was
applicable to the property in question. Louisiana Central Lbr.
Co. v. Catahoula Parish School Bd.2
Morris v. Hankins3 held that a tax sale in which the property
is not described with such reasonable certainty as to make it
susceptible of identification cannot be brought within the curative
sections of Article 233 of the Constitution of 1898 which provides
a three year prescriptive period for defective tax sales. This constitutional provision is similar to that contained in Section 11 of
Article 10 of the Constitution of 1921.
State v. El Rito Transp. Co., Inc.' held that a franchise tax
upon the gross receipts of the intrastate business of a shipping
line which plied the Mississippi between New Orleans and Burwell
is not a burden upon interstate commerce. Nor is it contrary to the
Enabling Act 5 admitting Louisiana to statehood which provided
that the Mississippi and navigable rivers leading into it or into
the Gulf of Mexico should be common highways free of tax. The
court pointed out that the tax was not on the privilege to use
the Mississippi River but was a tax upon the gross receipts of
the purely intrastate business done, the tax being levied only
after the gross receipts had been reduced to possession. The court
likewise held that the taxes here sued for, being due and payable
prior to the passage of Act 182 of 1938, were not exempted by
the provisions of that statute even though taxes of this nature
2.
3.
4.
5.

191 La. 470, 185 So. 885 (1939).
192 La. 504, 188 So. 155 (1939).
193 La. 548, 190 So. 803 (1939).
2 Stat. 642 (1811).
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due subsequent to the act would be exempt. The court found in
the act no intention, express or implied, to make its exemption
retroactive and decided against the taxpayer on the familiar
principle that tax exemptions are to be strictly construed. The
court did not discuss the cases of Cooper v. Mintz & Goldblum6
and Fournet & Sierra Inc. v. Grosjean7 in which the state had
unsuccessfully attempted to collect "luxury taxes" after repeal
of the tax. These decisions rested on the ground that the repealing
act did not -contain a clause saving the right to prosecute claims
arising out of the tax statute.
State v. Grace8 decided that Act 161 of 1934 as amended by
Act 140 of 1935 (4 E.S.) did not permit redemption of tax property where the property had been donated to the Pontchartrain
Levee District. This decision in effect holds that the redemption
statutes do not apply to those cases in which land has been transferred to a subdivision -of the state and has been absolutely vested
in the subdivision. The Chief Justice and Justices Land and Odom
dissented.
In State v. Owin9 a license tax on retail dealers was held
applicable to a defendant, ninety per cent of whose purchases in
gold and silver were sold to the United States. The defendant's
contention that he was a wholesale dealer was rejected since the
court took judicial notice of the fact that the United States was
not a dealer, but a consumer, of gold and silver.
Where a subsidiary corporation receives and uses gasoline,
the subsidiary is liable for a dealers' tax and a suit against a
parent corporation for the amount of the tax must be dismissed.
The court in this case recognized the separate corporate existence
of the subsidiary despite the attempt on the part of the state to
show its substantial identity with the parent because of interlocking directorates, identical general executive officers, and
substantially complete ownership of the stock of the subsidiary
by the parent. State v. Gulf, Mobile & N. R. Co.10

D.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

The subject of municipal corporations is a growing field of
the law. In the era since the World War, the increase in federal
and state governmental activities has been so phenomenal that
6. 192 La. 1016, 190 So. 115 (1939).
7. 191 La. 186, 184 So. 719 (1938).
8. 191 La. 15, 184 So. 527 (1938), noted in

626.
9.'191 La. 617, 186 So. 46 (1939).
10. 191 La. 163, 184 So. 711 (1939).

(1939) 1 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
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one is apt to overlook a corresponding growth in the activities
of the lesser political entities. But just as surely as state and
federal action continue to impinge at an accelerated rate upon
the lives of the citizens, so do the village, the town, the district,
and the parish or county parallel this activity with an increase
in the functions of local government. We are witnessing an age
of public service by local public administrators, and the law
which directs and governs their activities has grown with them.
Suits to determine legality of municipal bond issues are a
species of litigation that is sui generis. Since these suits result in
a, kind of declaratory judgment they are a source of great convenience to the political entities, to the bond issuers, and to bondholders. Municipal financing is greatly facilitated by this device.
Nevertheless, certain possible dangers exist in the practice. Aided
by the thirty day prescriptive period for challenging the validity
of refunding bonds (Const. Art. XIV, §14g) and the sixty day
period for contesting bond issue elections (Const. Art. XIV, §14
(n) ) municipalities now find the legality of bond issues a thing
easy to establish. Conversely, dissatisfied taxpayers discover that
the issues are difficult to attack. This, added to the fact that the
legal issues are usually framed with an eye to purchasers' requirements, that the points urged are not contested with the
energy of those motivated by genuinely adverse interests, that
legal issues settled by many previous decisions may be raised
at will in the bond suit, thus retarding the growth of a jurisprudence of municipal corporations, all combine to raise a doubt that
such suits are an unmixed blessing from the point of view of the
public interest. In Sammons v. City of Lafayette1 and in Lapeyronnie v. Police Jury of Parish of Jefferson2 refunding bond suits
were admitted to have been brought more than thirty days after
the issuance of the bonds had been authorized. This admission
disposed of the most important aspects of the cases. The same
result was reached in Henning v. Town of Sulphur' where the
parties stipulated that "more than sixty days had elapsed between
the promulgation of the returns of each of the bond elections and
the date that this suit was filed."
In State ex rel. Maestri v. Cave, Com'r of Public Finance,4
all the manifold legal issues of an ordinance authorizing the
1.
2.
3.
4.

191
192
191
193

La.
La.
La.
La.

444,
775,
979,
419,

185
189
186
190

So.
So.
So.
So.

463
132
845
631

(1938).
(1939).
(1939).
(1939).
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issuance of certain refunding paving certificates were resolved
in favor of the legality of the ordinance.
The parish of Tangipahoa signed notes in payment for paving
work, part of which included the courthouse square at Amite.
After the work was completed, the plaintiff, a holder in due
course, sued on the notes. The parish defended on the grounds
(1) that the parish had not provided for payment of the notes
and (2) that the note holder could not enforce a lien against the
courthouse square. The Supreme Court decided against the parish
on the first point on the basis of the doctrine of estoppel and
against the note holder on the second point on the ground that the
lien on the courthouse square could not be enforced since the
square was public property. Turfitt v. Police Jury of Tangipahoa
Parish.,
In Harrison v. Louisiana Highway Commission6 suits by
property owners for injuries alleged to have been caused as a
result of the construction of a bridge at Shreveport by the State
Highway Commission were dismissed as to the City of Shreveport notwithstanding the enactment of an ordinance by the city
authorizing the State to construct the bridge. The familiar principle of law that a municipality is subject to the will of the
legislature and cannot be held liable for injuries arising from
performance by the State of what might otherwise have been a
municipal enterprise disposed of this aspect of the case.
Smith v. Police Jury of St. Tammany Parish7 held that a
police jury is not liable for injuries resulting from the defective
construction of a bridge, since in the building of the bridge the
police jury acted as an instrumentality of the state and shared its
sovereign irresponsibility for damages resulting from negligence.
A contractor who after having completed a public works
project deposits a bond in an amount exceeding by one-fourth
all statutory liens arising out of the work is entitled to full payment of the contract price notwithstanding the provisions of Act
224 of 1918, as amended by Act 271 of 1926. Those provisions of
law declare that if the authority having any public work done
under a contract should make payments to the contractor after
notice of claims for labor or materials, such payments "shall make
said authority liable for the amount of such claim." The court
5. 191 La. 635, 186 So. 52 (1939).

6. 191 La. 839, 186 So. 354 (1939).
7. 192 La. 214, 187 So. 553 (1939).
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stated that although the Act of 1926 did not specify that the
posting of bond by the contractors would release the authority,
nevertheless "the inference that that is the effect of the giving
of such a bond by the contractor is inescapable." Pitmann Bros.
Constr. Co. v. First Sewerage Dist. of Lake Charles."
An ordinance of the city of Shreveport requiring all operators
of public transfer service to post an indemnity bond in the
amount of $5,000 for each vehicle so used, was upheld as a constitutional exercise of the municipality's police power. City of
Shreveport v. Breazeale9
VI. COMMERCIAL LAW

A.

BANKING AND NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS

Removal of Directors of Homestead and Saving Associations
In Riviore v. Masling' the Supreme Court for a second time
in the same case 2 held that Act 140 of 19323 did not vest in the
board of directors of a Homestead and Saving Association the
authority to remove one of their members for failure to take oath
that he owned in his own right the amount of stock required for
a board member under that statute. The court pointed out that
this authority of removal for noncompliance with the requirements of the act was vested in the Supervisor of Homestead and
Building Loan Associations. Since the first decision in 19354 the
state legislature, through remedial legislation has changed the
original act, so that now the board of directors exercise those
powers withheld from them under the 1932 statute by the instant
decision.2
Set Off of Deposits in Liquidating Banks
A much litigated question was again raised in Brock v. Black,
Rogers and Co.6 The action was brought by an insolvent bank
against a lessee for rent. The court, following a well established
line of jurisprudence, held that the defendant could not set off
his deposits in the bank, since the rent had accrued after the
8. 193 La. 307, 190 So. 563 (1939).

9. 191 La. 1088, 187 So. 33 (1939).
1. 191 La. 282, 185 So. 25 (1938).

2. Rivoire v. Masling, 182 La. 731, 162 So. 580 (1935).
3. La. Act 140 of 1932, § 37 (Dart's Stats. (1939) § 744.51.
4. Rivoire v. Masling, 182 La. 731, 162 So. 580 (1935).
5. La. Act 337 of 1938, § 6, amending La. Act 140 of 1932, § 37 [Dart's

Stats. (1939) § 744.5]. See Hebert and Lazarus, Louisiana Legislation of
1938 (1938) I LOUIsIANA LAw RsviEw 80, 125.
6. 192 La. 49, 187 So. 51 (1939).
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bank had been placed in liquidation. 7 It further held that such a
set off would not be permissible, irrespective of whether the
liquidation was of a solvent or insolvent bank.
Recovery of Overpayments by Liquidator
In the same decision8 the liquidator was permitted to recover
from the defendant depositor on a claim for overpayment in the
distribution of the bank's assets. The defendant attempted to invoke Article 1846 of the Civil Code9 which provides that money
paid through error of law cannot be recovered if there existed a
natural obligation to pay it. In disposing of this contention, the
court said that there might be some basis for the defendant's
argument if the controversy were between the bank and its depositor, but that "there was neither a moral nor a natural obligation"'10 on the liquidator's part to overpay the defendant any
more than there would be to overpay any other depositor.
Method of Providing Penalties Against Borrowers in
Credit Unions
In the case of Post Office Employees' Credit Union of New
Orleans, La. v. Morris,"- a credit union organized under Act
40 of 1924,12 brought suit against a delinquent borrower to recover penalties prescribed by the board of directors, which were
fixed in the by-laws and approved by the State Bank Commissioner. The defendant contended that the penalties claimed by
the credit union could not be collected, since they were not provided for in the charter as required by the statute. Construing
section 1 of the Act as a whole, the court upheld this contention
and declared that it was necessary for the charter of the credit
union to either expressly enumerate the charges that would be
levied against the debtors, or expressly confer this authority upon
the board of directors. This decision is unquestionably sound, in
view of the fact that statutes of this type should be strictly construed.'8
7. People's Bank in Liquidation v. Mississippi & Lafourche Drainage
Dist., 141 La. 1009, 76 So. 179 (1917); Brock v. Pan American Petroleum
Corp., 186 La. 607, 173 So. 121 (1937); In re Liquidation of Hibernia Bank
& Trust Co., 189 La. 813, 180 So. 646 (1938). Contra: Beatty v. Scudday, 10
La. Ann. 404 (1855).
8. Brock v. Black, Rogers & Co., Ltd., 192 La. 49, 187 So. 51 (1939).
9. Art. 1846, La. Civil Code of 1870.
10. 192 La. 49, 187 So. 51, 53 (1939).
11. 192 La. 891, 189 So. 566 (1939).
12. La. Act 40 of 1924, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 745].
13. Llquidators of Prudential Savings and Homestead Society v. Langermann, 156 La. 76, 100 So. 55 (1924).
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Letters of Credit-Liability of Buyers
In Vivacqua Irmaos, S.A. v. Hickerson,14 goods ultimately
intended for defendant, Hickerson, had been invoiced and consigned to the Interstate Trust & Banking Co., in accordance with
a letter of credit previously issued to the plaintiff, Vivacqua
Irmaos, S.A., on the request of defendant. Simultaneously with
the shipment of goods, plaintiff drew a draft on the Interstate
Bank and attached the bill of lading. In accordance with the custom prevailing among importers, the bill of lading was turned.
over to defendant who, upon selling the goods, sent the bank a
check for an amount sufficient to pay the draft. On the due date
of the draft the bank was insolvent and unable to pay. This suit
was instituted against defendant to recover the price of the goods,
The court, in refusing the relief prayed for, emphasized the fact
that the goods had been invoiced and consigned to the bank; and
took the view that by so doing the plaintiff did not intend a sale
to the defendant, but contemplated a sale only to the bank, which
in turn was to sell the goods to the defendant. Judge Rogers concluded that no contractual relationship whatsoever existed between the plantiff and the defendant, and that the defendant
was not a guarantor of the solvency of the bank. 15 It is very
likely that this decision will be limited to the special facts found
by the court. In such transactions the goods are normally consigned directly to the purchaser with the bill of lading sent to
the bank as security; and it has been uniformly held by the courts
in other states that both the bank accepting the draft and the
buyer are primarily liable for payment of the debt. 16 Thus payment to the bank would not release the buyer of his obligation
to the seller in case the bank failed to pay as agreed.
14. 193 La. 495, 190 So. 657 (1939).
15. Rogers, J., declared: "The coffee was invoiced and consigned to the
Interstate Bank. The defendant never received any coffee from plaintiff..
The only coffee he received was from the Interstate Bank in which the
title to the coffee vested ....
Since the plaintiff was not willing to sell its
coffee solely on the credit of defendant, but only on the credit of the Interstate Bank, the argument that plaintiff required that defendant would in
effect guarantee the solvency of the bank is not convincing, nor do we think
that any such guaranty was within the contemplation of the contracting
parties." (190 So. at 659.)
16. Border Nat. Bank of Eagle Pass, Texas v. American Nat. Bank of
San Francisco, Cal., 282 Fed. 73 (C.C.A. 5th, 1922), cert. denied 260 U.S. 701,
43 S. Ct. 96, 67 L. Ed. 471 (1922); Greenough v. Munroe, 53 F. (2d) 362, 80
A.L.R. 797 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1931); Scribner v. Rutherford, 65 Iowa 551, 22 N.W.
670 (1885); Nowell v. Equitable Trust Co., 249 Mass. 585, 144 N.E. 749 (1924);
Bassett v. Leslie, 123 N.Y. 396, 25 N.E. 386 (1890).
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Depositor's Duty to Notify Bank of Forgeries
Act 163 of 1934, Section 1,1' provides that a bank cannot be
held liable for the payment of forged or altered checks unless the
depositor has notified the bank of the forgery or alteration within
one year after the return of the paid vouchers or notice that the
vouchers are ready for delivery. In Win. M. Barrett, Inc. v. First
8
this statute was held constituNational Bank of Shreveport"
1
tional, " and the plaintiff's suit against the drawee bank to recover
the amount of a series of checks with the drawer's signature and
the payees' indorsements cleverly forged was held to be barred
by failure to give the required notice. The court correctly held
that the statute was applicable to those checks on which both
the drawer's signature and the payee's indorsement were
20
forged.
Bills and Notes-Effect of Acceleration Provisions
The question as to who is a bona fide holder in due course,
for value and before maturity, was raised in Brock v. First State
Bank & Trust Co. 21 In that case the defendants, maker and guarantors of the note-sued upon, contended that the plaintiff had
not acquired the note before maturity. They relied upon a clause
in the mortgage given as additional security for the note, which
stated that although the note was to mature seven years after
date, it would also become due and exigible in the event that
the interest payable thereon became delinquent for a period of
twelve months. Such delinquency was alleged to have occurred
in 1931, prior to plaintiff's acquiring the note. Justice Higgins,
without any discussion of the point, overruled the defendant's
contention, and held that the twelve months' nonpayment of interest had not accelerated the maturity of the note. Thus plaintiff was considered a holder in due course for value and before
maturity, and he held the note free from any equities which
might exist between the original parties.
There has been considerable conflict in other jurisdictions as
to the effect of acceleration clauses upon the maturity of notes.2"
Earlier Louisiana decisions had followed the majority view that
17. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 675.1.
18. 191 La. 945, 186 So. 741 (1939), noted in (1939) 1 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
835.
19. The trial court had held the act unconstitutional on the ground that
its object was not sufficiently indicated by its title.
20. Note (1939) 1 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 835, 841.

21. 192 La. 77, 187 So. 60 (1939).
22. See Note in 34 A.L.R. 848 (1925).
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such provisions contained in a mortgage securing a note entered
into and became a part of the note.2 3 Thus the fact that the
acceleration clause in the Brock case was inserted in the mortgage, rather than in the note itself, would have very little effect
on the decision. Again, according to the more modern view, supported by the clear weight of authority, a note containing an
acceleration clause for nonpayment of interest does not automatically mature after default; but, such default gives the payee
or holder the option of accelerating the maturity if he so desires. 2 4
Thus, in holding that the note had not automatically matured by
virtue of the maker's defaults, the Louisiana court was following
a well beaten path of jurisprudence.
Maturity of Demand Note
In Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Holloway2 the court
held that a demand note negotiated within a few days after its
date, had been "negotiated within a reasonable time, 2 6 and the

purchaser became a holder in due course. Thus the plaintiff, the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, to whom the notes had been
pledged by such holder in due course had all the rights of said
holder against prior parties, and took them free from the defense
that the makers had signed solely for the accommodation of
another and had received no consideration.
There is considerable confusion in the decided cases as to
what is "an unreasonable length of time" in the negotiation of
demand paper. Various factors and circumstances, such as the
form of the note, the local custom or usage, the locality of the
parties, and the payment of interest, must be taken into consid23. Heirs of Williams v. Douglas, 47 La. Ann. 1277, 17 So. 805 (1895);
Robson v. Beasley, 118 La. 738, 43 So. 391 (1907); McIntyre v. Andrews, 17
F. (2d) 865 (C.C.A. 7th, 1927); Miles v. Hamilton, 106 Kan. 804, 189 Pac. 926
(1920); Durham v. Rasco, 30 N.M. 16, 227 Pac. 699 (1924).
24. Moline Plow Co. v. Webb, 141 U.S. 616, 12 S. Ct. 100, 35 L. Ed. 879
(1891). See also Chafee, Acceleration Provisions in Time Paper (1919) 32
Harv. L. Rev. 747, 761.
There is a minority view relying mainly upon a literal interpretation
of the agreement between the parties, which holds that, upon default, the
note immediately becomes overdue and a subsequent purchaser is not a
holder in due course. Hodge v. Wallace, 129 Wis. 84, 108 N.W. 212, 116 Am.
St. Rep. 938 (1906).
25. 191 La. 583, 186 So. 35 (1938).
26. Section 53 of the Negotiable Instruments Law (§ 53 of La. Act 64 of
1904 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 842]) provides, "Where an Instrument payable on
demand is negotiated an unreasonable length of time after its issue, the
holder is not deemed a holder in due course." (Italics supplied.)
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eration in deciding the individual case. 27 In ordinary cases the
courts have held that a period of time longer than four months
was an "unreasonable length of time" and prevented the transferee from being a holder in due course. 2 There is considerable
confusion in cases where the demand note has been transferred
within a period of from one to four months after its issuance. 9
The courts have been almost uniform in holding that. a negotiation of a demand note within thirty days is a transfer before
maturity.2 0 The few decisons which have not lined up with the
above generalization have been based largely on special fact
findings of the court.2 1
Right of Debtor of Insolvent Bank to Set Off a Deposit
In the case of Reconstruction Finance Corporationv. Tangipahoa ParishSchool Board,3 2 the Tangipahoa Bank & Trust Com27. Brock v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 187 La. 1078, 175 So. 673 (1937);
Kintyre Farmers' Co-op. Elevator Co. v. Midland Nat. Bank, 2 F. (2d) 348
(C.C.A. 8th, 1924), cert. denied 266 U.S. 635, 45 S. Ct. 226, 69 L. Ed. 480 (1925);
First Nat. Bank of Aspen v. Mineral Farm Consolidated Min. Co., 17 Colo.
App. 452, 68 Pac. 981 (1902); Franklin Bank v. St. Louis Car Co., 321 Mo. 199,
9 S.W. (2d) 901, 60 A.L.R. 639 (1928).
28. Negotiations were held to be after maturity in the following cases:
American Nat. Bank v. Patterson, 145 La. 995, 83 So. 218 (1919) (seven
months); Parker v. Tuttle, 44 Me. 459 (1858) (four months); Brophy Grocery
Co. v. Wilson, 45 Mont. 489, 124 Pac. 510 (1912) (five months); Grossman v.
Checila, 127 Misc. 151, 215 N.Y. Supp. 353 (1926) (one year); State & City
Bank & Trust Co. v. Hedrick, 198 N.C. 374, 151 S.E. 723 (1930) (six months).
29. The following decisions treated the transfer as after maturity: Kerby
v. Wade, 101' Ark. 543, 142 S.W. 1121 (1912) (two months); Stevens v. Bruce,
21 Mass. 193 (1838) (three months); Losee v. Dunkin, 7 Johns. 70, 5 Am. Dec.
245 (N.Y. 1810) (two and one-half months); Camp v. Scott, 14 Vt. 387 (1842)
(two months). The transfer was considered as before maturity in: Bank of
St. John v. Hibernia Bank & Trust Co., 189 La. 1, 179 So. 15 (1938) (ninetythree days); First Nat. Bank of Aspen v. Mineral Farm Consolidated Min.
Co., 17 Colo. App. 452, 68 Pac. 981 (1902) (three months); Weber v. Hirsch,
163 N.Y. Supp. 1086 (1917) (three months); Colona v. Parksley Nat. Bank,
120 Va. 812, 92 S.E. 979 (1917) (sixty-eight days).
30. Brock v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 187 La. 1078, 175 So. 673 (1937)
(twenty-five days); Seymour & Co. v. Artz, 5 La. App. 556 (1927) (two days);
Kintyre Farmers' Co-op. Elevator Co. v. Midland Nat. Bank, 2 F. (2d) 348
(C.C.A. 8th, 1924), cert. denied 266 U.S. 635, 45 S. Ct. 226, 69 L. Ed. 480 (1925)
(thirty days); Anderson v. Elem, 111 Kan. 713, 208 Pac. 573 (1922) (twentyfour days); City Nat. Bank v. Roberts, 266 Mass. 239, 165 N.E. 470 (1929)
(two days); Merrill Trust Co. v. Brown, 122 Me. 101, 119 Atl. 109 (1922)
(one day).
31. Thus, in Louisiana Mortgage Corp. v. Pickens, 182 So. 385 (La. App.
1938), the pledgee of a note was held to be a holder in due course, notwithstanding the fact that the note had been executed six years previously. The
court assumed, from the fact that semi-annual interest was provided for
in the mortgage securing the note, and from payments that had been made
on the principal, that "it was the intention of the parties that the maker
was to pay the note in installments." (182 So. at 388.) Accord: McLean v.
Bryer, 24 R.I. 599, 54 Atl. 373 (1903), where interest was paid monthly, before
and after transfer, for eighteen months.
32. 192 La. 1059, 190 So. 217 (1939).
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pany bought all the assets of the closed banks in which the school
funds were deposited. The school board accepted in settlement of
its frozen deposits twenty (20%) per cent in cash and eighty
(80%) per cent in certificates payable in 17, 29, 41, and 53 months
from December 19, 1932. On January 17, 1933, the school board
borrowed a sum of money from the Tanpigahoa Bank and gave
as security the certificates of indebtedness issued to them in the
transaction of December 1932. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation, having advanced funds to the Tangipahoa Bank, received
as security the matured notes of the defendant, with the attached
and pledged deferred certificates of deposit. Later, the Tanpigahoa
Bank went into liquidation, paying only thirteen (13%) per cent
to the depositors. The plaintiff, Reconstruction Finance Corporation, instituted this suit to recover the sum represented by the
notes. The defendant, school board, contended that the money
received and represented by the notes was not borrowed, but
merely payment of their frozen deposits in the closed banks,
whose assets had been taken over by the Tanpigahoa Bank. The
court refused to adopt defendant's interpretation of the transaction, holding that to do so would be to effect a preference over
the other depositors of the insolvent Tanpigahoa Bank.
The Louisiana courts have always been careful to disallow
any plea of compensation which would result in giving a depositor of an insolvent bank, who is likewise a borrower, a
privilege or benefit not enjoyed by other depositors." This rule
peculiar to Louisiana jurisprudence," is apparently based on the
assumption that upon the insolvency of a bank, the general depositors immediately acquire certain definite rights within the
meaning of Article 2215,15 which would be abridged by allowing

a plea of compensation.
B. BANKRUPTCY
Alimony not Affected by Discharge
In Parker v. Parker' the court followed the clear mandate
33. People's Bank In Liquidation v. Mississippi & Lafourche Drainage
Dist., 141 La. 1009, 76 So. 179 (1917); Brock v. Pan American Petroleum Corporation, 186 La. 607, 173 So. 121 (1937). See also Comment (1933) 8 Tulane

L. Rev. 423.
34. Other jurisdictions do not recognize such a limitation on the corresponding right of set-off. 82 A.L.R. 665 (1933).
35. "Compensation can not take place to the prejudice of the rights
acquired by a third person. . . ." Art. 2215, La. Civil Code of 1870.
1. 191 La. 559, 186 So. 27 (1938).
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of section 17, subsection a (2) of the Federal Bankruptcy Act,2
and held that a divorced husband's discharge in bankruptcy did
not release him from liability for alimony due or to become due
for the maintenance and support of his wife and minor children.3
C.

CORPORATIONS

Ownership of Corporate Property on Voluntary Dissolution
The case of Munn v. Wadley" raised the question as to when
the property of a dissolved corporation vests in its shareholders.
A foreign corporation had transferred all its real estate to the
plaintiff's predecessor in title, reserving mineral rights for thirtyfive years. Immediately thereafter the corporation had been dissolved in a voluntary proceeding, conducted out of court, in the
state of its domicile. More than nineteen years later, three former
stockholders of the dissolved corporation filed an affidavit setting
forth that one of their number had not reached majority until
1931; and that since she owned an undivided interest, the ten
year prescriptive period could not run against the reservation of
mineral rights in the property held by the plaintiff. The present
suit for slander of title, brought against the stockholders named
in the affidavit, was based on the theory that the mineral rights
in question had never been transferred to the shareholders, and
that the corporate right had been barred by prescription. In deciding in favor of the plaintiff, the court held that title to the
property of a dissolved corporation does not automatically pass
to the stockholders but must be formally transferred by the corporation acting through its liquidator or pass to them by virtue
of a judicial decree. Chief Justice O'Niell relied largely on the
analogous case of Screwmen's Benevolent Association of Louisi2. 30 Stat. 550 as amended by 42 Stat. 354, 11 U.S.C.A.

§

35 (1927). The

court pointed out (191 La. at 566, 186 So. at 30) that "This provision was
originally enacted in the amendment to the Bankruptcy Act of Feb. 5, 1903

(32 Stat. 797, 798, Chap. 487) and has been maintained therein ever since."
The amendment in 1903 was apparently a codification of existing law, for
in the cases of Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U.S. 340, 23 S. Ct. 757, 47 L. Ed. 1084
(1903) and Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 25 S. Ct. 172, 49 L. Ed. 390 (1904),
the Supreme Court held that alimony was not a "debt" within the meaning
of Section 63a of the Bankruptcy Act, and thus was not affected by a discharge of the bankrupt, not being a provable claim.
3. Accord:

Schlessinger v. Schlessinger, 39 Colo. 44, 88 Pac. 970 (1907);

Cederberg v. Gunstrom, 193 Minn. 421, 258 N.W. 574 (1935); In re Williams,

208 N.Y. 32, 101 N.E. 853 (1913); Egbers v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 98 Wash.

531, 167 Pac. 1073 (1917).
1. 192 La. 874, 1891 So. 561 (1939). See also section on Mineral Rights,
supra, p. 75.
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ana v. Monteleone,2 where the Louisiana Supreme Court had
held that a corporation whose charter had expired continued to
own its property until actual distribution pursuant to law.
Fully Performed Ultra Vires Contracts
In Reimann v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc.,3 the New
Orleans Public Service, Inc. entered into a contract with the
Fairmont Realty Corporation, Inc., whereby the public service
company agreed to extend its gas mains to serve a subdivision
being developed by the realty company. This contract had been
fully performed, and the realty company had received full benefits thereunder. The liquidators of the realty corporation, alleging
that the contract was ultra vires as to both parties, brought suit
to annul the agreement and recover payments made to the public
service company. The court refused the relief sought, completely
rejecting the plaintiff's argument based on the ultra vires nature
of the contract. In so doing it followed a rule, well established in
Louisiana 4 and other jurisdictions,' that if an ultra vires contract
has been fully performed on both sides, neither party can maintain an action to set aside the agreement.
Treasury Shares Subject to Franchise Tax
The necessity of strict and immediate compliance with the
requirements of Section 450 of the Louisiana Business Corporation
Act, where a reduction of the corporation's capital stock is intended, was forcibly illustrated in the case of State v. Stewart
Brothers Cotton Co., Inc.7 The defendant, a domestic corporation,
had authorized and issued outstanding capital stock of $1,000,000.00,
represented by 10,000 shares of a par value of $100.00 per share.
The stock was owned equally by three brothers in portions of
3333 1/3 shares each. In 1929 one of the brothers died, and an
2. 168 La. 664, 123 So. 116 (1929). Accord: Bailey v. Porter-Wadley Lumber

Co., 28 F. Supp. 25, 28 (D.C. La. 1939); In re St. Vincent De Paul Benevolent
Ass'n of New Orleans, 175 So. 140 (La. App. 1937).
3. 191 La. 1079, 187 So. 30 (1939).
4. Edwards v. Fairbanks & Gilman, 27 La. Ann. 449 (1875) (the completed

purchase of property, although an ultra vires act, transferred title to the
purchaser); Cook v. Ruston Oil Mills Fertilizer Co., Ltd., 170 La. 10, 127 So.
347 (1930) (agreement to indemnify contractor's surety could not be rescinded

as ultra vires after all the benefits of the contract had been accepted); City
Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Shreveport Brick Co., Inc., 172 La. 471, 134 So.

397 (1931) (a corporation was held bound by notes given in connection with
a fully completed loan); Sharfenstein & Sons, Inc. v. Item Co., Ltd., 174 La.
794, 141 So. 463 (1932) (a continuing ultra vires contract which had been
acquiesced in for several years was held binding on the corporation).
5. Ballantine, Private Corporations

(1927)

252, § 72.

6. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 45 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1125].
7. 193 La. 16, 190 So. 317 (1939).
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amicable agreement was reached whereby the estate of the deceased brother was to receive one-third of the corporation's assets
in exchange for the decedent's stock. The 3333 1/3 shares thus
purchased were delivered to the corporation; and, pursuant to
Section 23, II, of the Business Corporation Act,' became "treasury
shares" which could be disposed of either by sale to the public or
by a reduction of the capital stock. Although a cancellation of the
purchased shares and reduction of the corporate stock was intended, an amendment of the articles providing for the reduction
of the capital stock was not prepared and filed until late in 1935.
The corporate Franchise Tax paid during the years 1933, 1934
and 1935 had been based upon the par value of the remaining
stock held by the two shareholders (6666 2/3 shares) plus the current surplus (which after the purchase of the deceased brother's
shares ranged between $104,883.66 and $164,004.99 for Nthe three
years in question).
The State of Louisiana brought suit to recover additional
franchise taxes, penalties and attorneys' fees, alleging that
during those years the outstanding capital stock of the corporation amounted to $1,000,000.00. Justice Higgins, in an opinion
containing an excellent discussion of Sections 23 and 45 of the
Louisiana Business Corporation Act, held that the shares purchased from the deceased brother were still "issued and outstanding capital stock within the meaning of the Franchise
Tax Law," until they were "formally retired or cancelled, as
required by law for the reduction of capital stock."9 Justice
Higgins definitely stated that Section 45 of the Louisiana
Business Corporation Act provided "the only legal method
by which the capital stock of a corporation may be either
increased or decreased."' 10 Chief Justice O'Niell was impressed by
the equities of the negligent corporation and filed a vigorous dissenting opinion." He argued that the stock which had been purchased for the purpose of retirement could not be classed as
"outstanding" stock because such treasury shares did not con8. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 23, II [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1103].
9. 193 La. 16, 190 So. 317, 322 (1939).
10. 190 So. at 321.
11. 190 So. at 324, 325. O'Niell, C. J., concluded: "The neglect of the two
remaining shareholders to amend the charter of the corporation, and thereby
to give evidence of the reduction of its capital stock, is not a just cause for
computing the corporation's franchise tax on outstanding capital stock or
surplus which the corporation, in fact, did not have."
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stitute an actual "present liability of the corporation."'1 2 While
recognizing the merit of the Chief Justice's position, the writer
suggests that the majority opinion is a correct interpretation of
Sections 23 and 45. Section 45, IX, expressly sets out the procedure to be followed where it is desired to cancel the purchased
shares and reduce the capital stock. Thus, subjective intent to
retire is not decisive of the inquiry. The instant decision, in holding that treasury shares are "outstanding" for the purpose of
taxation until they are formally retired, is in accord with the
clear weight of authority in other jurisdictions that have similar
statutory requirements.'
Conveyance of All CorporateAssets-Creditor's Rights
Section 41 of the Business Corporation Act 1 4 authorizes a corporation to make a voluntary transfer of all its assets, but expressly provides that such conveyance shall not be in fraud of corporate
creditors, or of minority or non-voting shareholders." In Walter
v. Caffal' 6 a debtor corporation transferred all its assets to a
newly organized corporation. The only consideration received
was stock in the new company, which also assumed to pay all
obligations of its predecessor with stocks, bonds or promissory
notes. The court found that there was not a single dollar of new
capital in the new company, which was simply a reincarnation
of the old company "in a new dress";" and looked upon the
transfer as a part of a series of transactions, extending over a
period of twelve years for the purpose of holding at bay and
harassing the plaintiff and other non-assenting creditors. For
this reason it held that the purported transfer should be set aside
12. The same courts that have declared that treasury shares are not outstanding in the sense of "constituting a present liability of the corporation,"
have held them "outstanding for franchise tax purposes'" until formally
retired. Borg v. International Silver Co., 11 F. (2d) 147 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1925).
13. Borg v. International Silver Co., 11 F. (2d) 147 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1925);
Porter v. Plymouth Gold Mining Co., 29 Mont. 347, 74 Pac. 938 (1904);
Knickerbocker Importation Co. v. State Board of Assessors, 74 N.J. Law 61,
65 AtI. 913 (1907); Goldstein-Fineburg Co. v. State Board of Assessors, 83
N.J. Law 61, 83 AtI. 773 (1912).
The recent case of Kemp v. Levinger, 162 Va. 685, 174 S.E. 820, 826 (1934),
clearly expresses the majority view in the following excerpt: "The question
has frequently arisen whether or not treasury stock, that is, stock which
was actually issued but subsequently reacquired by the corporation, should
be included in the term 'outstanding' quoad the corporation and the state. In
such cases, unless the stock has been formally retired, for the purpose of
taxation it is usually held to be outstanding."
14. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 41 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 11211.
15. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 41, III [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 11211.
16. 192 La. 447, 188 So. 137 (1939).
17. 192 La. at 463, 188 So. at 142.
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as a simulation, and any property in the hands of a new company
should be seized and sold to satisfy the indebtedness of the old
corporation, as if no transfer had taken place. The case is in
accord with prior Louisiana decisions 8 and the clear language
of Section 41, III, of the Business Corporation Act.
FiduciaryRelation of Directors in Purchase of Property
In the case of Lawrence v. Sutton-Zwolle Oil Company,19
plaintiff, Lawrence, assigned certain oil leases to Sutton, Boudreau,
and Stone who constituted the entire board of directors of the
Sutton Oil Company. These leases were then assigned to the
Zwolle Oil Company, which was organized by the three above
individuals who again served as the entire board of directors.
Funds necessary to carry out the deal had been advanced by the
Sutton Company. The plaintiff sues to secure a cancellation of
the assignment of the leases to Sutton, Boudreau and Stone, and
the subsequent re-assignment of the same to the Zwolle Company; and to have the Sutton Company decreed to be the holder
of the leases. A shareholder in the Sutton Company intervened
and joined the plaintiff in his demands. The court decided in
favor of the defendant.
The court's disposition of the case is clearly sound; for-even
assuming that the Sutton Company might be entitled to the
leases, it was not seeking to assert any such right. 20 However,
Justice Fournet predicated the decision on the much broader
ground that the evidence did not establsh any duty on the part
of Sutton, Boudreau and Stone to acquire the leases for the benefit of the Sutton Company. 21 In so deciding he relied on the fol22
lowing quotation from Fletcher on Corporations:
"...whether in any case an officer of a corporation is duty bound
to purchase property for the corporation, or to refrain from
purchasing property for himself, depends upon whether the
18. The court relied (192 La. at 465, 188 So. at 142) on the leading case
of Alliance Trust Co. v. Streater, 182 La. 102, 161 So. 168 (1935), and authorities cited therein.
19. 193 La. 117, 190 So. 351 (1939).
20. Some thirty stockholders of the Sutton Company had intervened
alleging "that after hearing the evidence of the case they were convinced
that it was to the best interest of the stockholders of the Sutton Company
to have the Sabine leases developed by the Zwolle Company and prayed that
the intervention of Menuet be disallowed and dismissed." (190 So. at 354.)
21. 190 So. at 357.
22. Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations (Perm. ed., 1931) 175, § 861. (Italics
supplied.) See also Comment (1939) 39 Col. L. Rev. 219, for a fine discussion
of the cases where a director avails himself of corporate opportunities.
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corporation has an interest, actual or in expectancy, in the
property, or whether the purchase of the property by the
officer or director may hinder or defeat the plans and purpose
of the corporationin carrying on or development of the legitimate business for which it was created."
An analysis of the actual decision will best clarify this rule.
It has been held that a mere negotiation or desire for the purchase
or lease of property would not create such an expectancy in favor
of the corporation so as to bar acquisition of the property personally by its officers.23 But where it has been shown that the
corporation has expended money and effort in an attempt to acquire the property, the courts have recognized an expectancy."
It is well settled that the corporate tenant, in possession under a
lease, has an expectancy of renewal, even though it may have
no legal right of renewal as against the lessor.2 5 Where a director
bought a contract obligating the corporation to pay royalties on
patented articles it manufactured, the court held that an interest
"adverse to that of the corporation" had been acquired. 26 Again,
when the directors of a corporation with a prospering and expanding business organized a rival corporation, they were required to account to shareholders of the original corporation for
the prospective profits thus diverted. 27 In the instant case, the
mere acquisition of the leases by directors Sutton, Boudreau and
Stone, did not constitute a wrong. Add, however, the fact that
funds of the Sutton Company were used in carrying out the deal,
and it appears that the Sutton Company might well have asserted
that there was a breach of the directors' fiduciary relation when
28
the leases were not acquired for that corporation.
Suit Against Dominant Corporation on Subsidiary's Obligation
In State v. Gulf, Mobile & N. R. Co., 2 9 the State instituted
suit against the defendant for taxes alleged to be due under the
23. Colorado & Utah Coal Co. v. Harris, 97 Colo. 309, 49 P. (2d) 429
(1935); Pioneer Oil and Gas Co. v. Anderson, 168 Miss. 334, 151 So. 161
(1933); Tierney v. United Pocahontas Coal Co., 85 W.Va. 545, 102 S.E. 249
(1920).
24. DeBardeleben v. Bessemer Land & Improvement Co., 140 Ala. 621, 37
So. 511 (1904).
25. Lagarde v. Anniston Lime & Stone Co., 126 Ala. 496, 28 So. 199 (1900);
Robinson v. Jewett, 116 N.Y. 40, 22 N.E. 224 (1889).
26. Farwell v. Pyle-National Electric Headlight Co., 289 Ill. 157, 124 N.E.
449 (1919). It was also suggested that the corporation was entitled to the
opportunity to purchase the patent contract, being financially able to do so.
27. Coleman v. Hanger, 210 Ky. 309, 275 S.W. 784 (1925).
28. Comment (1939) 39 Col. L. Rev. 219, 227-229.
29. 191 La. 163, 184 So. 711 (1938).
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State Motor Fuel Tax Law.30 The defendant contended that the
tax was not owed by them, but by the New Orleans Great Northern Railroad Company. The facts set out by the defendant
showed that the N. 0. G. N. R. Co. was a corporation with 95%
of its stock owned by the defendant company, and operated under
practically the same managerial personnel as the defendant company. The gasoline in question had been consigned to the N. 0.
G. N. R. Company upon the order of the defendant corporation,
which paid for the gasoline but was later reimbursed by the N. 0.
G. N. R. Company. Upon these facts being brought out by the defendant, the State contended that even though the defendant
corporation was not actually the importer, it should be held liable
by virtue of domination and control of the purchasing corporation. District Judge Ott in a well written decision, which was
adopted in full by the Supreme Court, held that the allegations
of the State's petition would not support evidence of liability on
such a ground, and that the State had not alleged or given any
notice, in its pleadings, of an intention to hold defendant liable
because of its ownership and control of the N. 0. G. N. R. Corporation. However, the court indicated that the State might be
able to redraft its pleading and recover from the defendant, if
enforcement of the obligation was not available and effective
against the subsidiary.3 1 Judge Ott declared, "It is now the policy
of the courts, where the occasion requires, to look beyond the
mere technical separate entity of corporations where one corporation, by stock control of another, with interlocking directors,
and having the same general executive officers, operates the other
corporation as a mere agency or instrumentality of the dominant
corporation in the furtherance of business of the dominant corporation, and as a part of one system. 3 2 Thus the Louisiana
court clearly points the way to holding a parent corporation for
the obligations of its completely controlled subsidiary, where
necessary to prevent fraud or evasion of legal responsibility.
30. La. Act 6 of (E.S.) 1928, § 2, as amended by La. Act 34 of 1934, § 3,
as amended by La. Act 413 of 1938, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8807].
31. In November, 1932, the N. 0. G. N. Railroad Company was placed in
the hands of a receiver, the president of the defendant corporation, and continued to operate as before. About July, 1933, all its property was acquired
by a holding company, N. 0. G. N. Railway Company, organized by and composed of stockholders of the defendant. The holding corporation then leased
all the property acquired from the N. 0. G. N. Railroad Company to the defendant corporation, who has operated the road until the present.
32. State v. Gulf, Mobile & N. R. Co., 191 La. 163, 182, 184 So. 711, 717
(1938).
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D. INSURANCE
FIRE INSURANCE. The standard fire policy in force in Louisiana
contains two provisions1 intended to foreclose any claim of forfeiture because of the death of the insured subsequent to the
issuance of the policy but prior to loss sustained thereunder. The
converse question of the validity of a policy issued in the name,
but subsequent to the death, of the insured was presented in
Dutton v. HarmoniaIns. Co. of Buffalo, N. Y.2 Two reasons seemed to the court sufficient to resolve this issue in favor, of the
validity of the policy, under the peculiar facts of the case. First,
the insurer had failed to prove that the death of the insured prior
to the issuance of the policy had increased the physical or moral
hazard, as required by the Anti-Technicality Statute.3 Secondly,
by treating the policy as valid and adjusting a prior loss thereunder, as well as by making an ineffectual effort to cancel it subsequently, the defendant insurance company was held to have
waived any possible right which it may have had to treat the
contract as unenforceable from its inception.
Carbajalv. Bickmann4 was a partition proceeding in which
inter alia plaintiff rendered to defendants, her co-owners, an
account of her administration of certain property of which plaintiff had had possession under an invalid adjudication. During such
possession plaintiff had procured fire insurance policies on the
improvements on the property, in all of which contracts she was
named as the insured. Under the theory that this coverage
afforded protection to all owners of the property, the plaintiff, as
negotiorum gestor, was decreed entitled to charge her co-owners
their proportionate share of the premiums paid.
LIFE INSURANCE. In common with the majority of other states,
Louisiana has a statute 5 providing that the policy and documents
attached thereto constitute the entire contract of insurance; and
that no statement shall be used by the insurer as a defense unless
it be in writing and indorsed upon or attached to the policy when
1. "This entire policy, unless otherwise provided by agreement and endorsed hereon or added hereto, shall be void . . . if any change, other than
by death of the Insured takes place in the interest, title or possession of
Where ever in this policy the word 'insured'
the subject of insurance ....
occurs, it shall be held to include the legal representative of the insured ......
2. 191 La. 72, 184 So. 546 (1938).
3. La. Act 222 of 1928, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4191).
4. 192 La. 56, 187 So. 53 (1939).
5. La. Act 52 of 1906, § 1, as amended, by La. Act 227 of 1916, § 2 [Dart's
Stats. (1939) § 4113].
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-issued. In 1938, in Laurent v. Unity Industrial Life Ins. Co.," the
Supreme Court held that this act precluded an insurer from
proving that the reserve on the policy had been applied by the
'insured prior to his death to an indebtedness due the insurer.
Apparently, the decision in the Laurent case would prevent an
insurer from making any effective disposition of the reserve on
a policy except for extended insurance.
The natural consequence of such an unfortunate decision
was presented to the court in Oppenheimer v. PrudentialIns. Co.
of America.7 The precise question presented was whether, in the
computation of extended insurance, the insurer might deduct
from the reserve the amount of a policy loan made to the insured
prior to his death. Mr. Chief Justice O'Niell, who had dissented
Vigorously in the Laurent case, was the organ of an undivided
'court which resolved this issue in favor of the insurer. Stating
candidly his own inability to differentiate the two cases, the
learned Chief Justice recorded the opinion of his colleagues that
while the statute was controlling in the Laurent case, it had no
application to the case at bar. The principal case has gone far in
rectifying the error made in the Laurent case, but just how far
no one can determine presently. Complete clarification of this
phase of insurance law can only come with an express overruling of the Laurent case.
MISCELLANEOUS.

In Arkansas Fuel Oil Co. v. National Surety

Corporation"plaintiff sued its predecessor's branch manager and
the surety on the latter's bond. The claim was predicated upon
an alleged embezzlement by another of its predecessor's employees. Under the agreement between the predecessor and its
branch manager, the latter would be held accountable only for
shortages in stocks, equipment or funds, stolen during the existence of the contract by his or the company's employees. The
:defaulting employee had been in the employ of the predecessor
oil company both before and after the execution of the contract
between the company and its branch manager. Since the petition
did not allege that any certain or definite goods or stock were
embezzled during the existence of the contract, it was held not
to state a cause of action as against either defendant.
6. 189 La. 426, 179 So. 586 (1938), noted in (1938) 13 Tulane L. Rev. 150,
and criticized in The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 19371938 Term (1938) 1, LOUISIANA LAW Rzvizw 314, 409, 410.
7. 193 La. 170, 190 So. 369 (1939).
8. 191 La. 115, 184 So. 560 (1938).
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Many automobile casualty insurance policies provide that
the coverage does not extend to an accident sustained while the
auto is being operated by a person in violation of any state or
federal law as tQ age. Phillips v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co.'
upheld the validity of such a provision.
Jiles v. Venus Community Center Benev. Mut. Aid Ass'n' °
presented, in the main, factual issues as to whether the defendant
had breached its contract to furnish medical attention to plaintiffs' son. The plaintiffs alleged that their child had died as a
result of the defendant's failure to provide timely medical treatment, and the factual issues were resolved in their favor. The
only interesting question was whether plaintiffs could recover
damages for mental anguish unaccompanied by any other injury.
The court applied the well settled civil law rule obtaining in the
field of delicts, and awarded plaintiffs a judgment of $350 for this
mental anguish.
Questions of fact only were presented in Williamson v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York. 1 Weighing all of the testimony
adduced, the court reached the conclusion that the insured had
not become permanently and totally disabled and hence was not
entitled to recover disability benefits under his policy.
VII. PROCEDURE
Only a few of the many decisions of the Supreme Court in
the field of civil procedure during the past term were of more
than ordinary importance. The remainder presented interesting
applications of more or less rudimentary principles of adjective
law to the varied facts of the cases.
COURTS. A 1934 statute' creates a privilege on the oil well,
the lease on which the well is brought in and the drilling equipment employed, in favor of anyone performing labor, rendering
services or furnishing materials in connection with the drilling.
One section of this act provides that "any suit under this Act" may
be brought either in the parish where the well is situated or in
the parish where defendant is domiciled, at plaintiff's option. In
Rhodes v. Chrysanthou2 the plaintiff brought suit for $22,750 as
9. 193 La. 314, 190 So. 565 (1939).
10. 191 La. 803, 186 So. 342 (1939).
11. 192 La. 338, 188 So. 22 (1939).
1. La. Act 145 of 1934 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 5101.1-5101.5].
2. 191 La. 774, 186 So. 333 (1939).
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the balance claimed to be due on a contract for the drilling of
an oil well in Iberia Parish. A personal judgment against the four
defendants was sought, but as an incident thereto plaintiff prayed
for enforcement of his privilege on the well, lease and drilling
equipment, and obtained a provisional seizure of this property.
Defendants timely excepted to this suit brought in Iberia Parish
on the ground that they were domiciled in New Orleans, and that
hence the trial court lacked jurisdiction ratione personae to render a personal judgment against them. On appeal the court
affirmed the judgment of the trial court maintaining this exception and dismissing plaintiff's suit except insofar as it affected
the property subject to the privilege. The only suit which could
be brought under the act was one for the enforcement of the lien
created. Hence the statutory venue provision was deemed insufficient to confer jurisdiction ratione personae to entertain the
personal action. The language of the act was held not to indicate a
legislative exception to the general rule that every person must
be sued at his own domicile.
FORMA PAUPERIS. The statute3 which permits indigent persons to prosecute and defend actions in Louisiana courts without
paying costs or furnishing security therefor extends the privilege
to "a citizen of this state or . . .an alien . . .domiciled in this
state for three years." Local jurisprudence has not as yet offered
any satisfactory interpretation of the phrase "citizen of this
state." Lee v. Memphis Natural Gas Co.5 clarifies the situation
somewhat with the holding that a person who resides in Louisiana with the intention of remaining here permanently is a
citizen of the state within the intendment of the statute. The
opinion does not disclose whether plaintiff was a citizen of the
United States, but it seems safe to conclude that the court implied this requirement.
The forma pauperis statute also provides that each party to
compromised litigation is liable for the unpaid costs accrued prior
to the compromise. In Jackson v. Hart' the constitutionality of
this provision was challenged. A defendant had been ruled into
court by the clerk and constable to show cause why he should
not pay the costs the plaintiff incurred prior to a compromise. The
trial court's judgment was reversed by the Orleans Court of
3. La. Act 156 of 1912, as amended by La. Acts 260 of 1918, 165 of 1934, and
421 of 1938 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 1400-1404].
4. On this point, see Cadwallader, Civil Suits in Forma Pauperis (1939) 1
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 787, 788 et seq.
5. 192 La. 157, 187 So. 276 (1939).
6. 192 La. 1068, 190 So. 220 (1939).
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Appeal, 7 which held the statutory provision violative of the constitutional injunction that every law "shall embrace but one ob8
ject, and shall have a title indicative of such object." Under a
writ of review the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the
intermediate appellate court. The statutory provision was held
germane and incidental to the object of the legislation, whose title
offered a sufficient indication of its contents.
In the remaining case on this subject," a laborer earning $30
monthly, and having a dependent wife and child, was held entitled to the benefits of the statute.
EXCEPTIONS, RULES AND MOTIONS.

In McFarland v. Brother-

°
hood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen plaintiff's action
to enforce seniority rights was met with an exception to the service of citation. The defendant voluntary association had not
appointed an agent in Louisiana for the service of process, but
the plaintiff contended that the defendant was brought into court
by citation served upon the heads of the local lodge and local
division of the association. Since neither the local lodge nor local
division had any jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit,
this service was held ineffective. There being no other manner
in which process could be served, the suit was dismissed. Another
declinatory exception was filed in Geter v. Young" where the
defendant pleaded lis pendens in a suit to recover damages for
assault and battery. The same claim had been incorporated into
a reconventional demand filed by Geter to Young's action to recover rent. Since the reconventional demand had been dismissed
by the Court of Appeal prior to institution of the present action,
the exception of lis pendens was overruled.
The rule permitting cumulation of actions which are neither
12
inconsistent nor mutually exclusive was invoked in Brandin.
8
Slate Co. v. Bennett. The joinder of demands against the defendant to enforce his liability both as a member of a commercial
partnership and also as the guarantor of the firm's obligation, was
held proper. The exception of nonjoinder of indispensable parties
14
was maintained in Succession of Stafford where plaintiff had

7. Jackson v. Hart, 186 So. 747 (La. App. 1939).
8. La. Const. of 1921, Art. III, § 16.

9. Scott v. Shreveport Rys. Co., 192 La. 495, 188 So. 152 (1939).
10. 193 La. 337, 190 So. 573 (1939).
11. 192 La. 922, 189 So. 577 (1939).
12. Art. 151, La. Code of Practice of 1870.

13. 193 La. 89, 190 So. 342 (1939). The points of substantive law involved
in this case are discussed supra, pp. 62, 63.
14. 191 La. 855, 186 So. 360 (1939).

1939]

WORK OF LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT

139

named as parties defendant the special legatees under a will
sought to be annulled. Since these defendants had never been
brought into court by service of process, the exception was
maintained.
The exceptions of no right, and no cause, of action figured
prominently in a number of cases decided during the past term.
In Succession of Thompson", the executrix' tableau of distribution was opposed because it failed to list the opponent's claim
for money loaned decedent. This account showed an interruption
of prescription because of alleged payments made by the deceased during his lifetime. To this opposition the executrix filed
exceptions of no right, and no cause, of action, and prescription.
All exceptions were leveled at the failure of the opposition to
allege the existence of written evidence of the interruption of
prescription, and were based upon the rule that parol evidence
is incompetent to prove such interruption as against a party
deceased. The trial judge maintained the exceptions of no right,
and no cause, of action,' and dismissed the opposition. Under the
exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction" a majority of the Supreme Court overruled these two exceptions, vacated the trial
court's judgment and remanded the case for further trial. This
decision was based upon dual grounds: (1) the issue of prescription cannot be raised through the exceptions of no right, and no
cause, of action; (2) since it is not necessary for the pleader to
allege his evidence, the objection to parol evidence could not be
raised through the exceptions maintained by the trial judge.
Under Louisiana practice the exceptions of no right, and no
cause, of action are filed together ordinarily. At times the line of
demarcation between the respective functions of the two exceptions becomes vague and shadowy 8 and so the double-barrelled
remedy is employed to escape the unfortunate effect of a bad
guess as to which would lie. The exception of no cause of action
is triable only on the face of the petition; 1 while under the ex15. 191 La. 480, 186 So. 1 (1938).
16. Chief Justice O'Niell dissented, taking the position that for all practical purposes there was filed only one exception founded upon the proposition that since the claim was prescribed the opposition disclosed no cause of
action. Consequently, he was of the opinion that the trial court's judgment
disposed of the prescription issue and was correct.
17. This question is discussed infra, p. 148.
18. On this point, see Duplain v. Wiltz, 174 So. 652 (La. App. 1937), noted
in (1938) 12 Tulane L. Rev. 315; McMahon, The Exception of No Cause of
Action in Louisiana (1934) 9 Tulane L. Rev. 17, 28; McMahon, Parties Litigant
in Louisiana-III (1937) 11 Tulane L. Rev. 527, 533.
19. Succession of Thompson, 191 La. 480, 186 So. 1 (1938); Higginbotham
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ception of no right of action evidence may be admitted at its
trial. 20 In Phillips v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. 21 plaintiff
contended that the exception of no right of action would not lie
and the lower court erred in admitting evidence on the trial of
the exception of no cause of action. Timely objection to this evidence had not been made by plaintiff, so the judgment of the trial
judge maintaining the exception of no cause of action was
affirmed.
One case 22 differentiated the functions of the exceptions of
vagueness and no cause of action by invoking the settled rule that
the objection to the uncertainty of plaintiff's allegations cannot
be raised through the exception of no cause of action. Bates v."
Prudential Ins. Co. of America23 confuses the rules relating to
the two exceptions. No cause of action based upon an insufficiency
of material allegations was stated to be in reality an exception
of vagueness which was waived by a filing after issue joined.
The result reached by the court is clearly correct, 24 but its lan5
guage is believed to be unfortunateY
A peremptory exception may be pleaded for the first time in
the appellate court, 26 but a plea of the unconstitutionality of a
statute made for the first time on appeal will not be considered.
In Causey v. Opelousas-St. Landry Securities Co. 27 plaintiff unsuccessfully sought to escape this latter rule on the ground that
a plea of unconstitutionality is really a peremptory exception
pleadable at any state of the proceeding. The court might well
v. Public Belt Railroad Commission, 192 La. 525, 188 So. 395 (1938); Markham
v. Lacaze, 192 La. 285, 187 So. 669 (1939).
20. The cases on this point are reviewed in Duplain v. Wiltz, 174 So. 652
(La. App. 1937), noted (1938) 12 Tulane L. Rev. 315. A contrary statement is
made in the original opinion in Higginbotham v. Public Belt Railroad Commission, 192 La. 525, 188 So. 395 (1938), but the court necessarily overruled itself on this point on rehearing. Markham v. Lacaze, 192 La. 285, 187 So. 669
(1939) is illustrative of a line of cases apparently contra but which may be
reconciled easily. When no evidence i8 introduced on the trial of the exception of no right of action, the allegations of the petition must be deemed true
for the purposes of this trial.
21. 193 La. 314, 190 So. 565 (1939).
22. Moore v. Moore, 192 La. 2-9, 187 So. 670 (1939).
23. 192 La. 1029, 190 So. 120 (1939).

24. The decisions relied on by the court clearly support the proposition
that the petition may be amended after the maintaining of an exception of
no cause of action levelled at an insufficiency of material allegations.
25. The rule of the case, intended to further the liberality of pleading, will

not attain its objective. Instead of filing an exception of no- cause of action
levelled at an insufficiency of allegations, on the trial defendant will object to
evidence not supported by allegations in the petition. Then the trial court

will either have to permit amendment or maintain the objection and nonsuit
the plaintiff.

26. Arts 346, 902, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
27. 192 La. 677, 188 So. 739 (1939).
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have rested its decision on the ground that exceptions are not
28
available to a plaintiff.
Exceptions of res judicata were maintained in two 2 9 cases
decided by the Supreme Court during the past term. As both
decisions rest upon their own respective facts and no doctrine
of consequence was announced, no useful purpose will be served
by a discussion of either.
Rules to strike pleadings were likewise involved in two other
cases. In one ° the rule was employed successfully to strike out a
supplemental petition changing the issue after answer filed. In
Cox v. Cox31 the rule was discharged. There, plaintiff filed suit
to be decreed the owner of 156 shares of the capital stock of
George M. Cox, Inc. and for the cancellation of a stock certificate
evidencing ownership of such stock in the defendant, his former
wife. The certificate was alleged to be invalid on the ground that
plaintiff's signature thereon was a forgery, or, if not a forgery,
that such signature was obtained through the false and fraudulent
misrepresentations of defendant. The latter moved to strike the
allegations of misrepresentation from the petition because of
their inconsistency with the claim of forgery. The court found
that defendant had possession of the certificate and all the books
and records of the corporation. Consequently the rule was discharged because of the wide latitude allowed a pleader where he
has no knowledge as to which of two sets of facts are correct.
The effect of the filing of a motion to discontinue was considered in Succession of Jones.32 After executing a compromise
agreement, plaintiff signed a motion to discontinue the cause,
which was duly filed by defendants but not acted upon by the
trial judge. Subsequently plaintiff ruled defendants into court
to show cause why the compromise agreement and motion to discontinue should not be decreed void because of fraud in their
procurement. The trial judge took the view that the case was
dismissed upon the filing of the motion. On appeal the Supreme
Court reversed his judgment, holding that plaintiff was entitled
to a trial of her rule. The action was held not to be dismissed
automatically by the mere filing of the motion.
28. Possibly except when the defendant files a reconventional demand. Cf.
Woodward-Wight & Co. v. Haas, 149 So. 161 (La. App. 1933).
29. Carbajal v. Bickman, 192 La. 56, 187 So. 53 (1939); Succession of Fitzgerald, 192 La. 726, 189 So. 116 (1939).
30. In re Buller's Estate, 192 La. 644, 188 So. 728 (1939).
31. 193 La. 268, 190 So. 401 (1939).
32. 193 La. 360, 190 So. 581 (1939).
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Schutzman v. Dobrowolski83 presented an issue as to whether
the suit should have been dismissed because of its abandonment
by plaintiff. No action towards its prosecution had been taken for
five years since plaintiff had moved for a default. However, less
than five years had elapsed since defendants filed their answer
to avoid the confirmation by plaintiff of his default. Since the filing
of the answer was under stress of the necessity created by plaintiff, it was held to be a step taken by plaintiff in the prosecution
of the suit. Defendants' motion to dismiss because of abandonment was overruled. The position taken by the court seems
specious, but it is well supported by prior jurisprudence.
PRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE.

Ever since Louisiana adopted the

rule permitting parties to litigation to give testimony in the case,
interrogatories on facts and articles have been considered obsolescent to a large extent. Of late this remedy appears to possess a
reviving popularity, and in the past term seven cases8 ' decided
by the Supreme Court involved these interrogatories. The growing use of this cumbersome procedure would seem to indicate a
crying need for the adoption of an adequate discovery statute in
Louisiana.
Under the pertinent Code provision,8 5 answers to interrogatories on facts and articles may be rebutted. In Scurto v. Le
Blanc36 it was pointed out that this rule does not obtain where
parol evidence is prohibited and the answers are sought as a
substitute for written proof. Fontenot v. Ludeau" presented the
converse situation-where parol evidence is admissible. The
failure of a party to answer an interrogatory was held not to be
a judicial confession of the fact putting an end to the case. Only
a rebuttable presumption was said to result therefrom. It was
held permissible for the party to overthrow such presumption by
the introduction of parol evidence on the trial of the case.
TRIAL. The rule in Louisiana that the pleadings are enlarged
8
by evidence unobjected to was invoked in Hopei v. Madison
33. 191 La. 791, 186 So. 338 (1939), noted in (1939) 13 Tulane L. Rev. 637.
Another aspect of the case is discussed supra, p. 66.
34. Scurto v. LeBlanc, 191 La. 136, 184 So. 567 (1938); Fontenot v. Ludeau,
191 La. 540, 186 So. 21 (1938); Deshotels v. Ludeau, 191 La. 554, 186 So. 26
(1938); Fontenot v. Ludeau, 191 La. 555, 186 So. 26 (1938); McDaniel v. Ludeau,
191 La. 556, 186 So. 26 (1938); Fontenot v. Ludeau, 191 La. 557, 186 So. 27
(1938); Tate v. Ludeau, 191 La. 558, 186 So. 27 (1938).
35. Art. 354, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
36. 191 La. 136, 184 So. 567 (1938).
37. 191 La. 540, 186 So. 21 (1938).
38. 192 La. 593, 188 So. 711 (1939).
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One well recognized exception to this principle is that if the evidence is admissible on some point raised by the pleadings, and
hence could not be excluded, no such enlargement results. Under
the facts of the case, it was held that the exception, rather than
the general rule, applied.
A code provision 9 announces the general rule40 that a merchant's books are not admissible as evidence in his favor. In Love
v. Woodard41 the defendant's bookkeeper testified to certain materials sold plaintiff's husband, using defendant's books to refresh
his memory. This testimony was received without objection, but
when the books were offered in evidence it was contended that
they were inadmissible because of the general rule announced
above. The trial court's overruling of this objection was held not
to be prejudicial, in view of the plaintiff's failure to object to
the testimony of the bookkeeper.
It seems settled that where the plaintiff's failure to prove his
case results from defective pleadings, or from an excusable
failure to supply evidence which may be available on the trial
of a second suit, the judgment rendered should be one of nonsuit
only. State v. Gulf, Mobile & N. R. Co. 42 reiterates this principle
of a liberal procedure. Various questions relating to the taxing
of fees of expert witnesses were presented in McCoy v. Arkansas
Natural Gas Corporation.48 Defendant was held not entitled to
recover fees of experts who were regularly in its employ. Subpoenas for expert witnesses were not thought to be a condition
precedent to the right to tax their fees as costs. The code limitation 44 of the recovery of witnesses' fees and expenses to not more
than six witnesses was held inapplicable to expert testimony.
In cases involving more than $100, a note of evidence is not
indispensable to the confirmation of a default in the district
courts. 4 For different reasons, the same rule obtains as to default
39. Art. 2248, La. Civil Code of 1870.
40. For the exceptions to this rule, see Shea v. Sewerage & Water Board
of New Orleans, 124 La. 299, 50 So. 166 (1909).
41. 193 La. 251, 190 So. 396 (1939).
42. 191 La. 163, 184 So. 711 (1938).
43. 193 La. 238, 190 So. 391 (1939).
44. Art. 472, La. Code of Practice of 1870. La. Act 19 of 1884, § 1 [Dart's
Stats. (1939) § 1990] governs the fees of expert witnesses.
45. Ordinarily, the clerk is not required to reduce the testimony of witnesses to writing unless requested to do so by one of the litigants. Art. 601,
La. Code of Practice of 1870. The testimony must be transcribed, however, in
probate cases. Art. 1042, La. Code of Practice of 1870. When an appeal is
taken in default cases a statement of fact must be prepared by plaintiff's
counsel, or by the trial judge on the refusal of counsel to do so. If the latter
cannot or will not draft such a statement, the case may be remanded for
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judgments rendered by justices of the peace. 6 Stetson v. Webber 47 presented the question of whether a note of evidence is a
condition precedent to the validity of a default judgment rendered in the district court where the latter had jurisdiction concurrent with that of the justice of the peace. Because of the rigid
requirement of the controlling statutory provision," the question
was answered in the affirmative. A judgment rendered by default, where no such note of evidence had been taken by the
clerk, was held invalid. The result, though justified by the applicable positive law, appears unnecessarily technical and wholly
undesirable.
APPEALS,

AND

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

AND

PROCEDURE.

The

right of the plaintiff to appeal from an order rendered by a state
trial judge, permitting the removal of the cause to the Federal
District Court, was reiterated in Rhodes v. Sinclair Refining
Co.4" After the appeal had been sued out, the federal judge remanded the cause to the state court, and the defendant filed its
answer therein. The question having become moot, the appeal
was dismissed at appellee's costs.
The constitutionality of the luxury tax statute ° had been
challenged in Fournet & Sierra, Inc. v. Grosjean.1' Plaintiff appealed from a judgment refusing to enjoin the Attorney General
and the Collector of Revenue from proceeding against it under
the statute. Pending the appeal, the statute had been repealed
without any reservation of rights to continue the prosecution of
actions thereunder. Consequently the appeal was held to present
only moot issues.
The state constitution 2 confers upon the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction in civil suits "where the amount in dispute
further trial. Arts. 602, 603, La. Code of Practice of 1870; Francis v. Barbazon,
10 La. App. 55, 120 So. 427 (1929); Williamson v. Enterprise Brick Co., 178 So.
197 (La. App. 1938).
46. Cf. Art. 1085, La. Code of Pratice of 1870, as amended by La. Act 102
of 1898. On appeal, the case is tried de novo. Art. 1129, La. Code of Practice
of 1870.
47. 192 La. 148, 187 So. 83 (1939).
48. "The clerk, in rendering judgments . . . in confirmation of defaults
before him, shall make a note of all documents offered in evidence, and shall
reduce, or cause to be reduced, to writing the oral evidence offered ..
" La.
Act 223 of 1928, § 11, as amended by La. Act 222 of 1932 [Dart's Stats. (1939)
§ 1494].
49. 191 La. 189, 184 So. 720 (1938).
50. La. Act 75 of 1936, repealed by La. Act 2 of 1938 [Dart's Stats. (1939)
§§ 8648.4-8648.25].
51. 191 La. 186, 184 So. 719 (1938).
52. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 10 (3).
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...
shall exceed two thousand dollars exclusive of interest."5 8
A number of decisions involved the determination of this jurisdictional amount. In one case, 5 where it was sought to annul a
tax sale of immovables, the value thereof was held to be the
amount involved. Falgout v. Johnson55 applied the settled rule
that in a petitory action the value of the real estate is to be considered as the amount in dispute. The mere fact that this value
had been fixed at less than $2,000 in a judgment constituting one
link of plaintiff's title was held not to prevent the appellate court
from finding that its value was in excess of the jurisdictional
amount. In a third case,56 brought to recover earnest money deposited on a contract, the amount of this money, and not the
value of the contract, was held to control the jurisdiction. In a
fourth decision,5 7 plaintiff sued for $2,115.80 on a fire insurance
policy, and defendant disputed the insured's right to recover
anything. A mortgage on the property involved amounted to
$1,298.36, which plaintiff admitted the mortgagee might recover
if it intervened. Since no intervention was filed by the mortgage
creditor, it was held that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction.
Each new term of court presents questions involving the
timeliness of filing motions to dismiss the appeal. It is now settled
that if the latter are levelled at any defect, error or irregularity
in the order of appeal, or in the appeal bond, which does not
strike at the right to appeal, these motions must be filed within
three days after the return day. What "strikes at the right to
appeal" is a question which has caused considerable difficulty.
In Esparros v. Vicknair5 8 the failure of the trial judge to fix the
amount of the suspensive appeal bond was held not to be a jurisdictional defect. Hence the irregularity was considered waived
when no motion to dismiss was filed within three days. In Succession of Vatter5 9 the motion to dismiss the appeal was granted
even though it was filed more than three days after the return
day. There the appeal was prosecuted by the executors in their
official capacities, from a judgment disallowing a claim presented
by one of them individually. Since the objection was levelled at
53. Workmen's compensation and personal injury cases are excluded from
this constitutional grant of jurisdiction. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 10 (3).
54. Baker v. Duson, 192 La. 391, 188 So. 40 (1939).
55. 191 La. 823, 186 So. 349 (1939).
56. Richardson v. Charles Kirsch & Co., 191 La. 991, 187 So. 1 (1939).
57. Dutton v. Harmonia Ins. Co. of Buffalo, N.Y., 191 La. 72, 184 So. 546
(1938).
58. 191 La. 193, 184 So. 745 (1938).
59. 191 La. 875, 186 So. 597 (1938).
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the right to appeal, the motion was granted despite the fact that
it was filed more than three days after the return day.
A few cases presented questions concerning the procedure for
taking appeals. Perhaps the most interesting one is Hunter v.
Forrest,0 where the appeal was granted by the court after it had
been requested in a letter written to the trial judge by counsel.
The request was read by the clerk in open court and an order of
appeal was granted immediately. The motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that no motion had been made therefor in open
court was overruled. In Hunt v. Hunt "' the appeal was granted in
chambers; but since no citation of appeal had been issued or
prayed for, the appeal was dismissed. In another case,6 2 the motion was levelled at the failure to have citation of appeal issued
after the order for an appeal was signed in chambers. It was admitted that counsel for the appellee had agreed orally to dispense
with the formality of a citation. Because of this oral waiver, the
motion to dismiss the appeal was overruled.
A judgment appointing an administrator must be executed
provisionally, despite any appeal therefrom.63 In Succession of
Heinig64 the appellee sought to dismiss a "suspensive" appeal
from such a judgment, but the appeal was allowed to stand as a
devolutive one only.
In two cases it was contended that the appeal had been abandoned. In the first,65 the mere filing of a second suit on the same
subject matter in the Federal District Court was held not to constitute an abandonment of the appeal taken from an adverse judgment in the first suit. In the second case 6 the Supreme Court
applied the general rule6 7 that the appeal is abandoned when the
transcript is not filed in the appellate court within three days of
the return day.
In Succession of Gravolet68 documentary evidence not introduced in the court below was pressed upon the Supreme Court.
60. 193 La. 179, 190 So. 372 (1939).
61. 191 La. 362, 185 So. 284 (1938).

62. Police Jury of Parish of St. James v. Borne, 192 La. 1041, 190 So. 124
(1939).
63. Arts. 580, 1059, La. Code of Practice of 1870.

64.
65.
66.
67.

192 La. 388, 188 So. 39 (1939).
Hope v. Madison, 191 La. 1075, 187 So. 28 (1939).
Maurer v. Haefner, 192 La. 929, 189 So. 579 (1939).
The rule applies only when the appeal has been prosecuted to the ex-

tent that the appellant has filed the appeal bond in the trial court. Vacuum

Oil Co. v. Cockrell, 177 La. 623, 148 So. 898 (1933), and cases cited therein.
68. 191 La. 599, 186 So. 41 (1939).
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No consideration was given to this new evidence. 6 The proper
procedure in such cases is illustrated by the decision rendered in
another cause, ° where the case was remanded for the purpose of
receiving newly-discovered evidence.
Elchinger v. Lacroix,7 1 differentiating the effect of the remand
of a cause for further proceedings from that of the new trial, is an
extremely important decision. It was pointed out that in the remand for further proceedings the effect is to permit merely the
introduction of evidence on the points reserved by the appellate
court's opinion; while the effect of the granting of a new trial is to
throw the entire case open for submission of evidence.
OF JUDGMENTS. In Richardson v. Helis72 plaintiff
sought to make a California judgment executory in Louisiana.
Under California law, a judgment is barred by the limitation of
five years, unless supplementary proceedings are taken to revive
it. The running of limitations, however, is tolled by the absence
of the judgment debtor from the state. No supplementary proceedings to revive the judgment had been instituted in California,
but the debtor had left that state prior to rendition of the decree
and had never returned. Since the judgment was still exigible in
the state in which it was rendered, it was held enforceable in Louisiana under the full faith and credit clause of the federal Constitution.
ENFORCEMENT

CONSERVATORY WRITS.

In Ludwig v. Calloway7 3 the assets of a

commercial partnership were sequestered judicially to preserve
them pending the liquidation of the firm. The case is of interest
primarily because of its holding that movables, as well as immovables, may be sequested by the judge ex mero motu, and
without bond. No re-examination of the question was attempted
by the majority of the judges, prior jurisprudence7 4 supporting
the position being relied on. Mr. Chief Justice O'Niell dissented,
69. Under the provisions of Art. 895, La. Code of Practice of 1870. The

Supreme Court has original jurisdiction for the determination of questions of
fact affecting its own appellate jurisdiction. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 10
(2). This jurisdiction is rarely exercised, however. The court usually remands the cause to the trial court for the purpose of securing the necessary
evidence. Cf. Harnischfeger Sales Corporation v. Sternberg Co., 177 La. 373,
148 So. 440 (1933).
70. Intravia v. Dixie Homestead Ass'n, 192 La. 1087, 190 So. 226 (1939).
71. 192 La. 908, 189 So. 572 (1939).

72. 192 La. 856, 189 So. 454 (1939).
73. 191 La. 1000, 187 So. 4 (1939).
74. Schwan v. Schwan, 52 La. Ann. 1183, 27 So. 678 (1900); Bogalusa Ice
Co. v. Moffett, 188 La. 598, 177 So. 679 (1937).
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pointing out that the only pertinent code provision 5 expressly
limited the remedy to immovables. The rule that conservatory
writs are harsh remedies which can be invoked only when granted
by the strict letter of the law is too trite to require citation. Judicial sequestration, where the writ issues without bond, may be
the harshest of all. The decision of the majority of the judges
appears to be questionable.
In George M. Cox, Inc. v. Eddy 76 plaintiff corporation sued
for injunctive relief to hold certain stock in statu quo pending the
outcome of a suit between a divorced husband and wife. In the
latter litigation the ownership of the majority of the stock of the
plaintiff corporation was at issue. Because of this, defendants argued that the real question presented was the title to offices in a
private corporation, and that since quo warranto was available,
injunction would not lie. Finding that more than this question
was involved, the court granted the injunctive relief prayed for.
SUPERVISORY JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE.

The most import-

ant decision on this subject handed down by the Supreme Court
during the past term was Succession of Thompson,7 which created
the necessary precedent for a broadened exercise of the court's
supervisory jurisdiction. As a general rule, supervisory writs will
not issue when there exists an adequate remedy by appeal. 78 One
recognized exception to this rule obtains in cases where a trial
court is usurping jurisdiction.7 9 But in the principal case the supervisory jurisdiction was invoked in order to control the trial
judge's rulings on exceptions of no right, and no cause, of action,
and prescription. The majority opinion gives no indication that
the court was aware of this broadening of the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction; but the question must have been considered, for the dissenting opinion of Mr. Chief Justice O'Niell observes that the case should have come up on appeal and not under
an application for writs. Just what are the limits of this broadened exercise of supervisory jurisdiction cannot be determined at
the present time. Its unfortunate effect may be observed from the
case itself.1s
75. Art. 274, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
76. 192 La. 802, 189 So. 283 (1939).
77. 191 La. 480, 186 So. 1 (1938).
78. Noe v. Maestri, 193 La. 382, 190 So. 588 (1939).
79. Iberia, St. M. & E. R. Co. v. Morgan's L. & T. R. & S. S. Co., 129 La.
492, 56 So. 417 (1911); Gretna v. Bailey, 140 La. 363, 72 So. 996 (1916); Stewart
v. Litchenberg, 148 La. 195, 86 So. 734 (1920); American Surety Co. of New
York v. Brim, 175 La. 959, 144 So. 727 (1932); Plitt v. Plitt, 190 La. 59, 181 So.
857 (1938).
80. If the opponent had been forced to appeal, the executrix might have
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Mandamus was issued in two other cases. In one, 8' the trial
judge was forced to grant a writ of subpoena duces tecum which
he had previously refused to issue. In the other,82 the Supreme
Court required the consolidation of similar actions arising out of
the same transaction and presenting the same factual issues. Noe
3
v. Maestrig
held that mandamus could not be employed to compel
a trial judge to issue an injunction unless it was his mandatory
duty to grant the injunctive relief.
REAL ACTIONS. Four cases involved the procedure applicable
to the action of jactitation. In Sherburne v. Iberville Land Co. 84
the court pointed out that after the rendition of judgment requiring defendant to institute a petitory action within a given delay, it
was not necessary that the latter action be commenced in another
suit. Defendant may file a supplemental answer in the original
suit, making the necessary allegations therein as to his ownership
of the property. This rule is entirely different from the one that
governs the possessory action, where defendant must institute a
new suit if he wishes to put the title of the property at issue. 5
Consequently, in two cases8 6 where the defendants presented the
issue of title in their answers, it was necessary for the court to
determine whether the actions were possessory or jactitory. In
both, the actions were held to be jactitory; hence the court permitted the question of title to be presented in this manner. In the
fourth case,8 7 one of the defendants was an absentee represented
by a curator-ad-hoc. Since the latter could not and did not put
the title of the property at issue, the only judgment which could
be rendered against the absentee was one requiring him to institute a petitory action within a reasonable delay fixed by the
court.
In Tyson v. York88 the ancestor of the defendants in the petitory action acquired property owned by himself and the plaintiffs
jointly. The suit was instituted more than seven years after such
answered the appeal and thus raised the issue of prescription. The entire
litigation might have ended there. This possibility was precluded by the in-

vocation of the supervisory jurisdiction of the court.
81. State v. Meraux, 191 La. 202, 184 So. 825 (1938).
82. Riggin v. Watson-Aven Ice Cream Co., 192 La. 469, 188 So. 144 (1939).
83. 193 La. 382, 190 So. 588 (1939).
84. 192 La. 1091, 190 So. 227 (1939).
85. Art. 55, La. Code of Practice of 1870, as amended by La. Act 202 of
1920.
86. Crowell & Spencer Lumber Co. v. Burns, 191 La. 733, 186 So. 85 (1939);

Board of Trustees of Ruston Circuit v. Rudy, 192 La. 200, 187 So. 549 (1939).
87. Ludeau v. Jacob, 192 La. 902, 189 So. 570 (1939).

88. 192 La. 373, 188 So. 33 (1939).
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tax sale, and laches of the plaintiffs was pleaded as a bar to the
action. There had never been any renunciation of ownership by
plaintiffs, and no rights of third parties had intervened. Consequently, it was held that plaintiffs were guilty of no laches which
prevented them from enforcing their interest in the property. In
Esparros v. Vicknairl" the defendants resisted plaintiff's petitory
action on the ground that they had acquired a prescriptive title to
the property. Since the area of the land claimed to be possessed
by the defendants adversely could not be determined, the cause
was remanded for further proceedings.
In State v. Austermell"° the judgment specifically ordered the
cancellation of a notice of lis pendens filed by defendant. This
decree was held to cancel a second notice of lis pendens filed by
Austermell, although not specifically referred to by the judgment.
EXECUTORY PROCESS.

The cases on this subject decided by the

Supreme Court during the past term all raised questions as to the
validity of judicial sales of immovables made in the enforcement
of mortgages. In Morris v. Foster"' it was argued that failure of
the sheriff to serve the notice of demand and notice of seizure,
upon the defendant had vitiated the sale. A further ground of
invalidity asserted was that the property did not bring an amount
sufficient to clear the paving liens affecting the property and
which primed the mortgage. All of these defects were held to be
mere irregularities barred by the prescription of five years. 2 The
code requirement"3 that the property must bring an amount sufficient to clear all superior privileges and mortgages was held inapplicable to paving liens. The failure to observe the same code
requirement was invoked as a ground of nullity of the sale in
Markham v. Lacaze.94 Since the plaintiff's petition negatived the
existence of valid superior privileges and mortgages, an exception
of no cause of action was maintained.
In Williams v. Simpson9 5 the adjudicatees failed to pay the
price for which the property was sold to them, and acknowledged
89.
90.
91.
92.

192 La. 383,
191 La. 308,
192 La. 996,
Under Art.

188 So. 37 (1939).
185 So. 34 (1938).
189 So. 601 (1939).
3543, La. Civil Code of 1870. Under a recent amendment

this prescription has been reduced to two years, except where minors or in-

terdicted persons are affected. La. Act 231 of 1932, amending and re-enacting
Art. 3543, La. Civil Code of 1870.
93. Art. 684, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
94. 192 La. 285, 187 So. 669 (1939).
95. 192 La. 1022, 190 So. 117 (1939).
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their inability to do so. Upon the instructions of the mortgagee,
the sheriff changed his records so as to show an adjudication to
him, and a deed was issued in his name. Realizing the invalidity
of this procedure, the mortgagee subsequently instructed the
sheriff to resell the property, and at this second sale it was adjudicated to the mortgage creditor. Since the original seizure had
been released after the first sale and the sheriff failed to make
another prior to the second adjudication, the latter was held invalid.
90 the widow
SUCCESSION PROCEDURE. In Succession of Dancie,
of the decedent's son applied for letters of administration on the
estate. The right to be appointed administratrix was claimed on
the ground that she was the sole instituted heir of her husband,
the latter having inherited an interest in the succession of decedent
prior to his death. This application for letters of administration
was opposed by the remaining children of decedent, the principal
ground relied on being the contention that the Civil District Court
for the Parish of Orleans had no jurisdiction to probate the will of
the applicant's husband. Consequently, it was argued that the
probate thereof was null and the will itself without effect. After
going exhaustively into the testimony, the court concluded that
applicant's husband had acquired a domicile in New Orleans prior
to his death, and hence the court possessed the jurisdiction to
probate his will. A judgment ordering letters of administration
to issue to applicant was affirmed.

The decision in Succession of Tyler appears to have settled
the right of the executor named in a will to appeal from a judgment annulling the testament. A most ingenious argument was advanced by the opponents of the will to deny the executrix in the
principal case the right of appeal. Since the code9 8 requires that
a judgment appointing an administrator be executed provisionally notwithstanding an appeal, it was argued that upon the annulment of the will and appointment of an administrator, the executrix became functus officio and could not prosecute the appeal.
The court, however, pointed out that the executrix was under the
duty of maintaining the will if possible, and consequently possessed the right to prosecute an appeal from a judgment annulling
the testament.
96. 191 La. 518, 186 So. 14 (1939), noted in (1939) 13 Tulane L. Rev. 473.
97. 192 La. 365, 188 So. 31 (1939).
98. Art. 1059, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
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VIII. MISCELLANEOUS
Elections
Two cases worthy of comment are State ex rel Todd v. Mills,
and Sealy v. Iberia Parish School Board.2 In the Mills case the
plaintiff sought to contest the validity of an election in which he
was a candidate, on the grounds that by "incorrect and irregular
counts, tabulations and returns"' it appeared that his opponent
had received more votes than he did. An exception of no cause of
action alleged that the petition failed to set forth specifically and
in detail the grounds upon which the contest was based and the
irregularities or frauds of which complaint was made, as provided
by law.4 The court properly maintained the exception not only
on the grounds that the petition failed to state a cause of action
in that it merely set forth conclusions of the pleader, 5 but also
on the well settled principle that the returns of an election are
presumed to be correct and will not be inquired into by the courts
in the absence of specific allegations of fraud or misconduct.
In the Sealy case, which was a suit to contest the legality of
an election authorizing a bond issue, the court had occasion to
reiterate the rule that under the Constitution such actions must
be brought within sixty days after the promulgation of the result
of the election; thereafter, the legality of the bonds and of the
taxes necessary to pay same is conclusively presumed. 7 Accordingly, where the suit was filed after a delay of eighty-four days,
the defendant's exception of prescription was properly maintained.
Colleges and Universities
In City of New Orleans v. Administrators of Tulane Educational Fund8 a statute vesting authority in the administrators to
sell, lease or otherwise dispose of the property transferred to them
by the State in 1884, "in the case the board . . . should deem it
for the interest of the institution, to remove the University
1. 191 La. 1, 184 So. 350 (1938).
2. 191 La. 223, 185 So. 6 (1938).
3. 191 La. 1, 4, 184 So. 350 (1938).
4. La. Act 97 of 1922, § 27, as amended by La. Act 8 of 1934 (2 E.S.)
and La. Act 28 of 1935 (2 E.S.) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 2677].
5. See La. Act 27 of 1926 (Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1483]; Succession of
Stafford, 191 La. 855, 860, 186 So. 360, 361 (1939).
6. La. Const. of 1921, Art. 14, § 14 n.
7. La. Const. of 1921, Art. 14, § 14 n; Hardin v. Police Jury of Vernon
Parish, 155 La. 899, 99 So. 690 (1924); Chiara v. Lafourche-Terrebonne Drainage District, 159 La. 422, 105 So. 418 (1925).
8. 193 La. 297, 190 So. 560 (1939).
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to some more suitable location . . .-9 was held to sufficiently
authorize the sale to the City of New Orleans of an 18 foot strip
of land to widen the adjacent street. By so holding, the court
obviated the necessity of deciding the question as to whether a
poll of the members of the Legislature constituted sufficient legislative sanction to comply with the requirement of the original
transfer.10
Highways-Dedication
The dedication to the Louisiana Highway Commission of a
right of way for the construction and maintenance of a roadway,
was held to grant only a servitude since it was expressly understood between the parties that "this dedication and transfer...
is made for and shall be solely used for the construction and
maintenances of a public road . . .and for no other purpose. '"11
Thus a suit by the original grantor to force the defendant to remove a restaurant and bar built partly on the shoulder of the
road and partly on the plaintiff's property was successful. Defendant's contention that the building was partly on the right of
way granted to the Commission and that the Commission was
not complaining was rejected. The court held that since the Commission was without right or authority to use the right of way
for any purpose other than that specified in the act of dedication,
it could not authorize the defendant nor anyone else to do so.
Public Lands
A controversy as to the State's right to certain lands in Vermilion Parish was settled adversely to it in the case of Louisiana
Furs, Inc. v. State. 2 Several claimants traced their title to the
original grantee who purchased all the property in question from
the State in 1883. The present action was one to fix boundaries
and the State came in to attack the original transfer. It appears
that all this property is situated in two adjacent townships but
due to an error by the surveyor in locating the dividing line, the
area of one of the townships was actually less than that stated in
the plats, and there was a corresponding overplus of acreage in
the other. The State contended that it was entitled to this overplus. However, since both the original grants were parts of the
9. La. Act 94 of 1890.
the
10. La. Act 43 of 1884, § 2 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 2577]: "...
property, so transferred, may not be sold or disposed of, except under Legislative sanction."
11. Jones Island Realty Co. v. Middendorf, 191 La. 456, 185 So. 881 (1939).
12. 191 La. 964, 186 So. 840 (1939).
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same transaction there was no error in the total acreage and the
State's claim was dismissed.
Schools and School Districts
State ex rel Kundert v. Jefferson Parish School Board13 was
a suit by a teacher, who had been discharged in violation of the
Teachers' Tenure Law,14 to compel the defendant school board

to reinstate her. The Board's defense, that the plaintiff had failed
to make timely demand for her reinstatement and therefore was
guilty of laches,1 5 was rejected by the court on the grounds that
although suit had been filed eight months after her wrongful
discharge, she had promptly taken steps to obtain amicable
settlement.
A similar defense was also rejected in Andrews v. Union
Parish School Board.6 where the plaintiff brought suit for reinstatement forty-seven days after her wrongful discharge.
13. 191 La. 102, 184 So. 555 (1938).
14. La. Act 100 of 1922, § 48, as amended by La. Act 58 of 1936, § 1 [Dart's
Stats. (1939) § 2267].
15. Cf. Calamari v. Orleans Parish School Board, 189 La. 488, 179 So. 830
(1938); McMurray v. Orleans Parish School Board, 189 La. 502, 179 So. 834
(1938), where no action was taken by the plaintiffs seeking reinstatement
until after the expiration of an unreasonable time.
16. 191 La. 90, 184 So. 552 (1938).

